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 State responsibility is central to modern politics and international 
relations. States are commonly blamed for wars, called on to apologize, punished 
with sanctions, admonished to keep their promises, bound by treaties, and held 
liable for debts and reparations. But why, and under which conditions, does it 
make sense to assign responsibilities to whole states rather than to individual 
leaders and officials? The purpose of this thesis is to resurrect and develop a 
forgotten understanding of state responsibility from the political thought of 
Thomas Hobbes. 
 Chapters 1 and 2 examine the two dominant theories of state 
responsibility and propose a Hobbesian alternative. According to the agential 
theory, states can be held responsible because they are moral agents like human 
beings, with analogous capacities for deliberation and intentional action. 
According to the functional theory, states can be held responsible because they 
act vicariously through their organs, much as principals act vicariously through 
agents. What makes Hobbes unique is that he considers states to be ‘persons’—
entities to which actions, rights, and responsibilities can be attributed—even 
though they are neither agents nor principals. Hobbes’ idea of state personality 
relies on the concepts of authorization and representation, not of agency and 
intentionality, nor of functions and organs. 
 Chapters 3, 4, and 5 develop the Hobbesian theory of state responsibility 
and apply it to three sets of problems. Chapter 3 addresses problems of 
attribution, such as whether the actions of dictators count as acts of state and 
whether states can commit crimes. Chapter 4 addresses problems of identity, 
such as whether revolutions and annexations negate the state’s identity and 
hence its responsibilities. Chapter 5 addresses problems of distribution, such as 
whether the subjects of the state ought to bear the costs of debts and reparations 
that their state incurred before they were born. I argue that the Hobbesian 
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STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND CORPORATE PERSONALITY 
 
 
 State responsibility is central to modern politics and international 
relations. States are commonly blamed for wars, called on to apologize, punished 
with sanctions, admonished to keep their promises, bound by treaties, and held 
liable for debts and reparations. But why, and under which conditions, should we 
assign responsibilities to states rather than to particular individuals? 
 Our responses to many political issues depend on how we answer this 
question. Should the United Nations impose sanctions on North Korea, or should 
its sanctions target the state’s leaders? Would it be legitimate for Greece to 
default on some of its debts? Does the United Kingdom owe reparations to its 
former colonies? Issues of state responsibility are common, contentious, and of 
great consequence. 
 There are two contemporary theories of state responsibility. According to 
the agential theory, states can be held responsible because they are moral agents 
like human beings, with similar capacities for deliberation and intentional action. 
The model for state responsibility is an ordinary case of individual responsibility, 
such as a criminal trial. According to the functional theory, states can be held 
responsible because they are legal persons that act vicariously through their 
officials. States are principals rather than agents, and the model for state 
responsibility is a case of vicariously liability, such as when an employer is held 
financially liable for the actions of her employee. While the agential theory is 
dominant in International Relations (IR), Political Theory, and Philosophy, the 
functional theory is dominant in International Law (IL).1 There are also some 
critics in every discipline who see the practice of holding states responsible as 
‘guilt by association’ on a grand scale. 
 The purpose of this thesis is to reconstruct and develop a forgotten 
understanding of state responsibility from Thomas Hobbes’ political thought. 
Like proponents of the agential and functional theories, Hobbes considers states 
                                                        
1 I use ‘IR’ and ‘IL’ to refer to the academic disciplines. I use ‘international 
relations’ and ‘international law’ to refer to the subject-matter. 
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to be persons, meaning that actions, rights, and responsibilities can be attributed 
to them. States can be said to wage war, possess sovereignty, and owe money.  
What makes Hobbes unique is that he does not consider states to be agents or 
principals. Unlike an agent, the state cannot will or act on its own; it needs 
representatives to will and act on its behalf. Unlike a principal, the state cannot 
authorize its own representatives. States are in some ways similar to “Children, 
Fooles, and Mad-men that have no use of Reason”, who are “Personated by 
Guardians, or Curators; but can be no Authors” (Hobbes, 2012: XVI. 248).2 
Although the state is incapable of acting on its own, it can nevertheless exercise 
rights and incur responsibilities through the representatives that its subjects 
authorize to act in its name. Hobbes’ “Artificiall Man” is conceptually more like 
an artificial child or “Foole”. 
 I argue that Hobbes’ idea of state personality gives us a richer 
understanding of state responsibility than the agential theory or the functional 
theory. According to what I call the Hobbesian theory, state responsibility is 
structurally different from ordinary individual responsibility and from vicarious 
individual responsibility. Instead, it involves a complex triad of relations 
between the state, its government, and its subjects.3 Subjects are the principals 
who authorize the government; the government is the collection of agents who 
represent the state; the state is the person who is responsible for the consequent 
debts and obligations; and subjects, in turn, share the costs and burdens of their 
state’s responsibilities. As I argue throughout the thesis, no individual-level 
analogue can fully capture the logic of state responsibility, and analogizing 
between states and individuals often leads us astray. 
The Hobbesian theory has both theoretical and practical payoffs. First, it 
avoids the two traps into which critics and proponents of state responsibility 
tend to fall: reductionism, or treating corporate entities as aggregates of human 
beings; and anthropomorphism, or treating corporate entities as human beings 
                                                        
2 I cite Hobbes’ Leviathan according to the chapter number and the page number 
from the 2012 Clarendon edition. 
3 I follow Hobbes (2012) in using ‘subject’ rather than ‘citizen’, and I follow 
Williams (2005: 4) in defining the subjects of a state as the people whom it 
asserts the right to coerce. Some subjects, such as resident foreigners, are not 
citizens. Some citizens, such as expatriates, are not subjects. 
3 
 
writ large. Despite what Hobbes’ description of the state as an “Artificiall Man” 
suggests, he drew a sharp distinction between human persons and corporate 
persons. Because the Hobbesian theory captures the unique conceptual structure 
of corporate personhood, it illuminates many features of state responsibility that 
the agential and functional theories obscure. 
Second, the Hobbesian theory is conceptually and ontologically thinner 
than the agential and functional theories. Since it is built entirely from the basic 
concepts of authorization and representation, it eliminates the need for the 
metaphysics of corporate agency and for organic conceptions of the state. The 
Hobbesian theory explains how state responsibility can be understood and 
justified from the perspective of ontological and normative individualism. It 
therefore provides a powerful rebuttal against individualist critics who see 
corporate personality and responsibility as collectivist dogmas. 
Third, the Hobbesian theory is both realistic and critical. It applies to the 
world of varied and imperfect states in which we actually live, but it provides 
ample resources for criticizing the current practice of state responsibility. 
Although the functional theory applies to all types of states, it makes no 
distinction between liberal democracies and oppressive dictatorships. And 
although the agential theory does make this distinction, it applies poorly, if at all, 
to non-democracies. The Hobbesian theory applies to all types of states, from 
monarchies to democracies, but also allows us to distinguish authorized from 
unauthorized governments and representation from misrepresentation of the 
state. 
Finally, the Hobbesian theory translates readily into a set of practical 
guidelines and policy prescriptions. While the concept of corporate agency is 
difficult to operationalize, the concepts of authorization and representation 
provide a familiar and intuitive guide for our political and legal judgments. The 
Hobbesian theory is also versatile enough to help us grapple with technological 
developments, such as autonomous weapons, that challenge both our concept of 
the state and our concept of responsibility. As the state becomes mechanized, 





I.1 The Idea of State Responsibility 
 Many of our basic political and economic practices presuppose that the 
responsibilities of states are distinct from the responsibilities of individuals. 
Sovereign debt is one salient example. The debts of Greece cannot be identified 
with the debts of individual Greeks. The members of government who borrowed 
the money are not expected to repay it from their own bank accounts, and they 
do not take the debt with them when they leave office. As Skinner (2015) points 
out, ‘sovereign debt’ is “a stupid thing to call it—it’s state debt. ... Who is the 
debtor? Well you can hardly answer, ‘the government’. Governments come and 
go, but that debt doesn’t come and go”. Nor are Greek subjects the debtors. 
Although journalists sometimes write as though each subject of a state owes a 
fraction of its debt, this cannot be literally true, since Greece does not owe less 
money whenever one of its subjects dies. As Maitland (2003: 70-71) argues, the 
only way to make sense of sovereign debt is to suppose that the state is a 
“corporation” with its own moral and legal personality (see also Runciman, 
2000a: 95-97). Greece—not Greeks—owes the money. 
 State responsibility is a uniquely modern phenomenon. What makes 
possible the distinction between the responsibilities of states and the 
responsibilities of individuals is the “modern idea of the State as a form of public 
power separate from both the ruler and the ruled” (Skinner, 1978: 353). If the 
state were simply the rulers, then the responsibilities of states would be nothing 
more than the personal responsibilities of government officials. If the state were 
simply the ruled, then the responsibilities of states would be nothing more than 
the personal responsibilities of subjects. The issue of state responsibility arises 
only because we posit a corporate state that stands between the government and 
the subjects. 
Although ‘state’ and its cognates have had political usages since the 
fourteenth century, these terms originally denoted the status of the ruler rather 
than something separate from the ruler (Skinner, 2002: 369-70). The ruler’s 
state was his personal majesty or high standing. ‘State’ was alternatively used to 
denote the condition of the ruler’s domain, as in “the state of the kingdom” (Ibid. 
370). A semantic shift occurred near the end of the sixteenth century, and ‘state’ 
began to be used to denote an entity rather than an attribute (1978: 354-58). The 
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idea that the state is an entity that is distinct from both ruler and ruled was not 
fully developed until the mid-seventeenth century (2002: 394-404). Only then 
did it become possible to speak of the actions, rights, and responsibilities of 
states as distinct from those of rulers and subjects. 
 Although state responsibility is a type of corporate responsibility, an 
adequate theory of state responsibility cannot be deduced from a general theory 
of corporate responsibility. States have three features that distinguish them from 
most other corporate entities. First, states are involuntary associations. People 
typically choose to join universities and companies, but most people do not 
choose their states and cannot easily leave. Holding states responsible therefore 
carries a much greater risk of “misdirected harm” (Erskine, 2010; Stilz, 2011: 
191). Second, states are non-participatory. Even in democratic states, most 
people rarely participate in making laws and policies, and many people—
children, incapacitated people, and often prisoners and resident foreigners—are 
entirely excluded from the decision-making process. We might hold a committee 
or a team responsible for a discriminatory policy because each member 
participated in making that policy (Gilbert, 2000, 2006; Tuomela, 2007: Ch. 10), 
but participatory accounts of corporate responsibility do not apply to the state. 
Third, states are not subject to the principle of limited liability. While the 
personal assets of shareholders cannot be seized to satisfy the obligations of a 
corporation, the personal assets of subjects can be seized (as in the 2013 
‘haircut’ of personal bank accounts in Cyprus) to satisfy the obligations of a state 
(Pasternak, 2013: 364). I focus on state responsibility because it is a unique and 
especially difficult case. If a theory of corporate responsibility applies to states, 
then it should apply to other large, coercive organizations, such as criminal 
organizations and rebel groups. It applies a fortiori to more voluntary, 
participatory, and limited organizations, such as committees, charities, and 
universities. 
 State responsibility should not be confused with national responsibility. 
Although the two concepts are superficially similar, they involve different types 
of collective responsibility (Feinberg, 1968). National responsibility concerns the 
responsibilities that individuals have because of their national identities (Abdel-
Nour, 2003; Butt, 2006; Miller, 2007). For example, as Jaspers (1961) famously 
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asked, are the German people guilty of the Holocaust? National responsibilities 
are ‘distributive’: the responsibility of a nation implies the responsibility of each 
of its members. State responsibilities are ‘non-distributive’: the responsibility of 
a state is conceptually independent from the responsibilities of its members 
(Erskine, 2003; Lang, 2007). One could consistently say that Germany is guilty 
but that the German people are not, and vice versa. Whereas national 
responsibilities attach to each member of the nation, state responsibilities attach 
to the state as distinct from its members.  
I construe ‘responsibility’ broadly to cover both prospective 
responsibility (duties and obligations) and retrospective responsibility 
(wrongdoing and punishment).4 Prospective responsibilities prescribe what a 
state ought to do in the future; retrospective responsibilities concern a state’s 
past actions (Erskine, 2003: 8; Gilbert, 2006: 94-95). Whereas issues of 
prospective responsibility include treaty obligations and the responsibility to 
protect, issues of retrospective responsibility include economic sanctions and 
reprisals. Some responsibilities, such as reparations and apologies, are 
simultaneously prospective and retrospective. Claims about responsibility are 
essentially claims about what someone ought (not) to do or what someone ought 
(not) to have done. The central question of this thesis is why, and under which 
conditions, it makes sense to address ought-claims to states rather than to 
individuals.  
 
I.2 The Three Fundamental Questions 
 Any cogent theory of responsibility must answer three ‘Fundamental 
Questions’ about its subject. 
1. The Question of Ownership: How can actions be attributed to the subject? 
2. The Question of Identity: How can the subject be identified over time? 
3. The Question of Fulfillment: How can the subject discharge its 
responsibilities? 
 
Every judgment of responsibility depends on judgments of ownership, identity, 
and fulfillment. For example, the judgment that a person is guilty of theft 
                                                        
4 I use ‘state responsibility’ more broadly than it is used in IL, where it refers 
exclusively to retrospective responsibility for wrongful actions (ILC, 2001). 
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depends on three auxiliary judgments: (1) that the person who took the object 
intended to do so, such that the act of theft was his; (2) that the accused and the 
thief are the same person; and (3) that the accused is fit to be held responsible 
for the theft. It is both unjust and nonsensical to hold the accused responsible if 
any of these auxiliary judgments fail. We would not find the accused guilty of 
theft if he took the object by mistake (lack of ownership). Much less would we 
punish his identical twin for theft (lack of identity) or try to punish the thief if he 
were deceased (impossibility of fulfillment). Whether we hold the accused 
responsible depends in large part on our judgments of ownership, identity, and 
fulfillment.  
 The Fundamental Questions are perennial ones in ethics and law, 
although they are rarely posed alongside each other. The Question of Ownership 
involves issues of intent and representation, such as whether people are 
responsible for the unintended consequences of their actions and whether 
following orders mitigates responsibility (Estlund, 2007; Finkelstein, 2005). The 
accused might not be guilty of theft, even if he did take the object intentionally, if 
he were commanded to do so under the threat of force. The person who 
commanded him might instead be the ‘owner’ of the theft. The Question of 
Identity concerns the transmission of responsibility through time (Glannon, 
1998; Shoemaker, 2012; Weiss, 1939). Parfit’s (1984) “non-identity problem” 
implies that the ‘victim’ of the theft would have no claim to compensation from 
the accused if the theft had somehow caused him to exist in the first place. For 
instance, if, through some series of events, the ‘victim’ were conceived because 
his family’s fortune was stolen, then he would have no claim to restitution. The 
Question of Fulfillment covers the old issue of whether ‘ought implies can’, as 
well as more recent issues of whether a lack of motivation or feasibility 
precludes responsibility (Estlund, 2011; Gilabert and Lawford-Smith, 2012). The 
accused might not be guilty of theft, or might instead be excused, if he had a 
medical condition that impaired his impulse control. We might say that his 
obligation not to steal was unfulfillable under the circumstances. A great deal of 




 The Fundamental Questions apply to any theory of responsibility, 
whether its subjects are humans, nonhuman animals, groups, or machines. For 
example, there is a growing interest in the question of whether it makes sense to 
assign responsibilities to artificial intelligences (AIs), such as robots and 
computer systems (e.g., Bostrom and Yudkowsky, 2014; European Parliament, 
2017; Floridi and Sanders, 2004). One issue is whether AIs can ‘own’ their 
actions or whether ownership resides with the people who program them. Can 
we ‘blame’ a self-driving vehicle for running over a pedestrian in anything but a 
metaphorical sense? Another issue is how we can identify AIs over time. If we 
replace the navigation software of the self-driving vehicle, is it still the same 
vehicle? Yet another issue is how AIs can be held responsible. If a self-driving 
vehicle can act wrongly, then can it be punished? The Fundamental Questions 
apply no less to AIs than to human beings, although the answers will certainly be 
different.  
 A theory of state responsibility must answer the very same questions. I 
examine how the agential and functional theories of state responsibility answer 
the Fundamental Questions in Chapter 1. For now, I simply pose the questions.  
First, how can actions be attributed to a state? It is necessary to 
determine what counts as an ‘act of state’ in order to determine what states are 
responsible for. For example, was the 2014 missile attack on Malaysian Airlines 
Flight MH17 an act of Russia or simply an act of particular pro-Russian rebels? 
Russia cannot be responsible for the attack unless it is the owner of the attack. A 
theory of state responsibility must explain how actions of states can be 
distinguished from actions of individuals, despite the fact that states act only 
through individuals. 
 Second, as Aristotle (1992: III.3, 175) asked, “how are we to tell whether a 
state is still the same state or a different one?” Unless states retain their 
identities despite changes in their populations, territories, and governments, 
they cannot be responsible for what their antecedents have done. Britain cannot 
owe reparations to former British colonies, for example, unless it is the same 
state as the one that colonized them in the first place. A theory of state 




 Third, how can a state fulfill its responsibilities? Corporate entities cannot 
act on their own, so their responsibilities must be distributed to individuals in 
order to be fulfilled. The debts of states must be paid by their taxpayers, the 
treaties of states must be implemented by their legislators, state apologies must 
come from their leaders, and punishing states inevitably harms their subjects. 
The question, then, is what makes the distribution of responsibility legitimate. 
For example, why should Greeks bear the burden of their state’s debt? Many did 
not vote for the governments that borrowed the money, and some young Greeks 
had not yet been born when the money was borrowed. A theory of state 
responsibility must provide a justification for distributing states’ responsibilities 
to their subjects. 
 The Fundamental Questions provide a structured way to interpret and 
evaluate theories of state responsibility. The agential, functional, and Hobbesian 
theories answer each question differently, which makes the questions useful 
points of comparison.  
 
I.3 Back to Hobbes 
 Returning to Hobbes for a theory of state responsibility may seem 
antiquarian or anachronistic. Much has been written about state responsibility 
since the mid-seventeenth century, and Hobbes could never have foreseen 
contemporary issues of sovereign debt, economic sanctions, or reparations. 
Hobbes obviously does not provide all of the answers. However,  
he does provide some crucial but forgotten insights that help us to understand 
state responsibility in the present. His theory of state personality lays the 
groundwork for a theory of state responsibility. 
 One reason to return to Hobbes is that his theory of the state helped to 
make state responsibility possible. He provides one of the first unambiguously 
modern theories of the state, as well as the first systematic exposition of the idea 
that the state is a person. Skinner (2002: 404) points out that Hobbes, “more 
clearly than any previous writer on public power, ... enunciates the doctrine that 
the legal person lying at the heart of politics is neither the persona of the people 
nor the official person of the sovereign, but rather the artificial person of the 
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state”. Given that Hobbes’ theory of the state paved the way for the idea of state 
responsibility, we would do well to understand it. 
 Another reason to return to Hobbes is that his idea of state personality 
has no counterpart in the current scholarship on state responsibility. What 
makes Hobbes unique, as I explained above, is that he considers the state to be a 
person but neither an agent nor a principal. Hobbes’ state is a person “by fiction” 
(Runciman, 2000b; Skinner, 2007), much like a child or a “Foole”, which (unlike 
an agent) acts only through its representatives but (unlike a principal) cannot 
authorize its own representatives. For example, an incapacitated defendant in a 
trial can neither represent herself nor authorize a lawyer to represent her. 
However, if the judge authorizes a lawyer to represent her, then she is 
nevertheless a person as far as the court is concerned. The defendant owns the 
actions that the lawyer performs, such as entering a plea and cross-examining 
witnesses. The personality of the state is conceptually similar. Although the state 
“can do nothing but by the Person that Represents it” (Hobbes, 2012: XVI. 388), it 
can nevertheless be said to make laws, borrow money, sign treaties, and wage 
wars. The actions of the sovereign are attributable to the state, just as the actions 
of the lawyer are attributable to the incompetent defendant. The subjects are the 
principals; the sovereign is the agent; but the state is the person that owns the 
actions that the sovereign performs. 
Hobbes’ idea of the state as a fictional person might seem like nothing 
more than the ‘fiction theory’ of corporate personality applied to the state. The 
fiction theory dates back at least to Pope Innocent IV, who declared in 1245 that 
a corporate entity, such as a guild or a church, is only a persona ficta and 
therefore cannot be excommunicated (Dewey, 1926: 665-66; Kantorowicz, 1957: 
305-6; Koessler, 1949: 436-39). The idea that corporate personality is a fiction is 
now ubiquitous in politics and law.  
Although Hobbes might be considered a proponent of the fiction theory in 
a broad sense, he differs from other proponents of the fiction theory in several 
important ways. First, whereas most proponents of the fiction theory consider 
corporations to be creations of law, Hobbes sees the state as a precondition for 
11 
 
law.5 Hobbes’ state is a fiction, but it is not a legal fiction. He considers the state 
to be a pre-legal corporate person.  
Second, whereas the fiction theory carries the connotation that corporate 
personality is just a fiction that should not be taken too seriously, Hobbes reifies 
the fiction, calling the state both an “Artificiall Man” and a “Mortall God” (Hobbes, 
2012: Intro. 16, XVII. 260). Only in his earliest political work, and then only once, 
does Hobbes explicitly say that “a body politic ... is a fictitious body” (Hobbes, 
1999: XXI.4). Not once in Leviathan does he spell this out, even though his theory 
of personhood clearly implies it (Runciman, 2003b: 30). He downplays the 
implication that the state is a fictional person because he wants to emphasize 
that the personality of the state has very real and important consequences. 
Having a separate personality from the sovereign gives the state an “Artificiall 
Eternity of life”, or continuity over time, despite the deaths of individual 
sovereigns and members of sovereign assemblies (Hobbes, 2012: XIX. 298). For 
Hobbes, the fiction of state personality was the only thing that prevented 
subjects from falling back into the state of nature in every generation. 
Third, and most importantly for my purposes, Hobbes’ theory of the state 
is much more sophisticated than the present-day fiction theory. Hobbes does not 
simply maintain that corporate entities are fictions in order to avoid ontological 
commitment to collective entities. He also provides a well-developed account of 
attribution that explains how, despite the fact that corporate entities are fictions, 
we can legitimately attribute actions, rights, and responsibilities to them (see 
Fleming, 2017a). There are more and less plausible ways of representing the 
state, just as there are more and less plausible ways of representing a fictional 
character, such as Robin Hood or Harry Potter. The fiction of state personality 
cannot be used in any which way. 
Hobbes’ idea of the state as a fictional person was essentially lost in 
translation. Although “the Hobbesian view of the person of the state as the seat of 
sovereignty won immediate acceptance among a broad range of writers on 
natural jurisprudence in continental Europe” (Skinner, 2002: 407), these writers 
also abandoned the features that made this view of the state distinctly 
                                                        
5 More precisely, the state is a precondition for civil law, or human-made law. 
Hobbes does believe that natural law precedes the state. 
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Hobbesian. Samuel von Pufendorf, whose work was, “the most important conduit 
for the transmission of [Hobbes’] doctrine”, altered his idea of state personality 
in a crucial way. Whereas Hobbes thought the state was a fictional person, 
Pufendorf (1934: BVII II.13, 984) described the state as a “moral person”.6 
Skinner (2009: 349-52) takes this shift to be rather insignificant. He maintains 
that Pufendorf’s theory of the state is little more than an “adaptation of Hobbes’s 
fictional theory” (Ibid. 349). On the contrary, the shift from Hobbes’ fictional 
personality to Pufendorf’s moral personality marks a deeper, substantive shift.7 
For Hobbes, the state is a fictional person because it has no will of its own: “a 
Common-wealth hath no Will, nor makes no Lawes, but those that are made by 
the Will of him, or them that have the Soveraign Power” (Hobbes, 2012: XXXI. 
570). For Pufendorf, the state is a moral person because it does have a will, as 
well as an intellect that guides this will. He describes the state as “a single person 
with intelligence and will, performing other actions peculiar to itself and 
separate from those of individuals” (Pufendorf, 1934: BVII II.13, 983; see also 
Boucher, 2001: 566-67). One of Pufendorf’s crucial moves was to reify the will of 
the state. He thus popularized Hobbes’ theory of the state but stripped it of what 
made it distinctly Hobbesian.  
 The issue of whether non-rational entities can be persons illustrates the 
difference between Hobbes’ view of personhood and Pufendorf’s view of 
personhood. Hobbes thought there were “few things, that are uncapable of being 
represented by Fiction” (Hobbes, 2012: XVI. 246). Anything that has an 
authorized representative “can be a person, that is, it can have possessions and 
other goods, and can act in law, as in the case of a temple, a bridge, or of anything 
whatsoever that needs money for its upkeep” (1991: XV.4).8 Just as “Children, 
Fooles, and Mad-men that have no use of Reason, may be Personated by 
Guardians, or Curators” (2012: XVI. 248), “Inanimate things, as a Church, an 
                                                        
6 I cite Pufendorf’s De Jure Naturae et Gentium according to the book number, 
chapter number, and paragraph number, as well as the page number from the 
1934 edition of the Oldfather translation. 
7 Skinner (2015) later acknowledges this. See Holland (2017: 6-14, 83-91, 199-
207, 211-21) for a detailed account of the differences between Hobbes’ theory of 
the state and Pufendorf’s theory of the state. 
8 I cite Hobbes’ De Homine according to the chapter and paragraph numbers, 
which are the same for every edition. 
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Hospital, a Bridge, may be personated by a Rector, Master, or Overseer” (Ibid.). 
Even “An Idol, or meer Figment of the brain, may be Personated” provided that 
someone is authorized to speak and act in its name (Ibid.).9 Pufendorf, on the 
other hand, thought it was a mistake to ascribe personhood to non-rational 
entities. 
On this point Hobbes, Leviathan, chap. xvi, is mistaken in holding that in 
communities a man may frequently represent the person of an inanimate 
object, which in itself is not a person, such as a church, a hospital, a bridge, 
&c. For it is not necessary by a fiction of law to assign a personality to any 
of these things, since it is very much simpler to say that certain states 
have assigned to particular men the duty to collect the revenues for the 
preservation of such places, and to prosecute and defend any suits that 
arise on such account. (1934: BI I.12, 11) 
 
Pufendorf argues that ascriptions of personhood “should presuppose such 
qualities as are appropriate” (Ibid. I.14, 15)—namely, intelligence and will. For 
this reason, it was “sheer madness and silly impudence” for Caligula to make his 
horse a Roman consul and a householder (Ibid. I.15, 15-16), as it was for Hobbes 
to describe inanimate things as persons. Whereas Hobbes thought anything that 
had an authorized representative could be a person, Pufendorf thought only 
rational agents could be persons. In List and Pettit’s (2011: 170-73) terms, 
Hobbes’ conception of personhood is “performative”, while Pufendorf’s is 
“intrinsicist”. For Hobbes, the state is a person because someone speaks and acts 
in its name. For Pufendorf, it makes sense to speak and act in the name of the 
state only because it has a will and an intellect. Hobbesian persons, unlike 
Pufendorfian persons, need not have any intrinsic capacity for rationality or 
agency. 
Later ideas of state personality owe much more to Pufendorf than to 
Hobbes. Pufendorf’s conception of the state as a moral person was taken up by 
many others, including Wolff, Vattel, Rousseau, and Kant,10 and it remains 
                                                        
9 A contemporary example of a Hobbesian fictional person is the Whanganui 
river in New Zealand, which is recognized as a legal person and is represented by 
both the Maori and the Crown (BBC, 2017b; Hutchison, 2014). The Whanganui 
river can initiate court proceedings, assert its rights, and incur debts through its 
authorized representatives. 
10 See Holland (2011: 439-41; 2017) on the influence of Pufendorf’s idea of moral 
personhood on Wolff, Vattel, Kant, and others. See Derathé (1995: 397-410) on 
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common in Political Theory and IR to describe the state as a moral person (e.g., 
Vincent, 1989; Stilz, 2011; Wendt, 2004). What these disparate ideas of state 
personality have in common is that they take personhood to be a matter of 
intrinsic features rather than social ascription. Hobbes’ claim that bridges and 
idols can be persons falls strangely on modern ears because, like Pufendorf, we 
tend to take for granted that rationality and will are preconditions for 
personhood. Hobbes’ theory of the state has thus been thoroughly eclipsed by 
Pufendorf’s adaptation of it. 
Hobbes’ idea of state personality has no contemporary counterpart in the 
scholarship on state responsibility. In Political Theory, IR, and Philosophy, it has 
been supplanted by the idea of the state as a moral agent. In IL, it has been 
supplanted by the idea of the state as a functional legal person. However, there 
was one previous attempt to understand state responsibility in Hobbesian terms. 
E. H. Carr (1946) approvingly cites Hobbes in (of all places) his chapter titled 
“International Morality” in The Twenty Years’ Crisis. He describes Hobbes’ idea of 
state personality as “an important step forward”, which “made possible the 
creation of international law on the basis of natural law” (Ibid. 146). Hobbes’ 
theory of the state helps to explain how states can have responsibilities—not just 
legal responsibilities, but moral responsibilities: “States could be assumed to 
have duties to one another only in virtue of the fiction which treated them as if 
they were persons” (Ibid.). For Carr, as for Hobbes, the personality of the state is 
“a necessary fiction” (Ibid.). It is a fiction because it has no factual or 
metaphysical basis, but it is necessary because it underpins sovereign debts, 
treaty obligations, and other corporate responsibilities (Ibid. 149-51). Carr even 
describes the process of attribution in Hobbesian terms: “The acts with which 
international morality is concerned are performed by individuals not on their 
own behalf, but on behalf of those fictitious group persons ‘Great Britain’ and 
‘Italy’” (Ibid. 152). Attribution is a product of representation, not of agency, will, 
or function. 
The only significant difference between Carr and Hobbes is one of 
emphasis. Whereas Hobbes downplays the fictional character of the state, Carr 
                                                                                                                                                              




emphasizes it. His primary aim in doing so is to discredit “utopian thinkers”, who 
“reject [state personality] with fervour, and are consequently led to deny that 
morality can be attributed to the state” (Ibid. 148). Carr’s response is that the 
“controversy about the attribution of personality to the state is not only 
misleading, but meaningless” (Ibid. 148). The utopians have made the same 
mistake as the ‘real personality’ theorists (perhaps Otto von Gierke and the 
British Idealists), which is to assume that the question of whether states are 
persons can be answered by metaphysics. As he later adds, “[t]he hypothesis of 
state personality and state responsibility is neither true nor false, because it does 
not purport to be a fact, but a category of thought necessary to clear thinking 
about international relations” (Ibid. 150). What drew Carr to Hobbes’ idea of 
state personality is that it carries no metaphysical baggage. 
Oddly, although Carr occupies a central place in the IR canon, his 
discussion of state personality and responsibility has been almost entirely 
overlooked in the contemporary literature on these subjects. One of the few 
passing mentions comes from Wendt (1999: 196), who invokes Carr to support 
his own theory of state personality: “As Carr points out, it would be impossible to 
make sense of day-to-day IR without attributions of corporate actorhood”. The 
irony is that Wendt’s theory, which aims to provide a metaphysical foundation 
for state personality, is exactly the kind of theory that Carr aimed to discredit. 
Carr’s Hobbesian way of thinking about state responsibility has been misread on 
the rare occasions when it has been read at all. What follows can be understood 
as an attempt to pick up where Carr left off—to develop a ‘political’ theory of 
state responsibility using Hobbes’ theory of political representation. Although 
Carr’s remarks on state responsibility are intriguing and suggestive, they are also 
brief and polemical, so they leave many important questions unanswered. 
 
I.4 The Structure of the Thesis 
 The thesis has five chapters. Chapter 1 reviews the agential and functional 
theories of state responsibility and argues that neither provides adequate 
answers to the Fundamental Questions. At best, the ‘agent’ and ‘principal’ models 
give us an incomplete set of answers. At worst, they blind us to important 
features of state responsibility. 
16 
 
 Chapter 2 lays the groundwork for the Hobbesian theory of state 
responsibility. It explores what exactly Hobbes means when he says that the 
state is a person. Scholars of state and corporate responsibility, and even many 
Hobbes scholars, have failed to appreciate the novelty of Hobbes’ idea of state 
personality because they have projected the idea of corporate agency back onto 
Hobbes. I argue that we can recover an entirely different understanding of state 
responsibility from Hobbes if we resist this urge to project backward.  
The next three chapters develop the Hobbesian answers to the Three 
Fundamental Questions. Chapter 3 addresses issues of ownership, such as 
whether the actions of dictators and rogue officials ought to be attributed to 
states and whether states can commit crimes. I show that, with some 
modifications, Hobbes’ account of attribution provides an intuitive and 
compelling answer to the Question of Ownership: an action counts as an act of 
state if and only if the agent who performed it was an authorized representative 
of the state. Much of the chapter focuses on the conditions for authorization and 
representation. 
 Chapter 4 addresses issues of identity, such as whether changes in a 
state’s population, territory, government, or constitution negate its personality 
and hence its responsibilities. According to Hobbes, the corporate identity of the 
state is created and sustained by representation. The state has a corporate 
identity because it has an authorized representative who speaks and acts in its 
name. This identity persists as long as the state has a continuous ‘chain of 
succession’, or an unbroken series of representatives. I show that this Hobbesian 
account of corporate identity solves many of the identity problems that arise in 
cases of revolution, annexation, secession, absorption, unification, and 
dissolution. 
 Chapter 5 addresses issues of fulfillment, such as why subjects ought to 
bear the costs of their state’s debts and reparative obligations. I focus on 
intergenerational distributions of liability—for instance, distributing the Greek 
debt to subjects who had not yet been born when the government borrowed the 
money. I use Hobbes’ idea of “representation by fiction” to explain how subjects 
can be implicated in acts of state that occurred before they were born. 
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 The Conclusion summarizes the argument and then looks to the future. 
There are three ongoing trends that are likely to alter both the nature and the 
scope of state responsibility: the development of international criminal law; the 
proliferation of treaties; and the replacement of human representatives with 
machines and algorithms. Although the practice of holding individuals 
responsible for acts of state might seem to render state responsibility redundant, 
I argue that the rise of international criminal law will not lead to the decline of 
state responsibility. The two forms of international responsibility are 
complementary rather than competitive. If anything, the domain of state 
responsibility will continue to expand in the coming decades because of the 
proliferation of treaties. As states continue to sign bilateral and multilateral 
treaties about everything from investor protection to environmental protection, 
domestic policymaking will increasingly be circumscribed by international 
agreements, and political decisions will increasingly be made by international 
arbitration rather than domestic legislation. A sovereigntist backlash is already 
underway. 
 New technologies pose the greatest challenge to current understandings 
of state responsibility. Our theories of state responsibility are designed for a 
world in which the ‘members’ or ‘organs’ of states are flesh-and-blood human 
beings. But states are becoming “internally mechanized” (Matwyshyn, 2010) as 
they rely more and more on algorithms to make decisions and on machines to 
execute them. Hobbes’ theory of the state, which is mechanistic to begin with, is 














THE AGENTIAL AND FUNCTIONAL THEORIES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 
 
 
 The aim of this chapter is to distinguish, compare, and evaluate the two 
dominant theories of state responsibility. According to the agential theory, states 
can be held responsible because they are moral agents like human beings. The 
model for state responsibility is an ordinary case of individual responsibility, 
such as a criminal trial. According to the functional theory, states are principals 
rather than agents. The model for state responsibility is a case of vicarious 
liability, such as when an employer is held liable for the actions of her employee. 
The primary distinction between the two theories of state responsibility is that 
they rely on different understandings of how corporate entities can act.  
The agential and functional theories belong to parallel traditions of 
scholarship that often appear to be unaware of each other. While the agential 
theory is dominant in IR, Political Theory, and Philosophy, the functional theory 
prevails in IL. Those on opposite sides of the ethical-legal division ask many of 
the same questions, but they tend to talk past each other because they employ 
different concepts and vocabularies.11  
This chapter uses the Three Fundamental Questions to reconstruct and 
interrogate the agential and functional theories. I argue that neither provides an 
adequate set of answers. While the ‘agent’ and ‘principal’ models of state 
responsibility are useful in some respects, each has important gaps and blind 
spots. Subsequent chapters will explain how the Hobbesian theory fills these 
gaps and show that it provides a better set of answers to the Fundamental 
Questions. 
 
1.1 States as Moral Agents: The Agential Theory  
 The core idea of the agential theory is that states can be held responsible 
for the same reasons that human beings are held responsible. Goodin (1995: 35) 
argues that “the state is a moral agent, in all the respects that morally matter”. 
                                                        
11 I have elsewhere tried to bridge the gap between ethical and legal approaches 
to state responsibility (Fleming, 2017b).  
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The state, “like the natural individual, is capable of embodying values, goals and 
ends; it, too, is capable (through its legislative and executive organs) of 
deliberative action in pursuit of them” (Ibid.). Erskine (2001: 69-70) argues that 
the disanalogy between states and human beings “is often over-stated” and that 
states are “capable of acting and knowing in a way that is analogous—but not 
identical—to that of most individual human beings”. Because states are capable 
of deliberating and of acting intentionally, they are “moral agents in the same 
way that we understand most individual human beings to be moral agents” 
(Erskine, 2008: 2).12  
The agential theory was developed by philosophers, most notably Peter 
French (1979, 1984, 1995, 1998), and later adopted by political theorists and IR 
scholars.13 French argues that certain groups, which he calls “conglomerate 
collectivities”, are moral agents over and above their members and can therefore 
be held responsible separately from their members.14 Conglomerate collectivities 
have two defining features: (1) corporate identities that do not depend on 
determinate memberships and (2) corporate internal decision (CID) structures. 
First, unlike “aggregate collectivities” such as a mobs and crowds, conglomerates 
retain their identities despite changes in their memberships (French, 1984: 29-
30). Ireland is the same state as it was yesterday even though some of its 
members have died and others have been born, and Microsoft remains the same 
company over time even though its employees and shareholders change. Second, 
conglomerate collectivities have CID structures that allow them to deliberate and 
to combine the intentions of individuals into corporate intentions (Ibid. 47-48). 
We might say that Ireland intends to raise taxes or that Microsoft intends to 
develop a new operating system. French concludes that conglomerate 
                                                        
12 The agential theory could alternatively be called the 'analogical theory' 
because it relies so heavily on the analogy between states and human beings. I 
call it 'agential' to emphasize the connection with 'moral agency'. 
13 French belongs to an analytic and mostly American tradition of thought about 
collective action and responsibility. Seminal works include Feinberg (1968), 
Cooper (1968), and Held (1970). 
14 French (1979, 1984) calls conglomerate collectivities “moral persons” in his 
early work but “moral actors” in his later work (1995, 1998). The reason for this 
terminological change is that he came to think “calling corporations moral 
persons creates more confusion and misunderstanding than clarity” (1995: 10, 
emphasis added). His argument remains substantially the same throughout. 
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collectivities, such as states and corporations, are distinct agents that can be 
blamed, praised, punished, and obligated separately from their members. In an 
often-quoted phrase that sums up his argument, he declares that corporate 
agents are “full-fledged members of the moral community, of equal standing with 
the traditionally acknowledged residents: human beings” (Ibid. 32). 
 O’Neill (1986) was the first to apply the agential theory to ethical issues in 
international affairs. She argues that many international ethical issues are 
intractable if individuals are assumed to be the only moral agents (Ibid. 51-53). 
“Individuals have remarkably few options to reduce nuclear dangers” (Ibid. 55), 
so it is futile to say that they have duties to prevent nuclear war. Many 
responsibilities, such as duties to prevent war or climate change, must be 
assigned to states because states are the only agents with the capacities to act on 
them. The key premise of O’Neill’s argument is that “some institutions may be 
agents in the literal and unmetaphorical way in which individuals are agents” 
(Ibid. 58). She argues that “the two sorts of agents are similar enough to suggest 
that if ethical reasoning is accessible to individuals then it is not inaccessible to 
states” (Ibid. 62, emphasis in original). The decision-making structures of states, 
like the minds of individuals, allow them to process ethical imperatives and set 
goals (Ibid. 61-66). O’Neill thus uses the analogy between states and human 
beings to scale up Kantian moral agency. 
 Erskine (2001) introduced the agential theory to the discipline of IR, 
where she remains its most influential proponent (Erskine, 2003, 2004, 2008, 
2010, 2014, forthcoming). Drawing from both French and O’Neill, she argues that 
a group is a moral agent if and only if it has five features:  
(1) an identity that is more than the sum of the identities of its 
constitutive parts, or what might be called a ‘corporate identity’; (2) a 
decision-making structure that can commit the group to a policy or course 
of action that is different from the individual positions of some (or all) of 
its members; (3) mechanisms by which group decisions can be translated 
into actions (thereby establishing, with the previous characteristic, a 
capacity for purposive action); (4) an identity over time; and (5) a 
conception of itself as a unit (meaning simply that it cannot be merely 
externally defined). (Erskine, 2014: 119)15  
 
                                                        
15 For earlier formulations of the criteria for corporate moral agency, see Erskine 
(2001: 72; 2004: 26; 2010: 264-65). 
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These five criteria determine which groups are sufficiently analogous to human 
beings to count as moral agents. For example, mobs and crowds are not moral 
agents because they do not have corporate identities or decision-making 
structures. Neither their personalities nor their intentions are distinct from the 
personalities and intentions of their members. Nor do puppet states or shell 
companies count as moral agents, since their identities are created and sustained 
by other agents. Examples of corporate moral agents include (most) states, 
business corporations, unions, intergovernmental organizations, rebel groups, 
and drug cartels. 
 For early proponents of the agential theory, corporate moral agency was a 
contentious proposition that had to be defended at every turn. Erskine (2003: 2) 
once lamented that there is a “general reticence to accept that the class of moral 
agent might extend from the individual human being to encompass certain types 
of groups”. However, since the mid-2000s, the agential theory has ceased to 
require much justification, save for some obligatory citations of the works of 
these early proponents. The next generation of scholarship in the agential 
tradition focuses on applying the concept of corporate moral agency to particular 
issues, such as great-power responsibility (Brown, 2004), evil (Lu, 2004), 
Europe’s international citizenship (Dunne, 2008), national defence (Eckert, 
2009), and state punishment (Erskine, 2010; Lang, 2007, 2008, 2011). Many 
works of international political theory now take the idea of corporate moral 
agency as a basic premise (e.g., Collins, 2016; Collins and Lawford-Smith, 2016; 
Crawford, 2013b; Pasternak, 2013; Stilz, 2011). As Valentini (2011: 133) 
declares, as if to state the obvious, “states, universities, churches, and hospitals 
clearly have a capacity for ‘collective will formation’ sophisticated enough to 
warrant attribution of moral agency” (emphasis in original). The agential theory 
is almost uncontested in political theory and IR. Its only significant rival is the 
lingering skepticism of corporate agency (e.g., Gould, 2009; Lomas, 2005, 2014; 
Wight, 1999, 2004, 2006). The remainder of this section uses the Three 






1.1.1 The Agential Answer to the Question of Ownership 
 According to the agential theory, states take ownership of actions through 
their wills or intentions. Just as an event constitutes an action of an individual 
when it implicates his or her will, an event constitutes an action of a state when it 
implicates that state’s will. We say that Michael committed theft because he 
intentionally took something that did not belong to him; we say that Russia 
committed aggression because it intentionally invaded territory that did not 
belong to it.  
 States have ‘intentions’ by virtue of their internal decision-making 
structures, which combine the intentions of individuals into corporate 
intentions. As Erskine (2001: 71) argues, a decision-making structure “entails a 
degree of decision-making unity that would allow the collectivity in question to 
arrive at a predetermined goal, rather than simply display a spontaneous 
convergence of individual interests”. While a mob or crowd has as many wills as 
it has members, a state or corporation has one will. Lang (2007: 244) similarly 
argues that “[s]tates that have a deliberative body that determines not only 
instrumental actions but also overarching political aims can be said to have 
intentions” (see also Stilz, 2011: 195-96). According to the agential theory, it is 
not merely a figure of speech to say that ‘Russia intends to annex Crimea’ or that 
‘the US plans to roll back foreign aid’. States have intentions, goals, plans, and 
desires, just as individuals do. 
 Although corporate intentions may conjure up the idea of collective 
consciousness, they need not.16 List and Pettit (2011) argue that corporate 
intentions “supervene” on individual intentions, which means that the former are 
dependent on but irreducible to the latter. All that a group requires in order to 
form intentions is a unified decision-making structure. Tollefsen (2015: 60-62) 
uses the example of a PhD admissions committee to illustrate how corporate 
intentions can emerge from the combination of individual intentions. The 
committee’s rules say that only applicants who have good test scores, grades, 
letters of recommendation, and writing samples can be admitted, and whether 
                                                        
16 O’Neill (1986: 62-63) and Erskine (2003: 6-7) avoid ‘intention’ because of its 
mental connotations. However, for most proponents of the agential theory, 
‘intentions’ are simply purposes or goals (see Wendt, 2004: 295). 
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an applicant meets each criterion is to be determined by a majority vote. The 
committee votes as follows on Trevor’s application. 
 
Table 1. Tollefsen’s Admissions Committee 










Member #1 Yes No Yes No No 
Member #2 No Yes Yes Yes No 
Member #3 Yes Yes No Yes No 
Committee Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Although none of the committee members believe that Trevor meets all of the 
criteria for admission, the majority of them believe that he meets each criterion. 
As a result, when the votes are tallied, the committee decides to admit Trevor to 
the PhD program even though none of its members think he is a suitable 
candidate. ‘We intend to admit Trevor to the program’ is true even though ‘I 
intend to admit Trevor’ is false for each committee member. The decision-
making structure of the committee thus produces a corporate intention that 
cannot be ascribed to any individual. 
Even if the intention of the committee were shared by a majority of its 
members, its intention would not be reducible to the sum of theirs. Corporate 
intentions are “multiply realizable”, which means that the same corporate 
intention can result from different combinations of individual intentions (List 
and Pettit, 2011: 65-66; Tollefsen, 2015: 87-88). The committee might still have 
decided to admit Trevor if each of its members had voted differently, and even if 
the committee had entirely different members. List and Pettit’s supervenience 
argument for corporate agency is powerful because it begins from individualist 
premises. It implies that corporate intentions are not reducible to individual 
intentions even though they are entirely made up of individual intentions. 
 Several proponents of the agential theory of state responsibility have 
drawn on the supervenience argument (Collins, 2016: 344; Erskine, 2014: 119; 
Stilz, 2011: 191; Wendt, 2004: 299-300, 2005). For instance, Wendt (2004: 300) 
argues that “even though the intentions of a state person at any given moment 
are ontologically dependent on its constituent members, its intentions are not 
dependent on any particular members” (emphasis in original). A state’s intention 
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to wage war can be realized by different legislators, just as the committee’s 
intention to admit an applicant can be realized by different members. The United 
States would still have intended to invade Iraq in 2003 if different members of 
Congress had voted for the invasion. Wendt (1999: 222-23) contends that the 
intentions of states are actually less mysterious than the intentions of individuals. 
While it is currently impossible to read another human being’s mind, the 
intentions of states are often clearly described in their laws and policies.  
 According to the supervenience argument, although states act only 
through individuals, states also exert higher-order control over what these 
individuals do. The intentions of states “program” the performance of certain 
actions, which can be “implemented” by different individuals (List and Pettit, 
2011: 160-63; Stilz, 2011: 191). The intention of the United States to invade Iraq 
was implemented by particular soldiers, but if some of these soldiers had refused 
to perform their duties, others would have been found to take their places. The 
United States is the agent that ‘owns’ the invasion because its intention to invade 
more or less guaranteed that the invasion would occur. While particular soldiers 
were the “leading edge” of the invasion (Wendt, 1999: 217), the United States 
was the force behind it. This is why we say ‘the United States invaded Iraq’ and 
criticize the United States for the resulting destruction. Presumably (although 
proponents of the agential theory never address this point), states are also 
responsible for the unintended consequences of their actions, just as individuals 
are. The United States did not intend to kill thousands of Iraqi civilians, but it is 
nevertheless responsible for these deaths because they were a foreseeable 
consequence of its invasion of Iraq, which was an intentional act. In any case, an 
action must somehow be connected to a state’s intention in order to count as an 
act of state. 
 An important implication of the agential theory is that only non-
dictatorial states can truly own actions. As Lang (2007: 245) argues, “when a 
dictatorial regime commits a crime, it makes more sense to attribute that crime 
to the head of state, in that the policy results from his individual intention”. Pettit 
(2014: 1649) likewise argues that we ought to treat a dictatorship “not as a 
group agent that operates via an authorized individual, but as an individual agent 
whose reach and power is extended and amplified by the members of the 
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authorizing group”. North Korea cannot own actions because its intentions are 
not corporate. Although we commonly say that ‘North Korea conducted a nuclear 
test’, the source of the intention, and thus the owner of the action, is really Kim 
Jong-un. Conversely, “[i]f a state is democratic and initiates a policy that leads to 
a crime, it makes more sense to attribute that crime to the state qua agent” 
(Lang, 2007: 245). Proponents of the agential theory are not clear whether 
oligarchic states can own actions. But since the actions of oligarchic states follow 
from collective decision-making, albeit by an exclusive decision-making body, it 
seems that they can have corporate intentions.  
 The notion of corporate intent remains contentious in Philosophy and 
elsewhere (e.g., Miller and Mäkelä, 2005: 645-49; Rönnegard, 2015: 17-29, 73-
90). For example, Wight (1999: 128) argues that it “rests on the classic error of 
methodological structuralism—the attribution of the agential powers and 
attributes of human agents to a collective social form” (see also Wight, 2004, 
2006). He warns that we should not confuse the attributes of the state, which is a 
social structure, with the attributes of the human agents within the state. 
According to his view, ascribing intentions to states is just as conceptually 
confused as ascribing intentions to cars. Although states and cars both behave in 
apparently purposive ways, this purposive behaviour is illusory or 
epiphenomenal. Neither have intentions of their own. Like cars, states are 
structures within which human beings act; they are not agents in their own right. 
Just as the physical structure of the car enables and constrains the driver, the 
social structure of the state enables and constrains its subjects and officials. Only 
human beings have intentions, even though they always form and act on these 
intentions within a set of structures. 
 Wight (2004: 279) denies that alleged examples of corporate intent, such 
as Tollefsen’s admissions committee (Table 1), demonstrate the reality of 
corporate intentions: “It is certainly possible for X to happen even if none of the 
group members intended X, but this falls under the rubric of unintended 
consequences”. Against Tollefsen’s (2015: 61) example of the admissions 
committee, Wight would say that no one intends to admit the applicant—that 
admitting the applicant is an unintended consequence of the decision-making 
structure of the committee—not that the committee as a whole intends to admit 
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the applicant. Ironically, according to Wight, ‘corporate intentions’ are really 
unintended consequences. 
 Even if we accept that a PhD admissions committee can have intentions, it 
does not follow that a state can have intentions. The archetype of a corporate 
agent is a small, participatory group, such as a committee or a panel of judges. 
This model does not easily scale up to large, non-participatory groups, such as 
states or even universities (Runciman, 2007: 104-05; Brito Vieira and Runciman, 
2008: 95-96, 135). According to List and Pettit (2011: 35-36), a member of a 
corporate agent is someone who either actively participates in its decisions or 
authorizes others to participate. It is plausible, on this account, to say that 
Tollefsen’s admissions committee intends to admit Trevor to the PhD program 
because each member of the committee, whether he or she voted for or against 
admitting Trevor, actively participated in the decision. It is also plausible to say 
that the department intends to admit Trevor, provided that every member of the 
department authorized the admissions committee. However, it does not follow 
that the university intends to admit Trevor. The university cannot be the 
relevant corporate agent because many of its members, such as students, neither 
participate in admissions decisions nor authorize others to do so. Given that only 
participants and authorizers count as members of a corporate agent, the claim 
that the university is the relevant agent has the absurd implication that students 
are not members of the university. Committees and departments are the 
corporate agents that make admissions decisions; the university as a whole is a 
passive recipient of these decisions.  
 The committee model is even less applicable to the state. It is plausible to 
say that Cabinet intends to increase military spending, since every minister 
participates in budget decisions. It is also plausible to say that Parliament 
intends to increase military spending, since every Member of Parliament gets to 
vote on the budget. The relevant corporate agent might also include members of 
the voting public, who authorize Members of Parliament. However, it does not 
follow that the United Kingdom intends to increase military spending. Some 
members of the United Kingdom, such as children, neither participate in nor 
authorize budget decisions. While students might be considered to tacitly 
authorize admissions committees when they choose to enroll, children certainly 
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do not authorize governments. Given that all members of a corporate agent are 
either participants or authorizers, the claim that the state is the relevant agent 
implies that children are not members of the state. It makes much more sense to 
think of Cabinet, Parliament, and the Treasury as the corporate agents that make 
budget decisions and of the state as a passive recipient of these decisions. The 
state appears not to be a single agent, but a collection of corporate agents, 
individual agents, and passive members. In other words, if we accept the 
dominant conception of corporate agency, then agency is an attribute of some 
parts of the state rather than an attribute of the whole. 
 List and Pettit’s (2011) account of collective agency is only one of many 
(e.g., Bratman, 1999: 109-29; Gilbert, 1990; Tuomela, 2005, 2013), so the fact 
that it is not applicable to the state does not seem fatal for the agential theory. 
Yet the rival accounts are no more promising. As Poljanšek (2015: 185) points 
out, existing accounts of collective agency tend to “presuppose the 
generalizability of small-scale cases of CA [collective agency], while they ignore 
the possibility of complex cases”. These accounts are based on examples, such as 
lifting a table or walking together, that have three common features: the 
members of the group share a goal; they interact face-to-face; and they act 
together simultaneously (Ibid. 189).17 States have none of these features: the 
goals of the state are deeply contested; most of its members have never met; and 
many of its members are not even alive at the same time. If the committee model 
does not scale up to the state, then the lifting-a-table model certainly does not. It 
is a mistake to make inferences about large, institutional groups from small, 
participatory groups of any kind.  
 At best, the agential theory provides a partial answer to the Question of 
Ownership. Although it provides a plausible explanation of how committees, 
courts, and legislatures can act in a way that is not reducible to the actions of 
their members, this explanation does not scale up to the state. There is a missing 
link between ‘Parliament decided to wage war’ and ‘the United Kingdom decided 
to wage war’. What is missing is an account of how the actions of agents within 
                                                        
17 See Pettit and Schweikard (2006) on the relationship between “joint action” 
and collective agency. 
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the state—individual and corporate—can be attributed to the state as a whole. 
Chapter 3 explains how the Hobbesian theory fills this gap. 
 
1.1.2 The Agential Answer to the Question of Identity 
 Few proponents of the agential theory even acknowledge the importance 
of identity for state responsibility. In their treatise on corporate agency, List and 
Pettit (2011: 31-32, 172-73, note 20) mention corporate identity only in passing. 
The Questions of Ownership and Fulfillment have so far garnered almost all of 
the attention. Erskine is one of the few who addresses the Question of Identity at 
any length. According to her account of institutional responsibility, a corporate 
moral agent must have “[1] an identity that is more than the sum of the identities 
of its constitutive parts, or what might be called a ‘corporate identity’; ... [2] an 
identity over time; and [3] a conception of itself as a unit (meaning simply that it 
cannot be merely externally defined)” (Erskine, 2014: 119). She argues that most 
states (the main exceptions being puppet states and some ‘quasi-states’) satisfy 
these criteria (Erskine, 2001; Erskine, 2010).  
 First, the identity of a state “does not rely on a determinate membership” 
(Erskine, 2001: 72). ‘The United Kingdom in 2018’ is the same state as ‘the 
United Kingdom in 2016’ even though some of its members have died, others 
have been born, and still others have emigrated and immigrated. Just as a human 
being remains the same person despite the gradual replacement of her cells, a 
state remains the same state despite the gradual replacement of its members. 
This opens up the possibility that the state can have ‘non-distributive’ 
responsibilities. If the identity of the state is irreducible to the identities of its 
members, then the debts, obligations, and crimes of the state might also be 
irreducible. 
 Second, the identity of a state is temporally continuous. The territory and 
the laws of the United Kingdom have changed significantly since 1900, but we 
still refer to it as the same state—the same United Kingdom that once colonized a 
large part of the globe. If the state “has ‘a past accessible to experience-memory 
and a future accessible to intention’” (Erskine, 2001: 75, quoting Wiggins, 1976: 
161), then it also has a past susceptible to blame and a future susceptible to 
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obligation. A state with an intergenerational identity can have intergenerational 
responsibilities. 
 Third, the identity of a state is internally defined. Although the United 
Kingdom, like all states, depends on the recognition of other states, it is not 
simply a contrivance of other states. The identity of the United Kingdom stands 
in contrast to that of the Republic of Transkei (1976-1994), which was created 
and sustained by South Africa. In short, according to Erskine, the identities of 
states are irreducible, intransient, and internal. 
 The problem with Erskine’s answer to the Question of Identity is that it is 
purely negative. She tells us that the identity of the state does not depend on its 
particular membership, is not transient, and is not externally defined, but she 
does not tell us on what the state’s identity does depend. If the identity of the 
state does not depend on its population, territory, or government, then what is 
the substratum that persists after subjects die, borders change, laws are 
amended, and institutions are reformed? We need a positive criterion for 
corporate identity in order to answer the central question: “how are we to tell 
whether a state is still the same state or a different one?” (Aristotle, 1992: III.3, 
175). For example, the Republic of Turkey has a different capital and even a 
different constitution than the Ottoman Empire. Is it therefore a different state?18 
We cannot even begin to answer this question until we identify the locus of the 
state’s corporate identity—the essential feature or features of a state that make 
it this particular state. Erskine tells us which features are not essential to a state’s 
identity, but she does not tell us which features are essential. 
 Because Erskine’s answer to the Question of Identity is purely negative, it 
is wide open to a riposte from skeptics who doubt that ‘state’ means anything 
more than ‘government’. Easton (1981: 316) argues that the state is either “no 
more than a substitute term for the political authorities” or “some kind of 
undefined and undefinable essence”. In response to the claim that the identity of 
the state does not depend on its particular membership, he would argue that this 
‘state’ is nothing but “a ‘ghost in the machine’, knowable only through its variable 
                                                        
18 I return to the issue of Turkish/Ottoman identity in Chapter 4. 
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manifestations” (Ibid.).19 Easton’s position amounts to the claim that no state 
satisfies Erskine’s identity criteria—that there is no such thing as a corporate 
identity in the first place. Defining the identity of the state by what it is not 
reinforces the suspicion that it is vacuous and inscrutable. 
 Wendt (1999) uses an analogy between personal identity and corporate 
identity to develop a positive answer to the Question of Identity: “what really 
distinguishes the personal or corporate identity of intentional actors from that of 
beagles and bicycles is a consciousness and memory of Self as a separate locus of 
thought and activity” (Ibid. 225). What Wendt means by this is that the identity 
of a state is constituted by its members’ shared narrative—for instance, their 
origin stories and national myths (Ibid. 217). Subjects create a corporate identity 
by describing themselves as parts of a corporate ‘Self’ and by behaving as such. 
They give their state temporal continuity by passing down their shared narrative 
from one generation to the next. 
 [W]e normally think of states as persisting through time despite 
 generational turnover, in part because their properties seem quite stable: 
 boundaries, symbols, national interests, foreign policies, and so on. Such 
 continuities help to give temporal continuity to the succession of 
 governments, enabling us to call every national government in 
 Washington, DC for 200 years a ‘US’ government. (Ibid. 217) 
 
Wendt adds that “[t]hese temporal and existential continuities are explained by 
structures of collective knowledge to which individuals are socialized, and which 
they, through their actions, in turn reproduce” (Ibid. 217, emphasis in original). 
According to ‘early Wendt’, the identity of a state depends on the continuity of its 
members’ shared narrative, similarly to how the identity of an individual 
depends on the continuity of her mental states.  
 The problem with Wendt’s account of corporate identity is that it assumes 
that the members of a state share a uniform and stable narrative. On the 
contrary, as Bell (2003: 73-74) argues, “[t]here is no singular, irreducible 
national narrative, no essentialist ‘national identity’ ... there will always be 
dissent and the story will never be accepted consistently and universally”. For 
example, Canada’s dominant narrative is that it is the inclusive, peaceful, post-
                                                        
19 Gilpin (1984: 301) and Jessop (1990: 366-67) are similarly skeptical that 
‘state’ refers to anything other than particular territory or government officials. 
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national cousin of the United States. One counter-narrative is that it is a settler-
colonial state with a brutal and violent past; another is that it is an 
assimilationist, English-protestant state. There is no single narrative by which 
Canada’s identity could be clearly defined. In addition, the narrative of 
inclusiveness serves to inoculate Canada against responsibility for genocide 
against its indigenous population and for repression of minorities, such as the 
internment of Japanese-Canadians during the Second World War. The dominant 
narrative of a state often forecloses important questions of state responsibility, 
including historical reparations, from the outset. 
 Wendt (2015) doubles down on the analogy between personal identity 
and corporate identity in his later work. He argues that states are not just agents, 
but conscious agents. His first move is to embrace “enactivism” in the philosophy 
of mind, which holds that “consciousness is a transaction between the mind and 
its environment” (Ibid. 277); it is not simply a function of the brain. An enactivist 
would say that, in the process of reading this thesis online, the Internet is as 
much a part of the relevant conscious system as is the reader’s brain. Enactivism 
raises the possibility that there are conscious systems that are non-biological 
and spatially distributed. 
Wendt’s (2015: 277-78) second move is to employ the concept of “We-
feeling”, or the idea that groups have shared points of view akin to first-person 
perspectives. Some experiences, such as national pride, are irreducibly collective. 
Wendt’s explanation of these collective experiences is that, through “quantum 
entanglement”, each individual’s experience is “non-locally connected” to the 
experiences of other members of the group (Ibid. 278-79). If, as ‘later Wendt’ 
argues, consciousness is not entirely a function of individual brains, and groups 
can have subjective experiences, then states can be conscious agents as well as 
intentional agents.20 
Wendt’s argument for collective consciousness gives new meaning to his 
claim that corporate identity depends on “a consciousness and memory of Self as 
a separate locus of thought and activity” (1999: 225). For early Wendt, 
‘consciousness’ and ‘memory’ were merely metaphors for the shared 
                                                        




experiences and narratives of the members of the state. For later Wendt, states 
literally have consciousness and memory. The crucial implication of this shift is 
that the common criterion for personal identity—psychological continuity—now 
applies straightforwardly to the state. According to psychological accounts of 
personal identity (e.g., Garrett, 1998; Shoemaker, 1970), I know that I am the 
same person as I was yesterday because I remember what I did yesterday, or 
because my thoughts today are causally connected to my thoughts yesterday. If 
states are conscious, then they are also the same persons as long as their mental 
states follow a continuous train. 
Wendt’s use of psychological continuity as the criterion for corporate 
identity runs up against an epistemological problem: “If such higher-order 
consciousnesses exist, how would we know it?” (Keeley, 2007: 428). I know that 
I am the same person as I was yesterday because I experience a continuous ‘train 
of thought’; you can verify your identity in the same way. However, we cannot 
know whether Canada is psychologically continuous for the simple reason that 
none of us are Canada. Only Canada could really know whether it has subjective 
experiences at all. Even if we accept Wendt’s argument for collective 
consciousness, it does not help us to make practical judgments about state 
identity, since we do not have access to the ‘thoughts’ of states. We might be able 
to discern the state’s ‘intentions’, construed as laws and policies (Wendt, 1999: 
222-23), but its subjective experiences are beyond the bounds of what we could 
possibly know. 
Ascribing psychological properties to states stretches the analogy 
between states and human beings to the breaking point. While the agential 
answer to the Question of Ownership is initially plausible because it requires 
only a thin notion of corporate intention, the agential answer to the Question of 
Identity requires consciousness or something functionally equivalent. Contra 
Wendt (1999: 225), the identities of states seem more like those of “beagles and 
bicycles” than like those of human beings. However, analogies with ‘animal 
identity’ and ‘object identity’ also will not carry us very far. Beagles seem more 
like humans than like states. They may not be self-conscious in the way that 
humans are, but they do appear to have some form of subjectivity, and they 
clearly display signs of psychological continuity—they remember people, places, 
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objects, and commands. Ascribing consciousness to states is much more of 
stretch than ascribing it to beagles. In many ways, states seem more like bicycles: 
they cannot think for themselves, nor do anything without human agents.  
Analogies with personal and physical identity would often be unhelpful 
even if they were conceptually sound, since corporate identity raises a unique set 
of problems. States unite, divide, dissolve, and reconstitute in ways that human 
beings and physical objects simply cannot. Individuals cannot secede from or 
annex one another, and bicycle parts cannot reassemble. I examine the 
conceptual differences between personal, physical, and corporate identity in 
Chapter 4.  
 
1.1.3 The Agential Answer to the Question of Fulfillment 
 An important implication of the agential theory is that the responsibilities 
of states are ‘non-distributive’ (Erskine, 2001: 73; Lang, 2007: 245). If states are 
moral agents over and above their members, then the responsibilities of states 
must exist over and above the responsibilities of their members. However, since 
states act only through individuals, it is difficult to see how states could fulfill 
their responsibilities without distributing them to individuals. The debts of 
states must be paid by their subjects, and the treaty obligations of states must be 
implemented by their legislators and officials. The challenge for proponents of 
the agential theory is to reconcile the idea that states are distinct agents with the 
fact that their members inevitably bear the costs and burdens of their 
responsibilities. 
 The idea that corporate responsibilities are non-distributive came out of 
the debates in analytic philosophy about collective responsibility in the 1960s 
and 1970s (e.g., Cooper, 1968; Feinberg, 1968; Held, 1970). An important insight 
that emerged from these debates is that the responsibilities of individuals often 
cannot be deduced from the responsibilities of groups. As Held (1970: 93) 
argues, “from the judgment ‘Collectivity C ought (ought not) to have done A’, 
judgments of the form ‘Member M of C ought (ought not) to have done A’ cannot 
be derived”. For example, it may be the case that the United States owes its 
bondholders $10 million this week, but this does not imply that any particular 
American owes these bondholders $10 million. Nor does it imply that each 
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American owes the bondholders a fraction of this sum. Despite what journalists 
sometimes say, the debt of the United States is not equivalent to “what every 
man, woman, and child in America owes” (Tanner, 2012), since the United States 
does not owe less money whenever an American dies. A corporate responsibility 
is not equivalent to a series of individual responsibilities. In this sense, corporate 
responsibilities are non-distributive. 
Proponents of the agential theory of state responsibility initially adopted 
the idea that corporate responsibilities are non-distributive. In the beginning, 
Erskine (2001: 73) argued that “some duties [of states] cannot be distributed 
among individuals at all”, and Lang (2007: 245) argued that “crimes can be 
attributed to states without attributing them to individuals” (emphasis in 
original). However, more recent proponents of the agential theory have largely 
abandoned this idea. As Pasternak (2013: 361) argues, “it is invariably the case 
that states pass their responsibilities on to their citizens” (see also Collins, 2016; 
Collins and Lawford-Smith, 2016; Stilz, 2011). Erskine, recognizing that states’ 
responsibilities are inevitably distributive, later turned her attention to “the 
danger of harming innocent individuals while ostensibly punishing delinquent 
states” (2010: 263). Although sanctions, treaty obligations, reparations, and 
debts attach to states in the first instance, the costs and burdens distribute to 
their subjects. The question that now concerns proponents of the agential theory 
is how these costs and burdens ought to be distributed. There are two rival 
answers to the Question of Fulfillment within the agential tradition. 
The ‘authorization account’ of distribution focuses on the structure of the 
state. As Stilz (2011) argues, the citizens of a state justifiably bear the burdens of 
its responsibilities provided that it is “a democratic legal state—one that 
guarantees citizens’ personal inviolability, basic subsistence, freedom of belief 
and expression, and legislates a system of private rights that treats them equally 
and in which they have a democratic voice and vote” (Ibid. 204, emphasis in 
original; see also Parrish, 2009). Any state that meets these conditions counts as 
an authorized representative of its citizens, including citizens who do not 
personally support their state or identify with it: “if a state that credibly 
interprets my basic right exists, then I necessarily authorize it—whether I agree 
to join it or not—since I require its system of law to secure me against others’ 
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interference” (Ibid. 200, emphasis in original). The citizens of a democratic legal 
state can justifiably be burdened with its responsibilities because they are the 
authors of its actions. According to the authorization account, distributing the 
responsibilities of the state is justified as long as the structure of the state is just. 
The ‘participation account’ of distribution focuses on the actions and 
intentions of the citizens of the state. Pasternak (2010, 2013) argues that the 
authorization account “is grounded in a problematic understanding of the notion 
of authorization, which ignores citizens’ own attitudes to their state, thus 
allowing them too little control over their liabilities” (2013: 362). She uses Kutz’s 
(2000) notion of “intentional participation” to develop a distributive principle 
that leaves room for individual attitudes. The members of a state count as its 
“intentional members”, and therefore can justifiably be made to bear the burdens 
of its responsibilities, provided that they satisfy four criteria: 
[1] they are members of the state according to its membership criteria; 
[2] they are reflectively aware of their citizenship status and that status 
informs some of their activities (e.g. applying for a passport, claiming 
state benefits, voting); [3] they are aware (or can be reasonably be 
expected to be aware) of their state’s policies, or of the fact that there are 
some policies of which they are ignorant; [4] and their membership status 
is not imposed on them against their will. (Pasternak, 2013: 371) 
 
Although there is a strong presumption that the citizens of a state that respects 
human rights are its intentional members, this presumption is not absolute. 
Pasternak’s (2013: 374-77) account allows citizens who publicly, consistently, 
and credibly disavow their citizenship—such as some ultra-Orthodox Jewish 
groups in Israel—to opt out of their share of its responsibilities. According to the 
participation account, what matters is not whether the structure of the state is 
just, but whether the members of the state are complicit in its actions. 
I return to the authorization and participation accounts of distribution in 
Chapter 5. For now, the important point is that both employ the same structure 
of argument: states are corporate moral agents, distinct from the individual 
moral agents who compose them; but states cannot act on their own, so their 
responsibilities must be distributed to their members in order to be fulfilled; 
therefore, we need a principle that determines whether a given distribution of 
responsibility is just. The distributive principles that proponents of the agential 
theory propose are ad hoc amendments to the theory rather than logical 
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implications of it. The idea of corporate moral agency does not help us to 
adjudicate between the authorization and participation accounts of distribution, 
and we could even accept one or the other without accepting the idea of 
corporate moral agency. Ad hoc amendments to the agential theory are necessary 
because the straightforward implication of corporate moral agency—that the 
responsibilities of states and individuals are mutually independent—is clearly 
false. If states and individuals are separate moral agents, then their 
responsibilities should also be separate—just as much so as the responsibilities 
of different individuals. The fact that the responsibilities of states and individuals 
are inextricable, and that the agential theory therefore requires patchwork 
amendments, is a reason to be skeptical of the agential theory. 
The analogy between states and human beings is no more helpful for 
answering the Question of Fulfillment than it is for answering the Question of 
Identity. Although we might think that “[c]ollective agents act by having their 
constituents act, in just the way that individual agents act by having parts of 
themselves act” (Collins and Lawford-Smith, 2016: 156), there is a crucial 
difference. The constituents of a state, unlike the constituents of an individual, 
are themselves moral agents. We depend on our members (i.e., appendages) to 
fulfill our responsibilities, but we do not distribute our responsibilities to them. 
Jim’s responsibility to pay back a loan does not imply that his arm has a 
responsibility to hand over an envelope of money. Corporate entities are unique 
in that they fulfill their responsibilities only by distributing them to others. This 
process of distribution has no individual-level analogue. 
    *** 
The appeal of the agential theory is that it promises a metaphysical 
foundation for state responsibility. Corporate moral agency eliminates the need 
to rely on juridical or political fictions. The line of argument, if it works, is 
powerful: if we think individuals are moral agents, then we should, for the same 
reasons, think states are moral agents. Yet there are reasons for doubt. First, 
although there are plausible arguments for corporate moral agency, they apply 
only to small, participatory groups, such as committees and teams. Corporate 
moral agency does not scale up to the state. Second, corporate identities are not 
closely analogous to personal identities. Even if states do have intentions, they 
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do not have anything like consciousness or subjectivity, and the most important 
problems of corporate identity—secession, unification, and annexation—do not 
have interpersonal analogues. Third, unlike individuals, states are made up of 
moral agents. The relation between a state’s responsibilities and its members’ 
responsibilities has no individual-level analogue. The state-human analogy is of 
little help for answering the Questions of Identity and Fulfillment. 
 
1.2 States as Legal Persons: The Functional Theory 
The international law of state responsibility has entirely different origins 
and influences. Whereas the agential theory grew out of Anglo-American 
philosophy, the law of state responsibility developed largely from post-World 
War One reparations law. As Crawford (2013a: 27-28) describes, the Treaty of 
Versailles “placed issues of responsibility for the major events of international 
war and peace irrevocably within the domain of the ‘legal’”. Efforts to codify the 
law of state responsibility began in 1924, when the Assembly of the League of 
Nations convened a committee to identify and codify the most important areas of 
customary international law.21 The United Nations International Law 
Commission (ILC) continued this work following the Second World War, and, 
after several decades, finished its Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (ILC, 2001).22 Although the Articles have not yet 
been turned into a treaty or convention, they are widely considered to be an 
authoritative codification of the customary law of state responsibility (Crawford, 
2013a: 42-44; Olleson, forthcoming). The Articles are of theoretical interest 
because they contain a ‘functional’ theory of state responsibility that has little in 
common with the agential theory. 
The idea of corporate agency is notably absent from the international law 
of state responsibility. States are held legally responsible not because they are 
                                                        
21 See Crawford (2013a: 3-44), Malekian (1985: 3-29), Matsui (1993), and 
Spinedi (1989) for histories of the law of state responsibility. 
22 International lawyers use ‘state responsibility’ narrowly to refer to 
responsibility for wrongdoing. As Crawford (2013a: 99) describes, “the category 
‘state responsibility’ covers the field of the responsibility of states for 
internationally wrongful conduct, part of the international law of obligations”. 
The other major part is the law of treaties (UN, 1969). 
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agents, but because they act vicariously through human agents. The ILC (2001: 
35) makes this point clearly in the Commentaries that accompany its Articles. 
The State is a real organized entity, a legal person with full authority to 
act under international law. But to recognize this is not to deny the 
elementary fact that the State cannot act of itself. An ‘act of the State’ must 
involve some action or omission by a human being or group: ‘States can 
act only by and through their agents and representatives.’[23] The 
question is which persons should be considered as acting on behalf of the 
State, i.e. what constitutes an ‘act of the State’ for the purposes of State 
responsibility.  
 
There are many similar remarks in the secondary legal literature and in the 
decisions of international courts. Cassese (2005: 246) writes that “for a State to 
be responsible it is necessary first of all to establish whether the conduct of an 
individual may be attributed to it”, and Nollkaemper (2003: 616) writes that “in 
factual terms states act through individuals”. Crawford and Watkins (2010: 287) 
emphasize that “states, lacking bodies of their own, can only act through the 
agency of others—in the end, of natural persons”. The relevant ‘agents’ for 
international lawyers are state officials.  
The idea of corporate intentionality, which is foundational for the agential 
theory, is treated as both irrelevant and mysterious by international lawyers. 
The ILC’s Articles include “no requirement of mens rea on the part of a delinquent 
state: an act incurring state responsibility could occur even where a state did not 
undertake the act intentionally” (Crawford, 2013a: 37). Crawford adds that “the 
‘intention’ underlying state conduct is a notoriously difficult idea, quite apart 
from questions of proof” (Ibid. 62). Even where proof of intent is necessary for 
state responsibility, it is the intent of state officials that counts (ILC, 2001: 34). 
Brownlie (1983: 38) similarly argues that “metaphors based on intention (dolus) 
or negligence (culpa) of natural persons tend to be unhelpful” for understanding 
state responsibility, and he suggests that a more appropriate analogue is a 
principal-agent relation: “the issues in inter-state relations are often analogous 
to those arising from the activities of employees and enterprises in English law, 
where the legal person held liable is incapable of close control over its agents” 
(Ibid. 38, emphasis in original). In accordance with this analogy, international 
lawyers often describe state officials as “state agents” (e.g., Cassese, 2007: 656, 
                                                        
23 The ILC quotes from the German Settlers in Poland case (PCIJ, 1923). 
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661; ILC, 2001: 78-80; Momtaz, 2010: 237-38). States are like principals on 
behalf of which their officials act rather than like agents in their own right. 
However, states differ from principals in one crucial respect. While 
principals authorize their own agents, and hence can act on their own, states 
cannot. States act only through their agents. An employer can authorize her own 
employees, but a state cannot authorize its own officials. International lawyers 
rely on a quasi-organic or systemic conception of the state, and especially the 
concept of function, to explain how the agents of the state act on its behalf. The 
state is a “community” or “system of administration”, and its agents are the 
“organs” who perform its “functions”, such as controlling territory and entering 
into relations with other states (Brownlie, 1983: 135, 141; Crawford, 2013a: 
113-15; Kelsen, 1970: 150).  
Proponents of the agential theory have overlooked the functional theory 
entirely. The reason is that they have projected their own idea of corporate 
agency onto international law.24 Lang (2007: 244) writes that, “[s]ince the 
heyday of positivism in the nineteenth century, states have been considered the 
primary agents of international law” and that “[t]he passage of the Articles on 
State Responsibility by the International Law Commission suggests that states 
can be considered responsible agents” (2008: 23). Wendt (1999: 10) declares 
that “[i]nternational politics as we know it today would be impossible without 
attributions of corporate agency, a fact recognized by international law”. 
Tollefsen (2002: 396) argues, more generally, that “[o]ur practice of attributing 
responsibility to organizations ... seems to presuppose that organizations 
literally have intentional states. For we could not hold them legally and morally 
responsible for an act unless they intended to commit the act” (emphasis in 
original). The agential theory is so dominant in IR, Political Theory, and 
Philosophy that its proponents cannot recognize an alternative theory of state 
responsibility when they see it. 
I describe the functional theory’s answers to the three Fundamental 
Questions in the next three subsections. But first, a word of caution is necessary. 
                                                        
24 See Fleming (2017b) for a detailed analysis of how and why philosophers, 




Proponents of the agential and functional theories have different aims, and any 
comparison must take this into account. IR scholars, political theorists, and 
philosophers are concerned primarily with developing a normative justification 
for the practice of holding states responsible. International lawyers are 
concerned primarily with developing a set of procedures and criteria for making 
judgments about whether, in particular cases, a state is responsible. There is a 
danger here of criticizing international law for not being political philosophy. 
That said, the law of state responsibility is theoretically sophisticated, and it 
offers a unique set of answers to the Fundamental Questions. Comparing legal 
and ethical approaches to state responsibility is fruitful as long as we avoid 
evaluating one approach according to the aims of the other. 
 
1.2.1 The Functional Answer to the Question of Ownership 
According to the functional theory, states take ownership of actions 
through “attribution”, which refers to the process of attaching or imputing an 
action of an individual to a state (Condorelli and Kress, 2010). For example, in 
United States v. Iran, the International Court of Justice (1980: 35) ruled that the 
actions of the Iranian protesters who occupied the American embassy in 1979 
were attributable to Iran. All actions are performed by individuals, but some 
actions are attributable to states, meaning that they count as acts of state.25 
 The most basic rule of attribution is that “[t]he conduct of any State organ 
shall be considered an act of that State under international law, whether the 
organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions” (ILC, 2001: 
Art. 5). The use of “organ” rather than “official” in the Articles is indicative of the 
quasi-organic conception of the state that underpins international law. Whereas 
“official” implies an office, “organ” implies a function (Kelsen, 1970: 150-58). For 
example, soldiers are state organs because they perform the function of defence. 
Other state organs include legislators, judges, diplomats, municipal officials, and 
police officers (Crawford, 2013a: 118-24; ILC, 2001: 41). Whether an entity is a 
                                                        
25 The fact that an action is attributed to the state does not mean that the 
individual who performed it is off the hook. Some actions “can be attributed 
twice: both to the state and the individual” (Nollkaemper, 2003: 618-19; ILC, 
2001: Art. 58). 
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state organ depends on its function: “The key element is the role of the entity or 
official as part of the administration of the state” (Brownlie, 1983: 141).  
 The actions of private entities that “exercise elements of the 
governmental authority” are also attributable to the state (ILC, 2001: Art. 5). The 
idea of governmental authority, although not functional on the face of it, 
ultimately collapses into the idea of function. Brownlie (1983: 136) uses 
“authority” and “function” interchangeably: “state authority has been delegated 
to local traditional and religious authorities ... state functions have at other times 
been farmed out to private individuals”. Crawford (2013a: 129) notes that 
“[t]here is no consensus as to precisely what constitutes ‘governmental 
authority’”, and he defines it primarily in terms of three sets of functions: 
detention and discipline, immigration control and quarantine, and seizure of 
property. Employees of private prisons exercise governmental authority because 
they perform the state functions of detention and discipline. In other words, they 
are “de facto organs” (Cassese, 2007: 656; Momtaz, 2010: 243). The rule is that 
the actions of entities that “exercise functions of a public character” are 
attributable to the state, even if these entities do not have formal state authority 
(Brownlie, 1983: 162; ILC, 2001: 43). 
 Actions can be attributed to the state even when the “official authorities” 
are absent or incapable, such as in times of revolution or civil war (ILC, 2001: 
Art. 9). When private individuals perform state functions in the absence of an 
official government—for instance, by acting as police officers or border guards—
their actions count as acts of state. The ILC (2001: 49) emphasizes that “the 
nature of the activity performed is given more weight than the existence of a 
formal link between the actors and the organization of the State”. The decisive 
factor is, again, whether the action is performed to fulfill a state function. 
 The actions of a de jure or de facto state organ are attributable to the state 
“even if it exceeds its authority or contravenes instructions” (ILC, 2001: Art. 7). 
For example, in Caire v. Mexico, two Mexican military personnel murdered a 
French citizen after trying to extort money from him. Although the personnel 
acted outside of their authority, the French-Mexican Claims Commission ruled 
that their actions were nevertheless attributable to Mexico because they acted 
under the guise of their status as state organs (UN, 2006: 517). What ultimately 
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determines whether the actions of an individual are attributable to the state is 
not whether he acted under the authority of the state, but whether he “acted by 
using the means and powers pertaining to his public function” (Cassese, 2005: 
246). Function, not authority or agency, is thus the foundational concept in the 
international law of state responsibility. 
 Another important concept in the rules of attribution is consent. Even if 
an action is not performed by a state organ, it may be attributable to the state “if 
and to the extent that the State acknowledges and adopts the conduct in question 
as its own” (ILC, 2001: Art. 11). This rule was at work in United States v. Iran (ICJ, 
1980). The protesters who occupied the American embassy in Tehran were 
neither de jure nor de facto organs of Iran, so their actions could not have been 
attributed to Iran on purely functional grounds. Their actions became acts of 
state when Ayatollah Khomeini endorsed them (ILC, 2001: 52-53).26 Attribution 
by consent is uncommon for wrongful actions, but it is the norm for many other 
kinds of responsibilities, such as debts and treaty obligations. A state owes 
money that it borrows and is bound by treaties that it signs. Although the 
concept of consent is sometimes thought to be the foundational one in 
international law, it presupposes the concept of function, since a state can 
consent only through its organs. As the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
says, heads of state and foreign ministers can offer their state’s consent “[i]n 
virtue of their functions” (UN, 1969: Art. 7.1(a)). The functional relationship 
between the state and its organs is thus a precondition for the state’s consent. 
 The rule regarding “organs placed at the disposal of a State by another 
State” (ILC, 2001: Art. 6) follows from a combination of function and consent. If 
one state loans a diplomat to another, the diplomat’s actions are attributable to 
the receiving state provided that she (1) performs a function for the receiving 
state (2) with the consent of the receiving state. As the ILC’s (2001: 44) 
Commentaries describe, “[n]ot only must the organ be appointed to perform 
functions appertaining to the State at whose disposal it is placed ... the organ 
must also act in conjunction with the machinery of that State and under its 
                                                        
26 In this case, the responsibility of Iran was overdetermined: Iran was 
responsible for the occupation of the US embassy both because it endorsed the 
protesters’ actions and because it neglected its duty to protect the embassy. 
Either would have been sufficient. 
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exclusive direction and control”. The second condition is intended to exclude 
“situations in which functions of the ‘beneficiary’ State are performed without its 
consent, as when a State [is] placed in a position of dependence” (Ibid.). One 
state cannot hijack another state by ‘volunteering’ its organs to perform the 
other state’s functions. However, if the receiving state does give its consent, it 
becomes just as much responsible for the actions of its ‘borrowed’ organs as it is 
for the actions of its de jure organs. 
 An important implication of the functional theory is that there is a direct 
line of responsibility that runs to the state from each of its organs—whether de 
jure, de facto, or borrowed. Although the chain of command might matter for 
determining individual criminal responsibility, “the position of an official in the 
internal hierarchy has no relevance to the question of state responsibility” 
(Brownlie, 1983: 134; ILC, 2001: 40). The actions of a corporal are attributable to 
the state no less than the actions of a general, since both perform the function of 
defence.  
 The functional theory also permits no distinction between legitimate and 
illegitimate governments. The actions of any insurrectional movement that 
successfully seizes power are attributable to the state. All of the insurrectional 
movement’s actions, including before it comes to power, count as acts of state 
(ILC, 2001: Art. 10). The ILC’s (2001: 51) Commentaries insist that “[n]o 
distinction should be made ... between different categories of movements on the 
basis of any international ‘legitimacy’ or of any illegality in respect of their 
establishment as a Government”. As Crawford (2013a: 172) adds, “Article 10 
treats all insurrections generally and makes no attempt to distinguish between a 
struggle for national liberation on the one hand and a simple rebellion on the 
other”. Considerations of legitimacy also have no bearing on other kinds of 
responsibilities: debts and treaty obligations are attributable to the state 
regardless of what kind of government borrowed the money or signed the treaty. 
(I return to this issue in Chapter 3.) The actions of any ‘functioning’ government 
are attributable to the state. 
 Relying on the concept of function allows international lawyers to 
sidestep the thorny issue of legitimacy. What matters for the purpose of 
determining what counts as an act of state is whether the individuals in question 
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perform state functions; international law does not consider whether they 
perform their functions well or badly. Nor does international law consider 
whether governments are democratically elected, have popular support, or 
respect human rights.  
The problem with the functional answer to the Question of Ownership is 
that it allows the state to become a ‘responsibility shield’. State organs can 
borrow money to enrich themselves, sign self-serving treaties, wage wars of 
conquest, and leave the state—and ultimately its subjects—with the resulting 
debts and obligations. For example, the Mobutu government borrowed about 
$14 billion in the name of Zaire between 1965 and 1997 (Ndikumana and Boyce, 
1998). Although much of the money was used for self-enrichment and nepotism, 
the debt was nevertheless attributed to Zaire, so the people of Zaire (later the 
Democratic Republic of Congo) were made to pay for their own oppression. 
Similarly, holding Iraq liable for reparations after Saddam Hussein’s invasion of 
Kuwait effectively made Iraqis pay for the wrongs of a regime of which they were 
also victims. Mobutu and Hussein were certainly state organs, but it seems 
perverse to attribute their corrupt and self-serving actions to Congo and Iraq. 
The functional answer to the Question of Ownership fails to distinguish 
representation of the state from misrepresentation of the state.  
 
1.2.2 The Functional Answer to the Question of Identity 
 The rules of state continuity determine whether a state persists over time 
as the same legal person. These rules follow from what Crawford (2007: Ch. 2) 
calls “the principle of effectiveness”: an entity counts as a state provided that it 
effectively performs the functions of a state, such as controlling territory and 
concluding treaties. The corollary is that a state retains its identity as long as it 
continues to function as a state.  
 The first rule is that “acquisition or loss of territory does not in itself 
affect the continuity of the State” (Crawford, 2007: 673; Marek, 1968: 15). 
Canada remained the same state after Newfoundland joined the federation in 
1949, and Sudan remained the same state after South Sudan seceded in 2011. 
Even “the total change of territory by a people which, under the same 
government and law, settles in a different territory, leaves the identity of the 
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state intact” (Kunz, 1955: 72). A state cannot exist without territory,27 since it 
needs territory in order to function as a state, but it does not need any particular 
territory.  
 The second rule is that changes in the population of a state do not change 
its identity (Crawford, 2007: 678; Kunz, 1955: 71-72). A state remains the same 
state despite births, deaths, immigration, and emigration, even if these changes 
alter the demographics of the state or result in a complete turnover in its 
membership. As Kunz (1955: 71) describes, “[t]he young US with five million and 
the present US with one hundred and sixty million of inhabitants is, of course, the 
identical state in law”. A state needs a population in order to function as a state, 
but it does not need any particular population. 
The third rule is that changes in the government of a state do not change 
its identity (Crawford, 2007: 678-88; Marek, 1968: 24-40). The United States has 
a very different government than it did in the 1990s, but it is nevertheless the 
same state. Even “the overthrow of a governmental system does not affect the 
continuity of the State” (Crawford, 2007: 679). Iran was therefore the same state 
before and after the Islamic Revolution. A state needs a government in order to 
function as a state,28 but it does not need any particular government, nor any 
particular form of government. 
 The rules of state continuity, like Erskine’s account of corporate moral 
agency (see section 1.1.2), provide a purely negative account of corporate 
identity. They tell us that the identity of a state does not depend on its territory, 
population, government, or form of government, but they do not tell us on what 
the identity of a state does depend. However, Crawford (2007: 671) argues that 
the criteria for statehood can also be used as positive criteria for state identity. In 
his view, a state retains its identity as long as it has the same nucleus, or 
“substantially the same constituent features”: “A State may be said to continue as 
                                                        
27 There is one important exception: “annexation of the territory of a State as a 
result of the illegal use of force does not bring about the extinction of the State” 
(Crawford, 2007: 690). I return to the issue of annexation and the related issue of 
relocated states in Chapter 4. 
28 As with territory, there is an important exception: “belligerent occupation does 
not affect the continuity of the State” (Crawford, 2007: 688; Van Elsuwege, 
2003). Occupied states retain their identities even when their governments are 
temporarily exiled or eliminated.  
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such so long as an identified polity exists with respect to a significant part of a 
given territory and people” (Ibid.). For example, the Russian Federation 
inherited the legal personality of the Soviet Union, including its seat on the 
United Nations Security Council, because Russia was the core of the Soviet Union 
in terms of both population and territory (Ibid. 676-77). A state retains its 
identity over time insofar as its features remain “substantially” the same. 
There are two problems with using the criteria for statehood as criteria 
for state identity. The first is that the notion of ‘substantial continuity’ is of little 
help when two or more contemporary states share core features with the same 
antecedent state. Which state is identical with pre-Revolution China—Taiwan or 
the People’s Republic of China? According to Crawford’s criterion, both states 
seem to have equally valid claims to be the ‘real’ China. The People’s Republic 
shares far more territory with pre-Revolution China, but Taiwan inherited the 
government of pre-Revolution China. (I return to this case in Chapter 4.) Unless 
we give different weights to different kinds of continuity—for instance, 
territorial continuity matters more than governmental continuity (Kunz, 1955: 
73-74)—we have no way to adjudicate cases in which multiple states are 
substantially continuous with the same antecedent state. Yet it is not clear how 
proponents of the functional theory could justify assigning different weights to 
different criteria for statehood, since territory, population, and government are 
equally necessary for a functioning state.  
The deeper problem with using the criteria for statehood as criteria for 
state identity is that it confuses two kinds of identity: ‘type identity’ and ‘token 
identity’. As Bartelson (1998: 297) explains, “[t]ype identity concerns the 
identity of the state as a general concept, whereas token identity concerns … 
individual states”. The criteria for statehood are criteria for type identity, while 
state continuity concerns the identities of token states, such as China and Russia. 
The difficulty, as Craven (1998: 160) points out, is that an account of token 
identity cannot be derived from an account of type identity. 
'Identity' assumes that individual states, whilst being members of a 
 particular class of social or legal entities, also possess certain 
 distinguishing features that differentiate one from another. Identity, 
 therefore, presumes personality but is concerned with what is personal or 
 exceptional in the nature of the subject. This can never be provided by 
 reference to the traditional requirements of statehood. 
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Territory, population, and government are features that an entity must have in 
order to be a member of the class of states, not identifying features of particular 
states. A state must meet the conditions for statehood in order to retain its 
(token) identity over time; it clearly cannot remain the same state if it ceases to 
be a state altogether. However, if a state’s territory, population, and government 
are not essential to its (token) identity, as the rules of state continuity imply, 
then the fact that a state has a particular population, territory, or government is 
not sufficient to identify it as a particular state. If the identity of the People’s 
Republic of China does not depend on its particular configuration of territory, 
population, and government, then we cannot use these features to identify it 
over time, let alone to determine whether the Peoples Republic or Taiwan is 
continuous with pre-Revolution China. 
There is a deep tension, if not a contradiction, between the rules of state 
continuity (which are functional) and Crawford’s ‘substantial continuity’ or 
‘nucleus’ account of state identity (which is not). On one hand, the rules of state 
continuity say that a state’s identity does not depend on its particular territory, 
population, or government. On the other, Crawford’s account implies that a 
state’s identity does depend on its particular territory, population, and 
government. He wants to maintain both that the features of a state are not 
essential to its identity and that we can use these features to identify a state over 
time. 
 
1.2.3 The Functional Answer to the Question of Fulfillment 
 The ILC’s (2001) Articles provide no specific guidance about how the costs 
and burdens of states’ responsibilities should be distributed to their subjects. 
International law’s answer to the Question of Fulfillment is implicit but clear: the 
laws of each state should determine the distribution of responsibility. There are 
currently only two pieces of secondary legal literature about the Question of 
Fulfillment.  
 Crawford and Watkins (2010) argue that the practice of holding states 
responsible is justified despite the fact that “the population that is eventually 
called upon to carry the costs of responsibility includes members who are, by 
any standard, morally blameless” (Ibid. 290). They provide two justifications for 
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distributing the costs of states’ responsibilities to their subjects. The first is that 
these costs are usually “so negligible as to be barely worth mentioning” (Ibid. 
293). The damages awarded against states by the International Court of Justice 
and international tribunals have rarely been large enough to have any noticeable 
impact on their members. There have only been a few exceptions, such as the 
reparations levied against Iraq after its invasion and occupation of Kuwait (Ibid. 
294-95). Yet even when the costs are significant, Crawford and Watkins argue 
that subjects ought to bear them: “In cases where one of two states must bear the 
costs of injury, then assuming that costs are always covered through general 
taxation, one of two populations is bound to end up worse off than it otherwise 
would have been” (Ibid. 295). Better to impose the costs on the population that 
has suffered less already. 
 One problem with this argument is that, in some cases, the population of 
the wrongdoer state has actually suffered more. Kuwaitis clearly suffered as a 
result of the Iraqi invasion and occupation, but Iraqis suffered triply from 
Saddam Hussein’s rule, the sanctions against Iraq, and the burden of reparations 
payments to Kuwait. If the goal is to shift losses to the population that has 
suffered the least, as Crawford and Watkins suggest, then the population of the 
‘victim’ state will sometimes be the one that should bear the costs. 
Another problem is that the ‘negligible burdens’ argument applies only to 
some kinds of state responsibility, such as responsibility for wrongdoing. 
Although it is true that states’ reparative obligations are rarely large enough to 
impose significant costs on their subjects, this is not at all true for other kinds of 
responsibilities (Murphy, 2010: 303). There are many cases in which sovereign 
debts have been so burdensome that they have severely diminished the life 
prospects of the debtor state’s subjects. The International Monetary Fund (2016) 
lists 39 Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), which are developing countries 
whose massive debt burdens hinder their development. Before the HIPC 
Initiative for debt relief, these countries “were, on average, spending slightly 
more on debt service than on health and education combined” (Ibid. 2). Even the 
populations of developed countries can be seriously harmed by sovereign debts. 
In Argentina, where life expectancy at birth is 75 years and approximately 
97 percent of the population is literate, almost half the population was 
pushed below the poverty line by the trough of the economic crisis in 
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2002, the year following the country’s debt default and collapse of its 
fixed exchange rate system. (E&IA: 2) 
 
Greece and Cyprus provide more recent examples of how the populations of 
developed states can be crushed by the burdens of their state’s obligations. The 
burdens are negligible in some cases, but this is clearly not always the case. 
 Crawford and Watkins (2010: 296-97) also make a quasi-Rawlsian 
argument for distributing states’ responsibilities to their members. They begin 
with the claim that a fair distribution of responsibility is one that “would be 
chosen above any alternative in a position of partial ignorance, in which we were 
unaware of the particular state or population to which we belonged but we knew 
the various kinds of effects which different forms of liability had on different 
types of states and their populations” (Ibid. 296). They argue that, behind this 
‘veil of ignorance’, people would choose an international legal system that 
assigns responsibility to states: “in the crucial choice between imposing remedial 
responsibilities on states or on assignable individuals (officials, leaders, etc.), we 
would choose the former over the latter” (Ibid. 297). There are two reasons why 
people would prefer state responsibility to individual responsibility. First, they 
could be more confident that, if they were harmed, they would be able to seek 
compensation from someone or something that has the means to pay. States 
have much deeper pockets than individuals. Second, they could be more 
confident that they would have redress for systemic wrongs, and in cases in 
which it is impossible to identify the particular state officials who perpetrated 
the wrongful act.  
 People behind the veil of ignorance would no doubt choose an 
international legal system in which reparative obligations are assigned primarily 
to states rather than to individuals. Yet the “crucial choice between imposing 
remedial responsibilities on states or on assignable individuals” (Ibid. 296) is not 
the only relevant choice. If people were asked to choose a principle for 
distributing states’ responsibilities, they would not choose the one that 
international law currently uses: let domestic law determine the distribution of 
responsibility, and tough luck to those who happen to be stuck in states with 
corrupt or predatory governments. Instead, people behind the veil of ignorance 
would want to guard themselves against the possibility that they would end up 
50 
 
in Mobutu’s Congo or Hussein’s Iraq. They would choose a distributive principle 
that ensures that they would not be crushed by massive debts and reparations 
from loans and wars that they played no part in. To this end, they would choose 
an international legal system in which responsibilities are assigned only to 
‘legitimate’ states. (I return to the issue of legitimacy in Chapter 3.) They 
certainly would not choose the system that we currently have. 
 Crawford and Watkins (2010: 297-98) recognize that their quasi-
Rawlsian argument does not justify the current practice of state responsibility in 
its entirety. They admit that people behind the veil of ignorance would be 
unlikely to expose themselves to the risk of having to pay enormous reparations, 
such as the reparations that Germany was saddled with after the First World 
War. Their suggestion is to create a special insurance scheme for aggression that 
spreads the costs of reparations among all states (Ibid. 298). But if it makes 
sense to spread the costs of reparations for aggression, then why not spread the 
burdens of other obligations as well? After all, as Crawford and Watkins (2010: 
290) recognize, most subjects of ‘wrongdoer’ states are no more blameworthy 
than the subjects of ‘victim’ states. The same applies to the subjects of debtor 
states and creditor states. 
 Murphy (2010) takes up this instrumentalist line of argument in a reply to 
Crawford and Watkins. He doubts that distributing the state’s responsibilities to 
its subjects can ever be justified on grounds of fairness or hypothetical consent. 
The justification will “have to be instrumental—not justifying the imposition of 
burdens on people because they are morally responsible, but in spite of the fact 
that they are not” (Ibid. 306). The costs that subjects bear for the responsibilities 
of their states are akin to collateral damage; they are necessary evils that must 
often be tolerated in the pursuit of some greater objective, such as peace or 
stability (Ibid. 311). If, at some point, a better mechanism for distributing costs 
becomes feasible, then the current mechanism should be abandoned. 
 Like the agential answers to the Question of Fulfillment, the functional 
answers are ad hoc amendments to the theory rather than logical implications of 
it. The functional theory implies nothing about how the responsibilities of states 
should be distributed to their subjects. On the contrary, the very structure of the 
functional theory excludes the Question of Fulfillment. By focusing entirely on 
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the relation between the state and its organs, the functional theory obscures the 
equally important relation between the government and its subjects.  
     *** 
 The appeal of the functional theory is that it allows us to set aside many 
difficult metaphysical and normative questions. It does not matter whether 
states are corporate agents; all that matters is that they have organs who act on 
their behalf. Nor does it matter whether these organs are legitimate; all that 
matters is that they perform state functions. While issues of agency and 
intentionality can be sidestepped without adverse consequences, sidestepping 
issues of legitimacy has turned state responsibility into a tool of the wicked. The 
functional theory allows corrupt governments to rack up debts, line their 
pockets, and leave the state with the bill. On top of that, because international 
law defers to domestic law in determining how states’ responsibilities ought to 
be distributed, the victims of corrupt and predatory regimes are made to pay for 
their own exploitation. Another problem with the functional theory is that its 
account of state identity is conceptually confused. Although statehood can be 
defined in terms of functions, such as controlling territory and entering into 
relations with other states, the identities of particular states cannot be. The 
functional theory is dysfunctional without an account of legitimacy and an 
account of corporate identity.  
 
1.3 The Limitations of the Agential and Functional Theories 
 The agential and functional theories illuminate certain features of state 
responsibility but obscure others. Neither the ‘agent model’ nor the ‘principal 
model’ can stand on its own, since state responsibility has important features 
that neither model captures.  
 States are like human agents in two important respects: we attribute 
actions to them, and they have unique identities that are denoted by proper 
names. These are the two most important features that an entity must have in 
order to have responsibilities. Yet there are also two important differences 
between states and human agents: corporate identities are not like the identities 
of human beings, and the process of distributing a state’s responsibilities has no 
individual-level analogue. The agential theory is best thought of as a helpful 
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heuristic. Although it is sometimes useful to think of states as giant individuals, 
this way of thinking is bound to lead us astray if we take it too far. 
 The same warning applies to the functional theory. States are like 
principals in one important respect: they act through representatives or agents. 
It is sometimes useful to think of the relation between the state and its officials 
as a principal-agent relation. However, this way of thinking also has limits. States 
differ from principals in two important respects: they are incapable of 
authorizing their own agents, and they are made up of agents. Focusing on the 
relation between the state and its officials obscures the role of subjects, both in 
authorizing these officials and in bearing the costs of the state’s responsibilities.  
 The broader point is that we should be careful with analogies between 
state responsibility and individual responsibility. It is a mistake to try to 
transplant any theory of individual responsibility onto the state. What we need is 
a theory of responsibility that is designed for the state. As I argue in the next 






















HOBBES AND THE PERSONALITY OF THE STATE29 
 
 
 One of the central claims that Hobbes makes in each of his major political 
works is that the state is a person. The state can be said to make laws, sign 
treaties, borrow money, and wage war. Proponents of the agential and functional 
theories of state responsibility would agree. However, Hobbes’ state is not the 
kind of person that proponents of the agential theory or the functional theory 
have in mind. Hobbes does not mean that the state is a corporate agent, despite 
the fact that he sometimes equates “person” with “actor”. Nor does he mean that 
the state is a principal or an organism, despite the fact that he describes the state 
as an “Author” and an “Artificial Animal”. This chapter intervenes in the debate in 
Hobbes scholarship about what kind of person his state is. It then proceeds to lay 
out the structure of the Hobbesian theory of state responsibility. 
 The chapter has five sections. The first describes the tension in Leviathan 
between Hobbes’ definition of ‘person’ and his claim that the state is a person. On 
one hand, he says that persons are actors or representatives. One the other, he 
says that the state is a person but not an actor or representative. The second 
section resolves this tension using Hobbes’ alternative definition of ‘person’ from 
Chapter 42 of Leviathan, which instead defines persons as representees. I show 
that this sense of personhood is essential for understanding how Hobbes uses 
‘person’ throughout his political works. The third section revisits Hobbes’ theory 
of the state in light of the Chapter 42 definition. I argue that Hobbes’ state is best 
understood as a character rather than an actor. Whereas a Hobbesian assembly, 
such as a legislature, is a fictional actor, Hobbes’ state is a fictional character. The 
fourth section explains how Hobbes’ theory of the state differs from the agential 
and functional theories. I show that it is neither a rudimentary theory of 
corporate agency, as it is often described, nor an organicist theory of the state, as 
it might also be interpreted. The fifth section explains how Hobbes’ idea of state 
                                                        
29 This chapter is based on an article titled “The Two Faces of Personhood: 




personality translates into a theory of state responsibility. What makes Hobbes’ 
idea of personhood unique and valuable is that it decouples personhood from 
metaphysical conceptions of agency; it explains how states and other entities can 
be persons even though they do not have any intrinsic capacity for rationality, 
intentionality, or action. 
 
2.1 The Skinner-Runciman Debate 
 Hobbes defines the state or “Common-wealth” as a “Multitude [of men] 
united in one Person” (Hobbes, 2012: XVII. 260).30 Although he had developed an 
elaborate typology of persons in the previous chapter, he does not tell the reader 
what type of person the state is. Nowhere does he provide an explicit answer. His 
many descriptions of the state invite confusion: “by Art is created that 
great LEVIATHAN called a COMMONWEALTH, or STATE, (in latine CIVITAS) 
which is but an Artificiall Man” and, as he later calls it, a “Mortall God” (Hobbes, 
2012: Intro. 16, XVII. 260).  
 Skinner (1999) and Runciman (2000b) have tried to figure out where in 
Hobbes’ typology of persons the state fits. The focal point of their debate is the 
definition of ‘person’ at the beginning of Chapter 16 of Leviathan. 
 A PERSON, is he, whose words or actions are considered, either as his own, 
 or as representing the words or actions of an other man, or of any other 
 thing to whom they are attributed, whether Truly or by Fiction.  
 When they are considered as his owne, then is he called a Naturall Person: 
 And when they are considered as representing the words and actions of 
 an other, then is he a Feigned or Artificiall person. (Hobbes, 2012: XVI. 
 244) 
 
Hobbes uses an analogy with representation in the theatre to illustrate this 
rather convoluted definition. He points to the common etymology of “person” 
and the Latin “persona”, which “signifies the disguise, or outward appearance of a 
man, counterfeited on the Stage” and “more particularly that part of it, which 
disguiseth the face, as a Mask” (Ibid.). The person is not the mask itself, but the 
actor who wears it: “a Person, is the same that an Actor is, both on the stage and 
                                                        
30 Hobbes provides similar definitions of the state in his earlier works (Hobbes, 
1994: XX.1, XIX.8; 1998: V.9, X.5). I cite The Elements of Law and De Cive 




in common Conversation”—that is, a “Representer of speech and action” (Ibid.). 
To “personate” someone or to “beare his person” is to speak or act in his name.  
 Skinner and Runciman agree on many points of interpretation: (1) 
persons are actors or representatives; (2) natural persons are those that act in 
their own names, such as defendants who represent themselves in court; and (3) 
artificial persons are those that do not act in their own names (but a subtle 
disagreement remains, as I discuss below). Their main point of contention is 
whether the state is represented “truly” or “by fiction”. Skinner (1999: 21-22) 
argues that Hobbes’ state is best described as a “purely artificial person”. Like a 
character in a play, the state is purely artificial because it is incapable of being a 
natural person, or of acting in its own name. The state acts only through its 
representatives. But whereas a character in a play is represented only by fiction, 
the state is represented truly because it is truly considered to be responsible for 
its representatives’ actions. Actions performed in the name of the state generate 
real responsibilities, such as debts and contractual obligations; actions 
performed in the name of Harry Potter do not. Runciman (2000b: 271-73) 
counters that Hobbes’ state is a “person by fiction”. Although we attribute actions 
to the state, we do so only by fiction, since the state cannot truly “own up” to 
these actions any more than Harry Potter can. The costs of the state’s debts and 
contractual obligations must be borne by human beings. Following Skinner’s 
(2005: 178; 2009: 346-47) concession on this point, I take it to be settled that the 
state is represented by fiction.31 I focus instead on Skinner and Runciman’s side-
debate about the meaning of ‘artificial person’, which points to a more 
fundamental issue about what kind of person Hobbes’ state is. 
 Skinner (1999: 11-12) argues that an artificial person is someone who is 
represented by someone else, such as a defendant who is represented by a 
lawyer. He points to the grammar of the following sentence: “when [the words 
and actions of a person] are considered as representing the words and actions of 
an other, then is he a Feigned or Artificiall person” (Hobbes, 2012: XVI. 244). 
While the structure of the paragraph suggests that the referent of ‘he’ in the 
                                                        
31 However, as Douglass (2014: 141) points out, “what the [Skinner-Runciman] 
exchange is lacking is a clear definition of ‘fiction’”. This is an important problem 
that I cannot adequately address here. 
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second clause is ‘a person’, which implies that an artificial person is a 
representative, Skinner argues that the referent of ‘he’ should be ‘an other’, 
which implies that an artificial person is instead a representee. According to the 
common reading of this passage, a lawyer is an artificial person when she 
represents a client. According to Skinner’s reading, her client is the artificial 
person. 
 Skinner acknowledges that his interpretation does not fit well with the 
remainder of Chapter 16. As Hobbes (2012: XVI. 244) later writes, “Of Persons 
Artificiall, some have their words and actions Owned by those whom they 
represent”. The artificial persons that Hobbes refers to here are clearly 
representatives. Moreover, if a person is “a Representer, or Representative” 
(Ibid.), then an artificial person should be an artificial representative. To justify 
his unconventional reading, Skinner (1999: 12) relies heavily on Chapter 15 of 
De Homine, where Hobbes inverts his definition: “a person is someone to whom 
the words and actions of men are attributed, whether they are his own or those of 
someone else. If they are his own, then the person is a natural one. If they are 
those of someone else, then the person is a fictional one” (Skinner’s 
translation).32 Whereas Chapter 16 of Leviathan defines an artificial person as 
someone whose words or actions are attributed to someone else (a 
representative), Chapter 15 of De Homine defines a fictional person—which 
Skinner in this case takes to be the same as an artificial person—as someone to 
whom someone else’s words or actions are attributed (a representee). The latter, 
he suggests, is Hobbes’ considered definition of ‘artificial person’. 
 Runciman (2000b: 269-72) replies that Skinner has artificial personhood 
upside down: ‘artificial person’ ought to be read as ‘artificial representative’ 
rather than as ‘artificial representee’. The artificial person in a lawyer-client 
relationship is the lawyer, not the client. Runciman argues that Skinner’s reading 
puts more weight on Hobbes’ later works than they can bear. He points out that 
                                                        
32 Skinner (1999: 12) also appeals to the Latin Leviathan. Although he claims that 
“the persons whom Hobbes had initially classified as artificial are now 
contrasted rather than equated with representatives”, his own translation of the 
relevant passage suggests otherwise: “if [a person] acts in the name of someone 
else, then the person is Representative of the one [i.e., the person] in whose name 
he acts” (Ibid.). The representative and the representee are both persons.  
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the crucial distinctions between natural and artificial persons, and between true 
and fictional representation, are either missing or muddled in De Homine and the 
Latin Leviathan (Ibid. 274-77). He contends that the accounts of personhood in 
these works are not careful clarifications of the one in the English Leviathan, as 
Skinner assumes, but simplified accounts of personhood that serve Hobbes’ 
political aim: to rule out the possibility that the state could act independently of 
the sovereign. Runciman therefore gives priority to the more detailed account of 
personhood from Chapter 16 of Leviathan, where Hobbes defines persons as 
representatives: natural persons represent themselves; artificial persons 
represent others; artificial persons “represent truly” when they are authorized 
by the entities that they represent; and artificial persons “represent by fiction” 
when they are authorized by third parties (Ibid. 269-70). 
 Runciman has the vast majority of Hobbes scholars on his side. Most, both 
before and after Runciman, also follow the definition of ‘artificial person’ as 
‘representative’ from Chapter 16 of Leviathan (Forsyth, 1981: 197; Gauthier, 
1969: 121-22; Hood, 1964: 164; Pitkin, 1967: 15-16; Tukiainen, 1994: 46; cf. 
Copp, 1980: 582-83; Green, 2015: 27). Pettit (2008: 56) neatly summarizes the 
standard interpretation of Hobbesian personhood: “Hobbes’s view, to put it in a 
slogan, is that there are no persons but spokespersons. Natural persons are 
spokespersons for themselves, acting and speaking in their own name, and 
artificial persons are spokespersons for another”. 
 Yet if “there are no persons but spokespersons”, it is difficult to see how 
the state could be a person of any kind. The state can speak neither for itself nor 
for anyone else. It requires a representative—a sovereign—precisely because it 
cannot be a representative. As Hobbes takes great pains to show, the state “can 
do nothing but by the Person that Represents it”, and the words and actions that 
we attribute to it are the words and actions “onely of the Soveraign” (Hobbes, 
2012: XXIV. 388).33 Skinner (1999: 11, note 65) clearly recognized the problem 
here: “If we adopt Hobbes’s initial proposal and call representatives artificial 
persons, then sovereigns are artificial persons while states are not”. This is the 
thought that led Skinner to question the standard interpretation of Hobbesian 
                                                        
33 See Hobbes (2012: XXI. 332, XXXI. 554) for additional statements to the effect 
that the state acts only through the sovereign. 
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personhood: the state is an artificial person (hence “Artificiall Man”); but the 
state is a representee, not a representative; so at least some artificial persons 
must be representees rather than representatives.  
 Runciman (2000b: 272-73; 2009) is well aware that Hobbes’ state is not 
really a representative or actor. But unlike Skinner, he does not recognize the 
tension between Hobbes’ definition of ‘person’ as ‘actor’ and his claim that the 
state is a person. He relies on the phrase, “by fiction”, to fill the gap. The state is 
not a natural actor like a human being, nor an artificial actor like an assembly, 
but an actor “by fiction”. Runciman compares the state to other “persons by 
fiction”, such as “bridges and madmen”, which are likewise “incapable of 
responsible action” (Ibid. 271). For a bridge to be a person, “both the owners and 
the representative of the bridge [must] act in such a way as to ensure that it 
appears that the bridge is itself acting responsibly” (Ibid. 272). Similarly, the 
actions of sovereigns and subjects together sustain the fiction that states “truly 
are persons, truly capable of the actions that personal responsibility requires” 
(Ibid.).  
 Emphasizing “by fiction” does solve the problem. For one thing, Hobbes 
never uses the phrase, “person by fiction”; he refers only to things that are 
“represented by Fiction” (2012: XVI. 246). “Persons by fiction” are Runciman’s 
invention, just as “purely artificial persons” are Skinner’s invention. Further, it is 
not clear from Chapter 16 that things that are represented by fiction are 
therefore persons, as Runciman assumes. Hobbes (2012: XVI. 246-48) says that 
“Inanimate things, as a Church, an Hospital, a Bridge”, “Children, Fooles, and 
Mad-men”, and even “An Idol, or meer Figment of the brain, may be Personated’ 
(emphasis added). As Martinich (2016: 228) points out, only in De Homine and 
the Latin Leviathan does Hobbes say that “an inanimate thing can be a person” 
(Hobbes, 1991: XV.4; 2012: 246-47). In Chapter 16 of the English Leviathan, 
there is only one instance in which Hobbes clearly says that something becomes 
a person by being represented: “A Multitude of men, are made One Person, when 
they are by one man, or one Person, Represented” (2012: XVI. 248). But the 
definition of ‘person’ as ‘representative’, which Runciman follows, is not 
sufficient to decipher this crucial passage: Hobbes does not mean that a 
multitude becomes a representative when it is represented by a representative. 
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As I argue in the following sections, Hobbes uses ‘person’ in two opposite ways, 
and it is necessary to recognize this in order to fully understand what kind of 
person the represented multitude is. 
 In sum, while Runciman provides decisive reasons to reject Skinner’s 
interpretation of Hobbesian personhood, his own interpretation is also 
untenable. On one hand, he maintains that all persons are representatives. On the 
other, he maintains that states (and other incapable entities), which are not 
representatives, are nevertheless persons. This inconsistency is a problem not 
only for Runciman, but for anyone who exclusively follows Hobbes’ definition of 
‘person’ from Chapter 16 of Leviathan. If we take persons to be representatives, 
as most Hobbes scholars do, then Hobbes’ state is no person at all. As I show in 
the next section, the source of the problem is that many Hobbes scholars have 
focused too narrowly on the definition of ‘person’ from Chapter 16 of Leviathan. 
 
2.2 The Two Faces of Personhood 
 In his discussion of the Holy Trinity in Chapter 42 of Leviathan, Hobbes 
(2012: XLII. 776) provides another definition of ‘person’: “a Person, (as I have 
shewn before, chapt. 13.) is he that is Represented, as often as hee is 
Represented”. He then describes God as “three Persons in the proper 
signification of Persons; which is, that which is Represented by another” (Ibid.). 
God is one person as represented by Moses, another person as represented by 
Christ, and yet another person as represented by the Apostles and their 
successors. Whereas Chapter 16 says that a person is a representative, Chapter 
42 says that a person is a representee.  
 Hobbes’ inversion of his definition of ‘person’ has not gone unnoticed 
(Abizadeh, 2012: 131, note 85; Brito Vieira, 2009: 169, note 69; Martinich, 2005: 
228; Pettit, 2008: 73). Although the Chapter 42 definition has a prominent place 
in discussions of Hobbes’ theology (Abizadeh, 2017; Brito Vieira, 2009: 213-14; 
Wright, 2006: 198), it is rarely mentioned in discussions of his political thought, 
and it is entirely absent from Skinner and Runciman’s debate about what kind of 
person the state is. This neglect of the Chapter 42 definition is especially odd 
given that Hobbes’ theological and political thought are so closely connected 
(Lessay, 2009; Runciman, 2009: 15, note 1). The principle that underpins his 
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doctrine of the Holy Trinity—“it is consequent to plurality of Representers, that 
there bee a plurality of Persons” (Hobbes, 2012: XLI. 772)—also underpins his 
claim that the state must have a single representative. For the same reason that 
“God, who has been Represented (that is, Personated) thrice, may properly 
enough be said to be three persons” (Ibid. XLII. 776), a multitude with three 
representatives is “not one Person, nor one Soveraign, but three Persons, and 
three Soveraigns” (Ibid. XXIX. 512). I argue that the Chapter 42 definition is just 
as important as the Chapter 16 definition for understanding how Hobbes 
employs the concept of personhood in his political thought. 
 The parenthetical reference to Chapter 13 in the Chapter 42 definition 
presents a puzzle. The former chapter (“Of the Naturall Condition of Mankind”) 
does not provide a definition of ‘person’, so the reference must be an error. 
Hobbes most likely meant to refer to Chapter 16.34 However, this makes the 
reference even more puzzling. He appears to have defined ‘person’ as 
‘representee’ and directed the reader to the opposite definition all in the same 
sentence. One possibility is that he contradicted himself in a moment of 
uncharacteristic carelessness. A more plausible explanation is that the Chapter 
16 and Chapter 42 definitions describe two sides of the same concept. Hobbes’ 
concept of personhood is ambivalent: persons can be representatives, 
representees, or both at the same time.  
 There are already hints of this ambivalence in Chapter 16 of Leviathan. 
Hobbes (2012: XVI. 244) claims that “persona”, which denotes “a Mask or 
Visard”, “hath been translated to any Representer of speech and action, as well in 
Tribunalls, as Theaters”. As Brito Vieira (2009: 168-69) points out, “[t]he 
inference is troubling because the theatrical mask is not the actor, but he whom 
the actor represents: more correctly, a representation of the represented 
(fictional) character”. The abrupt switch from ‘persona as mask’ to ‘person as 
actor’ is indicative of Hobbes’ ambivalence about whether persons are 
representatives or representees. 
 This ambivalence is borne out in Hobbes’ usage of ‘person’. His usage in 
Part II of Leviathan (“Of Commonwealth”) corresponds as often to the Chapter 42 
                                                        




definition as it does to the Chapter 16 definition. For example, when Hobbes 
(2012: XXIII. 376) writes, “every man, or assembly that hath Soveraignty, 
representeth two Persons”, he does not mean that every sovereign represents 
two representatives. The sovereign is the representative. The persons in this 
context are the things that the sovereign represents, or the roles that the 
sovereign plays—namely, the state and the sovereign.35 A monarch, for example, 
represents the state in public and himself in private. Similarly, when Hobbes 
(2012: XXIII. 380) writes, “in their Seats of Justice [judges] represent the person 
of the Soveraign”, he means that judges represent the sovereign. He does not 
mean that judges represent the representative of the sovereign. The person is 
the role that the judges play, not the actor who plays the role. Even in the phrase, 
‘bear a person’, the person is the representee. In Hobbes’ favourite example, 
Cicero is the representative, and the three persons that he bears are the three 
roles that he plays: the role of himself, the role of his adversary, and the role of 
the judge (Ibid. XVI. 244). Representatives are the things that bear persons; they 
are not the persons that are borne. Hobbes’ neglected definition of ‘person’ from 
Chapter 42 is indispensable for understanding how he uses the word. 
 However, the Chapter 16 definition is equally indispensable. Hobbes often 
uses ‘person’ as a synonym for ‘representative’, such as when he describes the 
sovereign as “the Person of the Common-wealth”. For instance, he says that “In 
all Courts of Justice, the Soveraign (which is the Person of the Common-wealth,) 
is he that Judgeth” (Ibid. XXVI. 422) and that “they that give Counsell to the 
Representative person of a Common-wealth, may have, and have often their 
particular ends, and passions” (Ibid. XXV. 404). He uses ‘person’ to mean 
‘representative’ even in Chapter 42. Although he defines persons as representees 
near the beginning of the chapter (Ibid. XLII. 776), he equates “the Publique 
Person” with “the Representant of the Common-wealth” near the end (Ibid. 920). 
The only way to determine whether any given instance of ‘person’ in Leviathan 
refers to a representative or a representee is to use the context as a guide. 
 Hobbes’ usage of ‘person’ in his early works displays the same 
ambivalence. Although he did not introduce the concept of representation until 
                                                        
35 See Brito Vieira (2009: Chapter 2) and Pettit (2008: 55-58) on the theatrical or 
role-based character of Hobbes’ concept of personhood. 
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Leviathan (Malcolm, 2012: 15-17; Skinner, 2007: 168; cf. Douglass, 2018), he did 
use the concept of personhood in The Elements of Law and De Cive, where he 
associates personhood with will rather than with representation. Hobbes does 
not provide italicized definitions of ‘person’ in these early works, so we have to 
rely solely on his usage. In some parts of The Elements, Hobbes uses “person 
civil” to refer to the state, as in “a multitude of persons natural are united by 
covenants into one person civil” (Hobbes, 1994: XX.1, see also XIX.8, XXVII.7). In 
other places, he equates the “person civil” with the sovereign: “a person civil [is] 
either one man, or one council, in the will whereof is included and involved the 
will of every one in particular; as for example: in this latter sense the lower 
house of parliament” (Ibid. XXI.11). Both the sovereign and the state—both the 
giver and the receiver of the will—are persons. The same ambivalence is present 
in De Cive. On one hand, Hobbes describes the state as “one person formed from 
several men” (Hobbes, 1998: X.5, see also V.9, XIII.3). On the other, he describes 
an aristocratic assembly, or “council of optimates”, as a person: “without a fixed 
schedule of the times and places at which the council of optimates may meet, 
there is no longer a council or a single person, but a disorganized crowd without 
sovereign power” (Ibid. VII.10). Hobbes’ concept of personhood was Janus-faced 
from the very beginning. 
 Once we recognize that Hobbesian persons can be representatives or 
representees, we can begin to make sense of his later accounts of personhood, 
which have often puzzled Hobbes scholars. Hobbes’ definition of ‘person’ as 
‘representee’ in Chapter 15 of De Homine is apparently the opposite of his 
definition in Chapter 16 of Leviathan: “a person is he to whom the words and 
actions of men are attributed, either his own or another’s: if his own, the person is 
natural; if another’s, it is artificial [fictitia]” (Hobbes, 1991: XV.1).36 Hobbes 
inverts his theatrical analogy to match. He begins by describing the distinction in 
Latin between facies and persona: “facies if they wished to indicate the true man; 
persona if an artificial one” (Ibid.). He does not mention facies in Leviathan, 
where he quickly jumps from saying that a persona is a mask to saying that “a 
Person, is the same that an Actor is” (2012: XVI. 244). The point of the distinction 
between facies and persona is that the actor is distinct from the person, or 
                                                        
36 Compare Skinner’s (1999: 12) translation, quoted in section 2.1. 
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character, that he plays. When an actor wears a mask, the audience considers his 
words and actions to be the words and actions of the character that the mask 
depicts: “the actor playing Agamemnon in a false face ... was, for that time, 
Agamemnon” (1991: XV.1). However, after the play is over, the actor is 
“understood without his false face, namely being acknowledged as the actor 
himself rather than the person he had been playing” (Ibid.). It is clear from 
Hobbes’ definition and his usage in De Homine that the person is the character 
that the actor plays rather than, as Chapter 16 of Leviathan says, the actor who 
plays the character.  
 Hobbes scholars have struggled to reconcile the De Homine and Chapter 
16 definitions. Simendić (2012: 153-55) argues that ‘artificial person’ in De 
Homine ought to be read as ‘representative’, as in Chapter 16. While Skinner and 
Runciman take “he to whom the words and actions of men are attributed” to be 
the representee, Simendić contends that “‘words and actions’ of the represented 
are attributed to the representative and not vice versa’ (Ibid. 155). But if we 
follow Simendić’s interpretation of ‘attributed’, we then need to explain why 
Hobbes uses ‘attributed’ in the opposite way in Chapter 16 of Leviathan, where 
he says that the thing to which words and actions are attributed is the 
representee (Hobbes, 2012: XVI. 244). Further, if the De Homine and Chapter 16 
definitions are equivalent, then why did Hobbes invert his theatrical analogy in 
De Homine? Martinich (2016: 329-30), seeing no way to make the two definitions 
compatible, suggests that Hobbes’ definition in De Homine “may have been 
different simply because it had a different purpose” and concludes that it “is of 
little value to his political theory”. This is implausible given that Hobbes 
explicitly discusses the state in Chapter 15 of De Homine, which is suggestively 
titled “De Homine Fictitio”—Of Fictional Man. As Hobbes (1991: XV.3) says, “Not 
only can a single man bear the person of a single man, but one man can also bear 
many”. The definition of ‘person’ in De Homine cannot be rendered congruent 




 What has gone almost entirely unnoticed is that the definition of ‘person’ 
in De Homine matches the one from Chapter 42 of Leviathan.37 Hobbes defines a 
person as “he to whom the words and actions of men are attributed” in the former 
and “he that is represented” in the latter. The two definitions are equivalent: 
someone who is represented is, by definition, someone to whom words and 
actions are attributed. There is clear continuity between Leviathan and De 
Homine—just not between the Chapter 16 definition and De Homine. The De 
Homine definition, like each of the Leviathan definitions, is best read as a one-
sided definition of a double-sided concept. 
 The definition of ‘person’ from Hobbes’ Latin translation of Leviathan is 
explicitly double-sided: “A PERSON, is he who does things in his own or another's 
name. If in his own, he is a proper or natural person; if in another's, he is the 
representative person of the one [i.e., the person] in whose name he acts” 
(Hobbes, 2012: XVI. 244-45). Here, as Runciman (2000b: 277) points out, “a 
person is defined both as an actor and as a non-actor to whom actions are 
attributed”—“both as he who acts and whatever is acted for” (see also Martinich, 
2016: 330-32). This definition, which Runciman says “introduces confusion”, is 
actually a symptom of the confusion that was there all along. The definition of 
‘person’ from the Latin Leviathan is the only one that captures the ambivalence 
of Hobbes’ usage. 
 A complete account of Hobbesian personhood must take both senses of 
‘person’ into account. Hobbes’ key distinctions apply to both representative and 
represented persons.  
 
Table 2. Hobbes’ Theory of Personhood 
Person Representative Represented 
Natural Represents itself Represented by itself 
Artificial Represents another Represented by another 
 True True representative Represented truly 
Fictional Fictional representative Represented by fiction 
 
Natural persons are both representatives and representees, so it does not make a 
difference which side of personhood we start from. The class of natural persons 
by the De Homine definition is coextensive with the class of natural persons by 
                                                        
37 The lone exception is Abizadeh (2012: 131, note 85; 2017: 923, note 40). 
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the Chapter 16 of Leviathan definition even though the definitions are opposite 
in meaning. However, the distinction between representative persons and 
represented persons becomes crucial when we consider artificial persons. While 
artificial persons in the first sense represent others, artificial persons in the 
second sense are represented by others. True artificial persons are those that are 
simultaneously natural persons: on the representative side, lawyers and estate 
agents; on the represented side, their clients. Fictional artificial persons are 
those that are not also natural persons: on the representative side, assemblies; 
on the represented side, corporate and incapable entities. The next section 
explains how each type of person figures in Hobbes’ theory of the state. 
 
2.3 Hobbes’ Theory of the State 
 A complete understanding of Hobbes’ theory of the state requires both 
senses of personhood, as well as the distinctions between natural and artificial 
persons and between true and fictional representation. His explanation of how 
the multitude becomes a person involves several types of persons. 
 A Multitude of men, are made One Person, when they are by one man, or 
 one Person, Represented; so that it be done with the consent of every one 
 of that Multitude in particular. For it is the Unity of the Representer, not 
 the Unity of the Represented, that maketh the Person One. And it is the 
 Representer that beareth the Person, and but one Person: And Unity, 
 cannot otherwise be understood in Multitude. (2012: XVI. 248) 
 
In other words, many persons become one person when they authorize one 
person to bear their person. This passage means hardly anything until we 
distinguish the types of persons involved.  
 The members of the multitude are natural persons. Each individual, acting 
in his or her own name, authorizes another person to represent the group. The 
multitude as a group cannot authorize its own representative because it 
“naturally is not One, but Many; they cannot be understood for one; but many 
Authors, of every thing their Representative saith, or doth in their name” (Ibid. 
XVI. 250). As Hobbes (1998: VI.1a) puts it in De Cive, “a crowd cannot make a 
promise or an agreement, acquire or transfer a right, do, have, possess, and so 
on, except separately or as individuals, so that there are as many promises, 
agreements, rights, and actions, as there are men”. A multitude is incapable of 
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acting as a unit, which is why each natural person must authorize a 
representative to act in its name. 
 The person that the members of the multitude authorize is a 
representative artificial person. If this person is an individual (i.e., a monarch), 
then he or she is a true representative. If this person is made up of several 
natural persons (i.e., an assembly), then it is a fictional representative. An 
assembly is, as Hobbes (2012: XVII. 352) says, “artificiall, and fictitious”: the 
artifice of majority rule sustains the fiction that the assembly has a single will. 
The fictitious character of an assembly explains why it cannot commit a crime or 
an injustice: “a body politic [in this context, meaning ‘assembly’], as it is a 
fictitious body, so are the faculties of will thereof fictitious also. But to make a 
particular man unjust … there is required a natural and very will” (Hobbes, 1994: 
XXI.4; see also Hobbes, 1998: VII.14). An assembly can serve as a representative 
only insofar as its members maintain the fiction that they have a single will, or 
speak with a single voice. They do this through majority rule, which cancels out 
contradictory wills or voices. 
 [I]f the Representative consist of many men, the voyce of the greater 
 number, must be considered as the voyce of them all. For if the lesser 
 number pronounce (for example) in the Affirmative, and the greater in 
 the Negative, there will be Negatives more than enough to destroy the 
 Affirmatives; and thereby the excesse of Negatives, standing 
 uncontradicted, are the only voyce the Representative hath. (Hobbes, 
 2012: XVI. 250)  
 
However, if the assembly has an even number of members, or if each member 
has a veto, then the fiction that it has a single voice may break down. The 
assembly will be “oftentimes mute, and uncapable of Action” (Ibid.).  
 The common claim that Hobbes made “no formal distinction between a 
democratic sovereign and a monarchical one” (Tuck, 2016: 100) is not entirely 
true. A monarch is a true representative, or one whose “civil will” is 
simultaneously a “natural will”; a democratic or aristocratic sovereign is a 
fictitious representative, or one whose “civil will” depends on the fiction that it 
speaks with a single voice (Hobbes, 1998: VII.14). Hobbes’ worry about 
sovereign assemblies is that this fiction is fragile: “a Monarch cannot disagree 
with himselfe, out of envy, or interest; but an Assembly may; and that to such a 
height, as may produce a Civill Warre” (2012: XIX. 290). Although Hobbes 
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thought democratic and aristocratic assemblies could be just as sovereign as 
monarchs, he did draw a conceptual distinction between representative 
individuals and representative assemblies. 
 The act of authorizing a single representative person transforms the 
multitude of natural persons into a represented person by fiction. Whereas an 
assembly is “Many men made One [person] by Plurality of Voyces”, a state is many 
men made one person when they are “by one man, or one Person, Represented” 
(Ibid. XVI. 248-50). An assembly is a person in the Chapter 16 sense: a 
“Representer of speech and action” (Ibid. XVI. 244). A state is a person in the 
Chapter 42 sense: “that which is Represented by another” (Ibid. XLII. 776). 
Hobbes scholars frequently overlook the fact that there are two ways in which a 
group can become a person (cf. Copp, 1980). An assembly is a person because it 
is a representative; a state is a person because it has a representative. To use 
Hobbes’ theatrical analogy, an assembly is a fictional actor, while a state is a 
fictional character. An assembly is like the chorus in an ancient Greek tragedy: it 
plays a single role, but only by the fiction that it speaks with one voice. A state is 
like the character that the chorus represents, such as the Elders of Argos in 
Agamemnon: it is incapable of playing a role, so it must be brought to life by an 
actor. The state cannot act apart from the sovereign any more than the Elders of 
Argos can act apart from the chorus. The difference between a state and a 
character in a play is not that they are different kinds of persons, but rather, as 
Runciman (2000b: 275-76) puts it, that “one is a person by fiction whose 
attributed actions are backed up by the actions of real persons, and the other is 
not”. Whereas subjects are ultimately liable for the actions that the sovereign 
performs in the name of the state, no one is liable for the actions that the chorus 
performs in the name of the Elders of Argos.  
 While the sovereign represents the state, she (or it) is also represented by 
public ministers. Ambassadors and messengers “represent the Person of their 
own Soveraign, to forraign States” (Hobbes, 2012: XXIII. 382), and “in their Seats 
of Justice [judges] represent the person of the Soveraign; and their Sentence, is 
his Sentence” (Ibid. XXIII. 380). The sovereign is therefore both a representative 
artificial person and a represented artificial person. Public ministers represent 
the sovereign truly, since they are authorized by the sovereign in whose name 
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they act: “Publique Ministers ... serve the Person Representative, and can doe 
nothing against his Command, nor without his Authority” (Ibid. XXIII. 378).  
 Runciman (2016: 373-74) argues that public ministers represent the state 
rather than the sovereign. Hobbes does sometimes suggest this reading, such as 
when he says that public ministers represent “the Person [qua representee] of 
the Commonwealth” (2012: XXIII. 376), but he also provides a decisive reason to 
reject it. Given that “it is consequent to plurality of Representers, that there bee a 
plurality of Persons” (Ibid. XLI. 772),38 the state would be multiple persons if it 
had multiple representatives. Further, when Hobbes provides examples of public 
ministers, he says that they act “in the name of the Soveraign”, “represent the 
person of the Soveraign”, “represent the Person of their own Soveraign”, and 
“serve the Person Representative” (Ibid. XXIII. 378-82). Although every action 
that public ministers perform is ultimately “the act of the Common-wealth” (Ibid. 
XXIII. 382), their actions are attributable to the state only through the sovereign: 
public ministers represent the sovereign, and the sovereign, in turn, represents 
the state. Hobbes confirms this reading in his reply to John Bramhall: “All that he 
objecteth is, that it followeth hereupon, that there be as many Persons of a King, 
as there be petty Constables in his Kingdom. And so there are, or else he cannot 
be obeyed” (2011: 393). If a king has as many persons as he has ministers, then 
public ministers must represent the sovereign rather than the state. Hobbes had 
a good reason not to allow public ministers to represent the state directly: they 
might claim to represent the state independently of the sovereign, as Parliament 
did around the time of the English Civil War. Portraying public ministers as 
deputies of the sovereign makes it clear that they are subordinate to the 
sovereign. 
 In sum, Hobbes’ formula for making a person out of a multitude involves 
five types of persons. When the multitude of (1) natural persons authorize a 
representative artificial person, whether (2) an individual (who is a true 
representative) or (3) an assembly (which is a fictional representative), they are 
transformed into (4) a represented artificial person (by fiction). The 
                                                        
38 Although the 12 Apostles represent the same person of God, this is possible 




representative artificial person is simultaneously (5) a represented artificial 
person (truly) when she (or it) authorizes public ministers to act on her (or its) 
behalf. Figure 1 describes how all of these persons hang together. 
 
Figure 1. Hobbes’ Theory of the State39 
 
 
The subjects authorize the sovereign; the sovereign authorizes public ministers; 
public ministers represent the sovereign; and the sovereign represents the state. 
The state neither authorizes nor represents; it is only passively represented.  
 Representation of the state is conceptually similar to representation by 
fiction of other artificial persons, such as “Children, Fooles, and Mad-men that 
have no use of Reason” and “Inanimate things, as a Church, an Hospital, a Bridge” 
(Hobbes, 2012: XVI. 246-48). Like “Fooles” and bridges, states “may be 
personated ... but cannot be Authors, nor therefore give Authority to their 
Actors” (Ibid. 246). Just as the representatives of “Fooles” and bridges must be 
authorized by their “Owners, or Governours” (Ibid.), the representatives of states 
must be authorized by their subjects. As Skinner (1999: 22) and Abizadeh (2012: 
133-34) argue, Hobbes’ state is most similar to “An Idol, or meer Figment of the 
brain”, such as the “Gods of the Heathen” (2012: XVI. 248). Although “Idols 
cannot be Authors: for an Idol is nothing”, the Roman Gods “were Personated, 
                                                        
39 This diagram is inspired by Runciman’s (2009) diagrams. 
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and held Possessions, and other Goods, and Rights, which men from time to time 
dedicated, and consecrated unto them” (Ibid. 248). “Fooles” and bridges exist 
regardless of whether anyone represents them, but the state, like a figment of the 
imagination, ceases to exist if it ceases to be represented: “a Common-wealth, 
without Soveraign Power, is but a word, without substance, and cannot stand” 
(Ibid. XXXI. 554).   
 What Hobbes gives us is an account of how the state can be a person—
that is, an entity that has actions, rights, and responsibilities attributed to it—
even though it is not an actor. Although the state has no more agency than a 
bridge or an idol does, it can properly be said to make laws, sign treaties, borrow 
money, and exercise the rights of sovereignty as long as the agent who in fact 
performs these actions has been duly authorized to act in its name. I turn to the 
question of who or what counts as an authorized representative in Chapter 3. 
 
2.4 Artificial Men and Artificial Animals 
 There are two rival interpretations of Hobbes’ theory of the state that 
must be addressed. First, since Hobbes frequently anthropomorphizes the state, 
it is possible to interpret his theory of the state as a predecessor of the agential 
theory. Second, since Hobbes compares the parts of the state to the organs of the 
body, it is possible to interpret his theory of the state as a predecessor of the 
functional theory. I argue that both of these interpretations are mistaken. If we 
resist the urge to project contemporary theories of the state back onto Hobbes, 
we can recover a unique and valuable conception of state personality from his 
political thought. 
 
2.4.1 Hobbes’ State as a Corporate Agent 
 Like proponents of the agential theory, Hobbes employs an analogy 
between states and human beings. He describes the state as an “Artificiall Man” 
(2012: Intro. 16), and the frontispiece of Leviathan depicts the state as a large 
man composed of many smaller men. In addition, Hobbes sometimes equates 
‘person’ with ‘actor’. If the state is a person, and “a Person, is the same that an 
Actor is” (Ibid. XVI. 248), then it seems to follow that the state is an actor. It is 
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therefore plausible to read Hobbes’ theory of the state as a predecessor of the 
agential theory. 
 Many IR scholars, political theorists, and philosophers interpret Hobbes’ 
theory of the state as a rudimentary theory of corporate agency. According to 
List and Pettit (2011: 7), Hobbes’ “‘authorization theory’ of group agency ... 
distinguished three ways a multitude or collection of individuals might form a 
group agent, particularly a state or commonwealth”. They argue that Hobbes’ 
state is “a degenerate group agent” because it fails to meet the standard of 
collective rationality (Ibid. 76). As Pettit (2014: 1648) later writes, “Hobbes takes 
the group agent that individuals constitute by recruiting an individual 
spokesperson to be an agent or person only ‘by fiction’”. Erskine (2001: 75) 
similarly portrays Hobbes’ state as a crude imitation of a corporate agent: “For 
Hobbes, the agency of the state is a useful ‘fiction’. Conversely, my aim is to 
establish the institution as a moral agent in a way that is not simply 
metaphorical”. Even Hobbes scholars have interpreted him in this way. 
Baumgold (1988: 43, 51) describes what she calls “Hobbes’ nominalist analysis 
of corporate agency”, which explains how “the multitude forms itself into a 
‘people’, or corporate agent”. Garsten (2010: 525) likewise reads ‘person’ as 
‘agent’: “to speak of a ‘people’ as if it could want anything, or do anything, was to 
speak of it as an agent—or, in Hobbes’s vocabulary, a ‘person’—an entity capable 
of being responsible for words and actions”. 
 Although Hobbes’ state could indeed be said to will and act, it is not an 
agent in the sense that contemporary philosophers, political theorists, and IR 
scholars use the term. Agents, in this sense, are “intentional—purposive or goal-
directed—systems” (Wendt, 2004: 295). In List and Pettit’s (2011: 20) terms, an 
agent is an entity that “has representational states, motivational states, and a 
capacity to process them and to act on their basis”—that is, an entity that acts 
according to its own will and its own conception of its environment. Hobbes’ 
state is not an agent, or even a fictional agent, by these definitions. As I have 
previously argued, his state is not a fictional actor or agent, but a fictional 




Hobbes’ state lacks the defining feature of a corporate agent: a will that is 
distinct from the wills of its members and representatives (section 1.1.1). He 
repeatedly denies that the state has a distinct will. Although he occasionally 
refers to “the Will of the Common-wealth”, he insists that it is nothing more than 
“the Will of the Representative” (Hobbes, 2012: XXVI. 420). Just as the will of a 
bridge is nothing but the will of its caretaker, the will of a state is nothing but the 
will of its sovereign: “a Common-wealth hath no Will, nor makes no Lawes, but 
those that are made by the Will of him, or them that have the Soveraign Power” 
(Ibid. XXXI. 570). Similarly, in De Cive, Hobbes says that “a commonwealth has a 
will, and can assent and refuse through the holder of sovereign power, and only 
so” (Hobbes, 1998: VI.19, see also VI.1a). This claim plays a crucial role for 
Hobbes. If the state had a will of its own, then two seditious possibilities would 
arise: the state could act independently of the sovereign, or the subjects could 
object that the sovereign has misrepresented the will of the state. The idea that 
the state is an agent in its own right is precisely what Hobbes wanted to rule out. 
 However, Hobbes does allow that assemblies have wills of their own. The 
will of an assembly, as Hobbes (1998: V.7) says, must be “understood as the will 
of the greater part of the men who make up the assembly”. It cannot be identified 
with the will of any particular individual. A crucial part of Hobbes’ theory of the 
state is that a sovereign representative, which must have a will of some kind, can 
be an assembly. Whereas states and other ‘characters’ cannot be said to act 
unless they are represented by third parties, an assembly can be its own 
representative, just as an individual can: “a Monarch, hath the person not onely 
of the Common-wealth, but also of a man; and a Soveraign Assembly hath the 
Person not onely of the Common-wealth, but also of the Assembly” (2012: XXIII. 
376). If there are any rudimentary corporate agents in Hobbes’ political thought, 
they are assemblies, not states.40  
 Yet a Hobbesian assembly differs in some important respects from a 
corporate agent. Whereas a corporate agent can have intentions that none of its 
                                                        
40 Corporations are not corporate agents either: like states, they will and act only 
through their representatives. Hobbes repeatedly suggests that states and 
corporations are persons of the same kind, such as when he describes the latter 
as “many lesser Common-wealths in the bowels of a greater” (2012: XXIX. 516; 
see also 1994: XXVII.7; 1998: V.10). 
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members share, a Hobbesian assembly cannot. If an assembly uses majority rule 
to decide every issue, as Hobbes suggests, then it cannot have an intention unless 
the majority of its members also have that intention. Recall Tollefsen’s example 
of the admissions committee (section 1.1.1, Table 1). It is possible for the 
committee to intend to admit an applicant to the PhD program against the wills 
of each of its members only because the decision-making procedure of the 
committee is not strictly majoritarian. The members of the committee vote on 
four ‘premises’—whether Trevor has a good test score, good grades, good letters, 
and a good writing sample—and then let their votes on these premises dictate 
the committee’s decision about whether Trevor will be admitted. Conversely, a 
Hobbesian version of this committee would vote directly on whether to admit 
Trevor. Its members’ judgments about whether he satisfies each criterion for 
admission would not be aggregated. Since all of the members of the committee 
voted against admitting Trevor, the committee would decline to admit him. The 
will of a Hobbesian assembly, unlike the will of a corporate agent, can never be 
anything more than the will of the majority.  
 Pettit (2008: 82-83) argues that Hobbes fails to appreciate the limitations 
of majoritarian decision-making (see also List and Pettit, 2011: 43-46). If the 
members of an assembly decide every issue using majority voting, then they are 
likely to end up making an inconsistent set of decisions. Pettit uses the example 
of a three-member assembly that must decide four issues: whether to balance 
the budget, whether to increase taxes, whether to increase military spending, 
and whether to increase other spending. Its members vote as follows. 
 
Table 3. Pettit’s Sovereign Assembly 
 Balance the 
budget? 




Member #1 Yes No Yes No (reduce) 
Member #2 Yes No No (reduce) Yes 
Member #3 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Assembly Yes No Yes Yes 
 
Although each member of the assembly makes a consistent proposal, the 
decision of the majority is inconsistent. It is impossible to simultaneously 
balance the budget, increase military spending, and increase other spending 
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without increasing taxes. This example illustrates a more general problem with 
majoritarian decision-making. Any assembly that tries to follow the will of the 
majority on every issue, as Hobbes proposes, will face a “‘discursive dilemma’: 
they can be responsive to individuals, in which case they will risk collectively 
[sic] irrationality; or they can ensure collective rationality, in which case they 
may fail to be responsive to individuals” (Pettit, 2008: 83). Pettit argues that 
assemblies have little choice but to take the second horn of the dilemma. They 
must follow the minority on some issues—for instance, by increasing taxes 
against the will of the majority—in order to ensure that their decisions are 
consistent and actionable. 
 Hobbes had obviously never heard of the discursive dilemma, but he 
would not have been troubled by it. He would simply have grasped the other 
horn of the dilemma. List and Pettit (2011: 56-58) solve the dilemma through a 
“sequential priority procedure”, which means letting the assembly’s decisions on 
temporally or logically prior issues determine its decisions on later or derivative 
issues. In the example above, the assembly might let its decisions on the other 
three issues dictate its decision about whether to raise taxes. Hobbes would 
solve the dilemma in precisely the opposite way: by letting later votes overturn 
earlier votes. He is deeply hostile to the idea that sovereigns, or even subordinate 
judges, can be bound by the decisions of their predecessors: “mens Judgements 
have been perverted, by trusting to Precedents … though the Sentence of the 
Judge, be a Law to the party pleading, yet it is no Law to any Judge, that shall 
succeed him in that Office” (Hobbes, 2012: XXVI. 434). If the assembly first voted 
to balance the budget, then to increase military spending, then to increase other 
spending, and then to keep taxes the same, the vote to keep taxes the same 
would overturn one of the three earlier decisions. The assembly would have to 
vote again to decide which to overturn.  
 The underlying principle is that “The Soveraign of a Common-wealth, be it 
an Assembly, or one Man, is not Subject to the Civill Lawes. For having power to 
make, and repeale Lawes, he may when he pleaseth, free himself from that 
subjection” (Ibid. XXVI. 416). Anything that the majority decides to do can be 
undone by a subsequent majority. This Hobbesian solution to the discursive 
dilemma follows from his theory of sovereignty. States are “Absolute, and 
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Independent, subject to none but their own Representative” (Ibid. XXII. 348), 
which means that this representative cannot be bound—not by its subjects, nor 
by other sovereigns, nor by the decisions of its predecessors, nor even by its 
previous decisions. Hobbes might have to admit that this solution to the 
discursive dilemma will not work for subordinate assemblies, such as the boards 
of companies and universities, which are legally bound by their prior actions and 
agreements. In any case, the discursive dilemma presents no problem for 
Hobbes’ theory of the state.  
 The main problem with describing Hobbes’ state as a corporate agent is 
not that it is anachronistic, but that it is misleading. Hobbes’ state does not have a 
will, as ‘agency’ implies; it wills and acts only through its sovereign. If there are 
any primitive corporate agents in Hobbes’ political thought, they are assemblies, 
not states. It is difficult to fault readers for taking Hobbes at his word in Chapter 
16 of Leviathan when he says that persons are actors. Yet focusing too narrowly 
on this passage, and subsequently ignoring his definition of ‘person’ from 
Chapter 42, leads them to project the idea of corporate agency onto Hobbes’ 
state.  
 What makes his idea of state personality novel and valuable is precisely 
that it decouples personhood from agency. It therefore allows us to sidestep the 
protracted debates about the metaphysics of corporate agency and 
intentionality. If we follow Hobbes, then whether corporate entities (and also 
other entities, such as robots, animals, and nature) should have rights and 
responsibilities need not depend on whether they are really agents. Hobbesian 
personhood is created out of political processes of authorization and 
representation, not discovered through metaphysical speculation. After all, even 
“An Idol, or meer Figment of the brain, may be Personated” (Ibid. XVI. 248). All 
that an entity requires in order to be a Hobbesian person is an authorized 
representative who acts in its name. 
 
2.4.2 Hobbes’ State as an Organism 
 Hobbes’ theory of the state could also be interpreted as a predecessor of 
the functional theory. He gives credence to this interpretation when he describes 
the state as an “Artificial Animal” and when he compares the parts of the state to 
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the organs of the body (Ibid. Intro. 16). For example, he describes public 
ministers as the “parts Organicall” of the state, which “resembleth the Nerves, 
and Tendons that move the severall limbs of a body natural” (Ibid. XXIII. 376-78). 
Hobbes also suggests, much as contemporary international lawyers do, that the 
relation between a state and its organs is akin to principal-agent relation. He says 
that the actions of public ministers must have “the Common-wealth for Author” 
(Ibid. XXIII. 382), as if the state is the principal and its ministers are its agents. It 
is therefore plausible to interpret Hobbes’ theory of the state as a predecessor of 
the quasi-organic theory of the state that underpins international law. Hobbes is 
rarely interpreted this way (e.g., Baumgold, 1988: 39), but, at the risk of 
knocking over a straw man, it is worthwhile to show that this interpretation is 
mistaken, if only to clearly distinguish Hobbes’ theory of the state from the 
functional theory. 
 Hobbes’ state is more like a machine than it is like an organism 
(Runciman, 1997: 21-24; Sagar, 2018). Although he describes the state as an 
“Artificiall Animal”, he conceives of animals, including human beings, as nothing 
more than machines: “For seeing life is but a motion of Limbs, the beginning 
whereof is in some principall part within; why may we not say, that 
all Automata (Engines that move themselves by springs and wheeles as doth a 
watch) have an artificiall life?” (Hobbes, 2012: Intro. 16). The heart is a spring, 
nerves are strings, and joints are wheels; the artificial heart (treasury), nerves 
(rewards and punishments), and joints (magistrates) of the state are simply 
artificial springs, strings, and wheels. As Runciman (1997: 24) points out, 
“Hobbes's organicism is as applicable to the watch to which the Leviathan is first 
of all compared as it is to the commonwealth itself”. The relation between the 
state and its organs is more mechanical than organic or teleological. Hobbes’ 
theory of the state is a mechanistic theory rather than a functional theory. His 
use of the organic metaphor was, above all, rhetorical. Describing the state in 
terms of the body was ubiquitous in early modern political thought (Holland, 
2017: 3-5), and Hobbes used this trope to give his readers a familiar heuristic 




 The relation between the state and its representatives bears only a 
superficial resemblance to a principal-agent relation. Whereas a principal 
authorizes his or her own agents, the state has representatives authorized for it 
by third parties (namely, subjects and the sovereign). Although Hobbes (2012: 
XXIII. 382) occasionally says that the state authorizes public ministers, he makes 
it clear that the state grants authority only through its sovereign: “For 
such Protectors, Vice-Roys, and Governors, have no other right, but what 
depends on the Soveraigns Will” (Ibid. XXIII. 378). Since the state “can do nothing 
but by the Person that Represents it” (Ibid. XXIV. 388), the state cannot grant 
authority except through the sovereign. The sovereign, in turn, receives her (or 
its) authority from the members of the multitude. Representation of the state is 
thus structurally different from a principal-agent relation. The relation between 
a lawyer and a client is dyadic: the client authorizes the lawyer, and the lawyer 
represents the client. The state is much more complex: the subjects authorize the 
sovereign, the sovereign authorizes public ministers, public ministers represent 
the sovereign, and the sovereign represents the state.  
     *** 
 Hobbes uses a variety of analogies for the state—artificial animal, 
artificial man, mortal god—because the state is not perfectly analogous to 
anything. Like an animal, the state is a kind of automaton, or a self-contained, 
mechanical system. Unlike a non-human animal, but like a man, the state is 
capable of speech and action. Unlike a man, however, the state is not an agent in 
its own right; it needs a representative to speak and act in its name. In this way, 
Hobbes’ artificial man is more like an artificial “Foole”, although he clearly would 
have balked at this suggestion. Like God, the state is the highest power in its 
respective domain. Just as God is supreme in the spiritual world, the state is 
supreme in the temporal world. In addition, as Abizadeh (2012, 2017) argues, 
the state and God are both represented by fiction: neither is capable of acting 
except through the sovereign and her ministers. Unlike God, however, the state 
cannot have multiple representatives. While “In the Kingdome of God, there may 
be three Persons independent, without breach of unity in God that Reigneth; but 
where men Reigne, that be subject to diversity of opinions, it cannot be so” 
(Hobbes, 2012: XXIX. 512). Multiple representation of God is the Holy Trinity; 
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multiple representation of the state is civil war. Each of Hobbes’ analogies 
captures an important aspect of the state but obscures others. The only way to 
precisely describe Hobbes’ state is to describe the relations of authorization and 
representation that constitute it (Figure 1).  
 
2.5 The Hobbesian Theory of State Responsibility 
 What I have shown so far is that Hobbes had a unique idea of state 
personality and that this idea has no contemporary counterpart. I argue in the 
remainder of the thesis that this idea of state personality provides a helpful way 
of conceptualizing state responsibility in the present. However, there is one 
apparent problem with this argument that must be addressed at the outset.  
 Although Hobbes (2012: XXII. 352) allows that subordinate corporations 
can be held responsible, his theory of sovereignty rules out the possibility that 
states could be held responsible. When companies misbehave, the state can fine 
or even dissolve them, but there is no higher authority that can fine or dissolve 
states. What distinguishes states from other corporate entities is that they are 
“Absolute, and Independent, subject to none but their own Representative” (Ibid. 
XXII. 348), which implies that there is no one to whom states can be responsible. 
A state cannot be responsible to another state because there is no higher 
authority that can compel states to fulfill their responsibilities to each other. As 
Malcolm (2002: 438-39) points out, Hobbes did think states had “natural” duties 
to uphold their agreements, as long as these agreements remain compatible with 
their survival and security: “if a weaker Prince, make a disadvantageous peace 
with a stronger, for feare; he is bound to keep it; unlesse (as hath been sayd 
before) there ariseth some new, and just cause of feare, to renew the war” 
(Hobbes, 2012: XIV. 212). But because “all men are equall, and judges of the 
justnesse of their own fears” in the state of nature (Ibid. 210), this effectively 
means that sovereigns have a right to repudiate their state’s agreements 
whenever they see fit. Further, if there were a higher authority that were capable 
of enforcing agreements between states, then this authority would, by Hobbes’ 
definition, be the lone state; there would consequently be no other states to 
which it could be responsible. 
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 A state also cannot “be obligated to a citizen; for since [the sovereign] can 
release it from its obligation, if he so wishes (since the will of each citizen is 
comprehended in the will of the commonwealth in all matters), the 
commonwealth is free whenever it so wishes” (Hobbes, 1998: VI.14). An 
agreement between the state and a subject would be of no consequence. If the 
state (acting through the sovereign) violated the agreement, the subject would 
have no reason to complain, because he “is Author of every act the Soveraign 
doth” (2012: XXI. 330), including the act that violated the agreement. According 
to Hobbes, states can be responsible only in a weak sense. They have 
responsibilities that derive from natural law, but they can never be held 
responsible because they are not subject to any higher authority. 
 However, as Runciman (2009) argues, Hobbes’ absolutism is not an 
unavoidable implication of his theory of representation. On the contrary, the core 
structure of Hobbes’ theory of representation—the relations of authorization 
and representation between the subjects, sovereign, public ministers, and 
state—is compatible with modern democracy and the idea of limited 
government. What is not compatible with modern democracy or limited 
government is Hobbes’ theory of sovereignty, which says that the sovereign’s 
authority is limitless and can never be withdrawn.41 His theory of sovereignty is 
also what precludes holding states responsible. If we retain Hobbes’ theory of 
representation but reject the idea that states are “subject to none but their own 
Representative” (Hobbes, 2012: XXII. 348), then a Hobbesian theory of state 
responsibility becomes possible. 
 The Hobbesian theory of state responsibility has three parts, which 
correspond to the Three Fundamental Questions. The first part is ‘attribution’: 
subjects authorize the government, and the government represents the state. 
The consequent responsibilities, such as debts and treaty obligations, are 
attributable to the state. The second part is ‘succession’: the state (along with its 
                                                        
41 Tuck (2016: Ch. 2) argues that Hobbes’ theory of sovereignty is more 
amenable to democracy than is usually thought. The people can be a “sleeping 
sovereign” that retains sovereignty even though they have appointed a monarch 
or an assembly to wield power. Yet a Hobbesian democracy, unlike a modern 
democracy, is still absolutist; it cannot be limited, either by constitutional 
constraints or by international law. The absolutist aspect of Hobbes’ theory of 
sovereignty is what precludes a more robust notion of state responsibility. 
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responsibilities) persists over time as long as it has a continuous series of 
representatives. The identity of the state is sustained by representation, just as it 
is created by representation. The third part is ‘distribution’: the costs and 
burdens of the state’s responsibilities are distributed to its subjects. Insofar as 
subjects are the authors of the sovereign’s actions, it is legitimate to distribute 
the resulting costs and burdens to them.  
 
Figure 2. The Hobbesian Theory of State Responsibility 
 
 
Judgments of state responsibility can be evaluated according to whether the 
judgments of attribution, identity, and distribution that underpin them are 
sound. Consider the claim that Turkey should pay reparations for the Armenian 
genocide. There are three ways in which this claim could fail: first, if the people 
who carried out the genocide were not authorized representatives of Turkey, 
which implies that the genocide was not an act of state; second, if the Republic of 
Turkey is not the same state as the Ottoman Empire, which implies that the 
former is not responsible for a genocide committed by the latter; and third, if the 
subjects of present-day Turkey are not authors of the genocide. (There is also a 
purely empirical way in which Turkey could fail to owe reparations; the Turkish 
government maintains that there was no genocide.) The next three chapters 




ATTRIBUTION: THE QUESTION OF OWNERSHIP 
 
 
 “[M]en cannot distinguish, without study and great understanding, between one 
action of many men, and many actions of one multitude” (Hobbes, 2012: XI. 158). 
 
How can actions be attributed to a state? Hobbes’ answer is deceptively 
simple: an action counts as an act of state provided that the agent who 
performed the action was an authorized representative of the state. For example, 
an airstrike is attributable to Israel if and only if the pilot who carried out the 
airstrike was an authorized representative of Israel. We do not need to 
determine the ‘intentions’ of the state, as the agential theory suggests. Nor do we 
need to determine whether the individuals who performed the action were 
‘organs’ of the state, as the functional theory suggests. The familiar concepts of 
authorization and representation do all of the work. 
However, there are many boundary cases and complications. Can 
dictators be authorized representatives? Hobbes thought so, but most of us 
would now doubt this. What about parastatal entities, such as state-owned 
companies? Hobbes thought of corporations, public and private, as little more 
than extensions of their parent states, but present-day corporations are much 
more autonomous. This chapter reconstructs Hobbes’ account of attribution and 
shows that, with some modifications, it provides an elegant and intuitive answer 
to the Question of Ownership.  
The chapter has five sections. The first section distinguishes two types of 
responsibilities and two corresponding modes of attribution. Whereas general 
responsibilities are attributed to states according to their types (such as 
‘wealthy’ or ‘democratic’), personal responsibilities are attributed to states 
according to the actions of their authorized representatives (such as signing a 
treaty or borrowing money). The second section divides Hobbes’ account of 
attribution into its two components: representation and authorization. The third 
section addresses problems and complications with this account, such as 
whether dictators count as authorized representatives and whether the actions 
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of rogue officials count as acts of state. The fourth section translates Hobbes’ 
account of attribution into an account of state responsibility. The state, its 
representatives, and its subjects are all implicated in acts of state, but in different 
senses: ownership lies with the state; accountability and culpability lie with its 
representatives; and liability lies with its subjects. The final section develops an 
account of misattribution, or ‘impersonation’, which determines who or what is 
responsible for misrepresentation and unauthorized representation of the state.  
 
3.1 General and Personal Responsibilities 
 There are two ways in which persons can incur responsibilities. The first 
is simply by being persons, or persons of a particular type. For example, it is 
often said that the rich have a responsibility to help the poor. The claim is that 
rich people have responsibilities because they belong to the type, ‘rich’. It does 
not matter how they got rich or whether they agreed to help the poor; the 
responsibility is attributed to them on the basis of their class alone. General 
responsibilities are prospective and, as the label suggests, general in form: ‘all 
persons (of type F) ought (not) to do X’. These include role-based 
responsibilities, which are attributed to persons according to their statuses (such 
as ‘police officer’), and relational responsibilities, which are attributed to persons 
according to their relations to other persons (such as ‘parent’ or ‘neighbour’).  
 The second way in which persons incur responsibilities is through their 
actions. If Margaret owes money to a creditor, it is because she borrowed the 
money. The amount of money she owes does not depend on how much money 
she has. The responsibility to repay the creditor is attributed to her on the basis 
of her actions rather than her class. Personal responsibilities have a simple 
subject-predicate form, and they can be either prospective or retrospective: ‘P 
ought (not) to do X’ or ‘P ought (not) to have done X’. Whereas general 
responsibilities are attributed to persons according to their types, personal 
responsibilities are attributed to persons according to their actions. 
 Many of the responsibilities of states are general. For example, the United 
Nations General Assembly proclaimed in 2005 that “[e]ach individual State has 
the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity” (UN, 2005: Art. 138). The claim is that all 
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persons that belong to the type, ‘state’, have a responsibility to protect their 
populations. Other general responsibilities apply to types of states, such the 
responsibility of wealthy states to help poor states. Attributing general 
responsibilities to states is theoretically unproblematic. There are often 
definitional issues, such as whether Romania counts as a wealthy state. But once 
the content of a general responsibility is specified precisely enough, the 
attribution of it is almost automatic. If states with per capita GDPs above $40,000 
USD have a responsibility to devote ten percent of their GDPs to helping states 
with per capita GDPs below $10,000, it follows logically that Luxembourg has 
this responsibility and that Romania does not. Problems of attribution that 
involve general responsibilities can only be solved only by refining our first-
order normative theories. A better theory of state responsibility will not make 
attribution any easier. 
 Most of the theoretical issues of attribution arise from personal 
responsibilities, such as debts, reparations, and treaty obligations. These 
responsibilities presuppose the attribution of particular actions to particular 
states. For example, the controversy about whether Russia is responsible for the 
2014 missile attack on Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17 hinges on whether the act 
of launching the missile is attributable to Russia or only to particular pro-
Russian rebels (Gibney, 2015). Issues of attribution are also central to the debate 
about whether states can commit crimes. It makes sense to hold Serbia (rather 
than individual Serbians) criminally responsible for ethnic cleansing during the 
Yugoslav Wars only if both the act of ethnic cleansing and the corresponding 
intent can be attributed to the state (Lang, 2011). Any theory of state 
responsibility must begin with an account of attribution—an account of what 
constitutes an act of state.  
 
 3.2 The Conditions for Attribution 
 Hobbes drew a sharp distinction between acts of state and private acts. 
Actions of the state, or “the people”, are those performed by its authorized 
representatives: “Whenever we say that a People ... is willing, commanding or 
doing something, we mean a commonwealth which is commanding, willing and 
acting through the will of one man or [assembly]” (Hobbes, 1998: VI.1a). Private 
84 
 
actions are those performed by subjects, or members of “the multitude”. He saw 
the failure to distinguish “between one action of many men, and many actions of 
one multitude” (2012: XI. 158) as a major cause of sedition and conflict. Subjects 
“are disposed to take for the action of the people, that which is a multitude of 
actions done by a multitude of men” (Ibid.), which leads them to misattribute 
private actions to the state. What Hobbes had in mind was the rebellion against 
Charles I during the English Civil Wars (1642-46, 1648-49). Subjects mistook the 
actions of the Parliamentarians for actions of England because they “speak of a 
large number of men as the people, i.e. as the commonwealth; they speak of the 
commonwealth having rebelled against the king (which is impossible)” (1998: 
XII.8). According to Hobbes, there are two individually necessary and jointly 




 The first condition for attribution is that the action must be performed in 
the name of the state. The fact that the action is performed by a state official, or 
even by the sovereign, is not sufficient. As Hobbes (2012: XXIII. 376) says, “a 
Monarch, hath the person not onely of the Common-wealth, but also of a man; 
and a Soveraign Assembly hath the Person not onely of the Common-wealth, but 
also of the Assembly”.42 When the sovereign acts (e.g., buys property or signs a 
contract) as a natural person, or in his own name, the action is attributable to 
him as an individual. But when the sovereign acts as an artificial person, or in the 
name of the state, the action is attributable to the state. Whether an act of the 
sovereign counts as a private act or as an act of state depends on which person—
his own person, or the person of the state—he represents at the time. 
 Similarly, subordinate officials or “ministers” may represent either the 
natural person or the artificial person of the sovereign. Ministers “that be 
servants to [sovereigns] in their naturall Capacity, are not Publique Ministers; 
but those onely that serve them in the Administration of the Publique businesse” 
(Ibid. XXIII. 376). Public ministers include judges, treasurers, provincial and 
colonial governors, ambassadors, civil servants, police officers, and soldiers. 
                                                        
42 For the sake of brevity, I refer to the sovereign as if it is always an individual.  
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They represent the artificial person of the sovereign and, indirectly, “the Person 
of the Commonwealth” (Ibid. XXIII. 376). For example, “in their Seats of Justice 
[judges] represent the person of the Soveraign; and their Sentence, is his 
Sentence” (Ibid. XXIII. 380); his sentence is, in turn, the state’s sentence. 
Sentencing a criminal is therefore an act of state. Conversely, private ministers 
represent the natural person of the sovereign (Ibid. XXIII. 382). When a servant 
makes tea for the sovereign, the act of making tea is not an act of state. Nor 
would making tea for the sovereign be an act of state if a judge or an ambassador 
did it, even though judges and ambassadors are normally considered to be public 
ministers. To act in the name of the artificial person of the sovereign, and hence 
the state, is to act for a public purpose. 
 If Hobbes’ distinction between natural and artificial representation seems 
obvious, it is because something like it is taken for granted in modern politics. 
We still distinguish private acts from acts of state in much the same way that 
Hobbes did. When Theresa May signs a contract in her natural capacity, we say 
‘May signed a contract’. But when May signs a contract in her artificial capacity, 
we say ‘the United Kingdom signed a contract’.43 The only significant difference 
between Hobbes’ notion of political representation and the modern notion is that 
we are less clear about where sovereignty is located. (As I discuss in the next 
section, where we fundamentally diverge from Hobbes is on the issue of 
authorization.) Hobbes insists on a sharp distinction between the sovereign, who 
represents the state directly, and the public ministers, who represent the state 
indirectly by representing the artificial person of the sovereign (see section 2.3). 
This distinction remains fairly sharp in constitutional monarchies. May is the 
prime (public) minister, and she represents the United Kingdom through the 
Queen, who is the sovereign. One might doubt that the Queen is the sovereign of 
the United Kingdom, let alone Canada or New Zealand, in anything but a vacuous, 
formal sense. But if the Queen is not really the sovereign, then who is? 
Parliament? The subjects? One might even doubt that there is a sovereign—
much less a Hobbesian sovereign—in a modern, democratic state.  
                                                        
43 See Fleming (2017a) for a Hobbesian analysis of the semantics of our language 
about the state. I show that Hobbes’ theory of attributed action allows us to make 
sense of action-sentences about states, such as ‘Israel invaded Lebanon’ and ‘the 
United Kingdom signed a contract’, without the idea of corporate agency. 
86 
 
The elusiveness of the modern sovereign matters little for the issue of 
attribution, since the actions of both the sovereign and the public ministers are 
ultimately attributable to the state. A contract that May signs in her artificial 
capacity binds the United Kingdom regardless of whether she is the sovereign or 
merely a minister. The important distinction is not that between the sovereign 
and the public ministers, but that between people who act in the name of the 
state and people who do not. In other words, what matters is who represents the 
state, not which of its representatives is sovereign. In what follows, I often 
collapse the distinction between the sovereign and public ministers by referring 
to both together as ‘the government’.44  
The concept of representation puts limits on the kinds of actions that can 
be attributed to the state. As Runciman (2009: 23) points out, “even the 
representatives of things that have no independent existence are limited by the 
need to keep up appearances”. An actor must provide a plausible portrayal of the 
character that he plays, even if this character is fictional. He might portray Robin 
Hood as a marksman instead of an archer, but he cannot portray Robin Hood as a 
greedy executive. The first portrayal is conceivable, albeit anachronistic; the 
second is so far ‘out of character’ that the audience will probably reject it. The 
representatives of the state are similarly constrained by the need to play its role 
in a plausible way. Although Hobbes insists that sovereigns can never be held 
accountable by their subjects, he argues that it is nevertheless important for 
sovereigns to provide a portrayal of the state that is acceptable to their subjects. 
The sovereign should always appear to be acting to preserve “the safety of the 
people … [and] all other Contentments of life, which every man by lawfull 
Industry, without danger, or hurt to the Common-wealth, shall acquire to 
himselfe” (2012: XXX. 520). It is especially important “that Justice be equally 
administred to all degrees of People; that is, that as well the rich, and mighty, as 
poor and obscure persons” (Ibid. XXX. 534). If the sovereign routinely acts in his 
own interest or in the interest of a certain class of subjects, then many of his 
subjects will come to see him as a natural person who is merely pretending to be 
                                                        
44 I elide the distinction between sovereign and government with recognition 
that it is important for purposes other than attribution, such as determining who 
has the final say on constitutional questions (see Tuck, 2016). 
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an artificial person, and they will cease to accept his actions as acts of state. The 
inevitable result of “partiality toward the great” is “the ruine of the Common-
wealth” (Ibid. XXX. 536), both metaphorically and literally: the idea that the state 
is a distinct person will be lost, and the political union will be torn apart by 
faction and rebellion. 
The representatives of modern states are similarly bound by the 
constraints of representation. Theresa May can sign a treaty in the name of the 
United Kingdom, but she cannot take a vacation in the name of the United 
Kingdom. Nor can she buy her husband a palace in the name of the United 
Kingdom. The more tenuous the connection is between an action and “the safety 
of the people”—or, as we would now say, the public good—the less plausible it is 
to attribute that action to the state. 
 
3.2.2 Authorization 
 Representation is necessary but not sufficient for attribution. Anyone can 
act in the name of the state, but only the actions of those who are authorized to 
do so are attributable to the state. As Hobbes says, “a Souldier without Command 
[of the sovereign], though he fight for the Common-wealth, does not therefore 
represent the Person of it” (Ibid. XXIII. 378). The Parliamentarians clearly acted 
in the name of England; what distinguishes them from Charles I is that they 
lacked authority (at least, in Hobbes’ view, before the King was executed). 
Authority likewise distinguished the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) 
from the Irish Army. Members of the Provisional IRA acted in the name of the 
Republic of Ireland, but, because they were not authorized to do so, their actions 
were not attributable to the state. We therefore say that the Provisional IRA 
assassinated Lord Mountbatten, not that the Republic of Ireland did. Much as 
Hobbes did, we use the concept of authority to distinguish personation of the 
state from impersonation of the state. 
 For Hobbes, authorization of the state’s representatives proceeds in two 
steps. The individual members of the multitude first “Authorise all the Actions 
and Judgements, of [one] Man, or Assembly of men” (Ibid. XVIII. 264); this man 
or assembly becomes the sovereign. The sovereign then parcels out this 
authority to public ministers, who “have no other right, but what depends on the 
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Soveraigns Will” and therefore “can doe nothing against his Command, nor 
without his Authority” (Ibid. XXIII. 378). As with representation, we no longer 
make such a stark distinction between sovereign authority and the authority of 
public ministers, but we still think of political authority as a roughly hierarchical 
chain. Authority is initially granted by subjects and then distributed among the 
representatives of the state. For example, in the Westminster system, subjects 
authorize members of parliament, members of parliament authorize the prime 
minister, the prime minister authorizes cabinet ministers, cabinet ministers 
authorize political staff, and so on. The important distinction is not that between 
sovereigns and public ministers, but that between representatives who are part 
of the chain of authority and representatives who are not.  
 Identifying the authorized representatives of the state is usually 
straightforward, since many of them literally wear their authority on their 
sleeves. Others have titles and documents that attest to their authority. As 
Hobbes says, “if the question be of Obedience to a publique Officer; To have seen 
his Commission, with the Publique Seale, and heard it read; or to have had the 
means to be informed of it, if a man would, is a sufficient Verification of his 
Authority” (Ibid. XXVI. 428). But a “Publique Seale” is clearly not a necessary sign 
of authority: a spy is a “Minister of the Common-wealth” even though he does not 
display his authority publicly (Ibid. XXIII. 382). The authority of spies, 
undercover police, and other secret agents can be inferred from the fact that they 
take orders from authorized representatives of the state.  
 So far, so simple. In order to count as an act of state, an action must (1) be 
performed in the name of the state, as well as constitute a plausible performance 
of the state’s role; and (2) be performed by an agent who has been authorized, 
directly or indirectly, by the subjects of the state. Omissions can be attributed to 
the state in the same way. For instance, we say that the United States failed to 
ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court because its 
authorized representatives failed to do so. As obvious as Hobbes’ account of 
attribution might seem, it differs greatly from the accounts of attribution that 
underpin the agential and functional theories of state responsibility. It relies on 
the concepts of representation and authorization rather than agency or function, 
and it therefore eliminates the need to identify the ‘intentions’ or ‘organs’ of the 
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state. However, as I explain in the next section, Hobbes’ account of attribution 
has several problems of its own.  
 
3.3 A Hobbesian Account of Attribution 
 There are five problems with Hobbes’ account of attribution: (1) his 
conception of ‘voluntary’ action is degenerate; (2) he assumes that subjects must 
authorize the sovereign unanimously; (3) he assumes that political authority 
must be limitless and therefore irrevocable; (4) he makes no distinction between 
the actions of unauthorized representatives and ultra vires actions; and (5) his 
view of subordinate corporations as extensions of the state is no longer realistic. 
What is needed in each case is a more refined notion of authorization. Although 
the structure of Hobbes’ account of attribution can be kept, his account of 
authorization must be discarded. This section makes the transition from Hobbes’ 
account of attribution to a ‘Hobbesian’ account of attribution. 
 
3.3.1 The Background Conditions for Authorization 
 Hobbes’ account of authorization is superficially similar to modern, 
democratic accounts of authorization (e.g., Parrish, 2009; Stilz, 2011). The 
representatives of the state are authorized by its subjects, and this authority can 
only be granted voluntarily: “The way by which a man either simply Renounceth, 
or Transferreth his Right, is a Declaration, or Signification, by some voluntary 
and sufficient signe, or signes, that he doth so Renounce, or Transferre” (Hobbes, 
2012: XIV. 202). However, what counts as a voluntary action for Hobbes is very 
different from what we would consider to be voluntary. In his view, actions that 
are performed under the threat of violence count as voluntary (Ibid. VI. 92; XIV. 
212), so authority that is granted under duress is valid. A sovereign who 
threatens his subjects into submission is nevertheless their authorized 
representative. 
 A Common-wealth by Acquisition, is that, where the Soveraign Power is 
 acquired by Force; And it is acquired by force, when men singly, or many 
 together by plurality of voyces, for fear of death, or bonds, do authorise all 
 the actions of that Man, or Assembly, that hath their lives and liberty in 




Hobbes places only one limit on what counts as valid authorization. People who 
are kept in prisons or chains cannot authorize their captors (Ibid. XX. 312-14), 
since a person can be bound by his words only if he is not already bound by 
force. The necessary background condition for valid authorization is thus that 
the author must have “corporall liberty allowed him” (Ibid. XX. 312). 
Hobbes’ account of authorization follows from his theory of the will. He 
defines the will as “the last Appetite, or Aversion, immediately adhaering to the 
action, or to the omission thereof” (Ibid. VI. 92).45 An appetite is an inclination 
toward something (such as hunger or lust), while an aversion is an inclination 
away from something (such as fear or disgust). An agent’s hunger is her will 
when it causes her to eat; an agent’s aversion to gaining weight is her will when 
it causes her to refrain from eating. Since “A Voluntary Act is that, which 
proceedeth from the Will” (Ibid. VI. 92), and since the will can be an aversion, it 
follows that “those [actions] that have their beginning from Aversion, or Feare of 
those consequences that follow the omission, are voluntary actions” (Ibid.). 
Hobbes considers authority that is granted under the threat of violence to be 
valid because, by his definition, it has been granted voluntarily. Although 
subjects of the Khmer Rouge might have pledged allegiance to the government 
because they were afraid of being killed, they nevertheless pledged allegiance 
voluntarily according to Hobbes, since their pledges proceeded from their wills. 
The only subjects of the Khmer Rouge who did not voluntarily pledge allegiance 
to the government were those who were compelled to do so through torture or 
imprisonment. Mere threats of torture, imprisonment, or even death do not 
suffice to make their pledge involuntary or their authorization invalid. 
Hobbes’ account of authorization looks repugnant to the modern reader, 
and for good reason. It implies that Pol Pot was an authorized representative of 
Cambodia no less than Tony Blair was an authorized representative of the United 
Kingdom. An adequate account of authorization requires a more refined 
conception of voluntary action. What makes an action voluntary is not just that it 
proceeds from the agent’s will, but that it proceeds from the agent’s authentic 
                                                        
45 See Overhoff (2000) on Hobbes’ theory of the will. 
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will—a will that follows from the agent’s own consideration and judgment.46 It is 
obviously true that no agent’s will ever fully meets this standard, even under the 
most favourable conditions. Habits, impulses, emotions, and social pressure 
inevitably interfere with our consideration and judgment. But although our wills 
are always corrupt, some wills are more corrupt than others. Voluntary action 
requires only a minimally authentic will, or, put the other way around, a will that 
has not been entirely corrupted or hijacked. A will that follows from habit, such 
as the desire to buy a product of a certain brand, seems authentic enough for 
voluntary action. So does a will that is shaped by social pressure, such as the 
desire to wear certain clothes to fit in with one’s peers. Even a will that follows 
from impulse or addiction, such as the desire to gamble or take drugs, is 
authentic enough for voluntary action in all but the most pathological cases. A 
will that follows from violent threats, systematic deception, or insanity, on the 
other hand, is not sufficiently authentic for voluntary action, since it is not 
mediated by the agent’s consideration and judgment. There are three necessary 
conditions for voluntary action and hence for valid authorization: the agent’s will 
must not be a product of (1) coercion, (2) indoctrination, or (3) incompetence. 
First, the ‘coercion condition’ says that an action is involuntary if the 
agent performs it under the threat of violence.47 If subjects pledge allegiance to a 
government only to avoid imprisonment, torture, or death, then they do not 
pledge allegiance voluntarily. The flaw in Hobbes’ argument to the contrary is 
not as obvious as it seems. He is right that actions performed out of fear are not 
necessarily involuntary: “when a man throweth his goods into the Sea 
for feare the ship should sink, he doth it neverthelesse very willingly” (Hobbes, 
2012: XXI. 326). His mistake is that he elides the difference between performing 
an action to avoid a negative consequence and performing an action to avoid a 
                                                        
46 The issue of ‘free will’ is beside the point. A will need not be ‘free’, in the sense 
of ‘undetermined’ or ‘agent-determined’, in order to be authentic. I take for 
granted (as Hobbes does) that agents’ wills are ultimately determined by some 
combination of forces beyond their control, such as education, socialization, and 
genetics. The relevant question is whether these forces are mediated by the 
agent’s own consideration and judgment. The distinction between voluntary and 
involuntary action does not require the idea of free will (Harris, 2012: 12-13). 
47 See Nozick (1969) for an influential account of coercion. While all kinds of 
threats can be coercive according to Nozick, I use ‘coercion’ more narrowly to 
refer to threats of violence. 
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negative consequence that another agent threatens to inflict. The man who 
throws his goods into the sea acts out of fear, but his actions are voluntary 
because the only will involved is his own. The subject who is threatened into 
pledging allegiance to a government does so involuntarily because her actions 
follow from someone else’s will. She is effectively an instrument of the 
government. What makes coerced authorization involuntary and therefore 
invalid is not that it is driven by fear, but that it is driven by the will of another 
agent.  
The first background condition for valid authorization is thus that the 
authors must not be compelled to authorize; otherwise, their authorization could 
not be said to follow from their own wills. At a minimum, subjects must be able 
to express dissent without violent consequences. This must be understood as a 
general standard rather than an absolute rule, since all governments occasionally 
use violence against dissenters. The fact that an otherwise liberal-democratic 
government has deployed police to arrest peaceful protesters clearly does not 
make it an unauthorized government. Even more violent and frequent repression 
of dissenters does not automatically disqualify the government from being 
authorized. A government that uses violence in response to certain kinds of 
dissent (such as protests) or certain kinds of dissenters (such as separatists) 
might still count as authorized if it allows other kinds of dissent, such as genuine 
opposition parties, public criticism, or independent opinion polling. The coercion 
condition only disqualifies governments that systematically and violently repress 
dissenters to such a degree that dissent is not a viable option. There are all too 
many examples of governments of this kind. The Maoist government, the Khmer 
Rouge, and, more recently, the governments of North Korea and Turkmenistan 
might be taken as archetypical examples. Governments that threaten their 
subjects into submission are ipso facto unauthorized because they make it 
impossible to know whether their subjects grant authority voluntarily. 
Second, the ‘indoctrination condition’ says that an action is involuntary if 
it is a consequence of systematic manipulation. If subjects support the 
government because it has used its power to indoctrinate or brainwash them, 
then they support the government involuntarily. What makes manipulated 
authorization involuntary is not that it proceeds from ignorance, but that it 
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proceeds from an inauthentic will. Someone who supports a certain party out of 
habit, without knowing much about the party’s platform or candidates, supports 
that party out of ignorance but nevertheless voluntarily, since the only will 
involved is his own. Someone who supports a certain party because the party has 
indoctrinated him (as in North Korea) does so involuntarily, since his will has 
been hijacked by other agents. Like the subject who is threatened into 
submission, the indoctrinated subject is little more than an instrument of the 
government. 
The second background condition for valid authorization is thus that 
subjects must have access to information. This is not to say that governments 
that control information or spread misinformation cannot count as authorized, 
but only that subjects must have some sources of information other than the 
government that they are supposed to authorize. Although Putin’s Russia and 
Erdoğan’s Turkey use censorship and propaganda, their subjects still have other 
sources of information, restricted as they are. Russian and Turkish subjects are 
not indoctrinated, much less brainwashed, though their governments have 
indeed deceived many of them. The governments of Turkmenistan and North 
Korea, on the other hand, have effectively monopolized information and used 
this power for systematic manipulation. Governments that indoctrinate their 
subjects are ipso facto unauthorized because they make it impossible for subjects 
to form the authentic wills that are necessary for valid authorization. 
The indoctrination condition is similar to Williams’ (2005: 6) “critical 
theory principle”, which says that “the acceptance of a justification [for 
exercising power] does not count if the acceptance itself is produced by the 
coercive power which is supposedly being justified”. Yet there is an important 
difference. Williams (2002: 226) argues that a “belief is not necessarily 
discredited just because it is caused through the power of someone”. The belief, 
and the consequent acceptance of the power that brought it about, is 
nevertheless valid as long as the agents would still accept the belief “[i]f they 
were to understand properly how they came to hold this belief” (Ibid. 227). 
Williams uses the example of compulsory education. Although the beliefs of a 
student are brought about through the power of her teacher, this power is 
legitimate insofar as the student, after coming to understand the power relation 
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between student and teacher, would continue to believe what the teacher taught 
her. The same test applies to the beliefs that subjects hold about their 
government: “If they were to understand properly how they came to hold this 
belief, would they give it up?” (Ibid. 227). 
 The indoctrination condition eschews this counterfactual and accordingly 
makes a stronger claim. Authorization that is a consequence of systematic 
manipulation, or indoctrination, is necessarily invalid because it does not follow 
from the authors’ own consideration and judgment. For example, suppose that a 
government used an extensive system of propaganda, censorship, and 
reeducation to create an ‘egalitarian cult’ that tried to eliminate all forms of 
inequality. This government might pass the critical theory test, since most 
subjects might still believe in human equality and even continue to support the 
government if they understood how their beliefs were brought about.48 
However, the authority of the egalitarian cult would be invalidated by the 
indoctrination condition. Since subjects’ beliefs were brought about through 
indoctrination, any action that follows from these beliefs is involuntary. Subjects 
are incapable of voluntary action and hence of granting authority because their 
wills have been hijacked by other agents. What subjects would do if they had the 
opportunity to exercise their consideration and judgment has no bearing on 
whether their actions are in fact voluntary, nor therefore on the validity of their 
authorization. Nor does it matter whether their belief in human equality is 
sound; the issue of ‘false consciousness’ is also irrelevant. The point of this 
admittedly artificial example is that the indoctrination of subjects renders their 
authorization invalid, no matter what the content of the doctrine is.  
What makes this artificial example necessary is that pure cases of 
indoctrination do not really exist. Coercion and indoctrination inevitably go 
together. It is difficult to see how a government could indoctrinate its subjects 
without tightly controlling information, and it is even more difficult to see how a 
                                                        
48 ‘Might’ is the crucial word here. The critical theory principle requires 
speculative counterfactuals about what people would believe under radically 
different conditions, which makes it easy for the speculators to smuggle in their 
own values. Libertarians and socialists would almost certainly reach different 
conclusions about what the members of the egalitarian cult would believe if they 
understood how their beliefs were brought about. An advantage of the 
indoctrination condition is that it makes these counterfactuals unnecessary. 
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government could tightly control information without using violence to silence 
dissenters. Governments that are disqualified by the indoctrination condition are 
very likely to be disqualified by the coercion condition. However, although 
indoctrination initially requires coercion, successful indoctrination renders 
subsequent coercion unnecessary. I treat the coercion and indoctrination 
conditions separately to emphasize that manipulated authorization is invalid 
even if it is no longer backed up by force. A cult-like government that 
indoctrinates its subjects into submission could not be authorized any more than 
a government that threatens its subjects into submission. 
 Third, the ‘competence condition’ says that an action is involuntary if the 
agent lacks the ability to comprehend its consequences. A child who recites a 
pledge that she cannot understand has not pledged allegiance voluntarily. 
Hobbes (2012: XXVI. 422) himself makes this point. 
[N]aturall fooles, children, or mad-men ... had never power to make any 
 covenant, or to understand the consequences thereof; and consequently 
 never took upon them to authorise the actions of any Soveraign, as they 
 must do that make to themselves a Common-wealth. 
 
Incompetent subjects, and especially children, pose a serious problem for any 
theory of state responsibility. If children cannot be counted as authors of the 
government’s actions, then why should subjects bear the costs of debts and other 
obligations that the government incurred before they reached the age of 
majority—let alone before they were born? I put this problem aside until 
Chapter 5 because it pertains to the distribution of liability rather than to 
authorization of the state’s representatives. For now, it suffices to say that the 
fact that some subjects are incapable of granting authority does not imply that 
the government is unauthorized. I argue in the next section that unanimous 
authorization is unnecessary.  
In sum, the background conditions for authorization follow from the 
principle that authorization requires a minimally authentic expression of the 
author’s will. A government cannot possibly count as an authorized 
representative of the state if it suppresses or hijacks subjects’ wills through 
systematic coercion or indoctrination. At a minimum, an authorized government 
must permit some dissent and some exchange of information among subjects. 
Yet this is only the beginning of the story. It is one thing to specify the 
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background conditions for valid authorization, but it is quite another to 
determine whether a particular government is actually authorized. The next two 
sections fill in the form and content of authorization. 
 
3.3.2. The Form of Authorization 
According to Hobbes, every single subject authorizes the sovereign. They 
are “many Authors, of every thing their Representative saith, or doth in their 
name; Every man giving their common Representer, Authority from himselfe in 
particular” (Ibid. XVI. 250). Although the members of the multitude might 
initially disagree about whom to authorize, they must authorize the sovereign 
unanimously: “every one, as well he that Voted for it, as he that Voted against it, 
shall Authorise all the Actions and Judgements, of that Man, or Assembly of men” 
(Ibid. XVIII. 264). A dissenter can either “consent with the rest” or remain in the 
state of nature, “wherein he might without injustice be destroyed by any man 
whatsoever” (Ibid. XVIII. 268). Authorization is therefore binary: a 
representative of the state is authorized by all subjects or by none of them. 
The idea that authorization must be unanimous clearly served Hobbes’ 
political aim—to encourage absolute obedience to the sovereign—but it is both 
unrealistic and unnecessary. For one thing, political authorization is always 
partial and contested. Subjects inevitably disagree about whether a government 
is authorized, and dissenters cannot simply be cast back into the state of nature 
(if there is even such a place to cast them). In any case, it is unnecessary for the 
government to be authorized by every single subject. Unanimous authorization 
would be necessary if the government represented subjects as individuals, since 
it is difficult to see how individuals who are not “fooles, children, or mad-men” 
could legitimately be represented by agents whom they did not authorize. 
Lawyers and accountants cannot represent competent adults who have not 
authorized them, so it is not clear how presidents and legislators could. But the 
government represents the state, not each subject; it need not be authorized by 
every individual because it does not represent any individual.49  
                                                        
49 Hobbes sometimes says that the sovereign is the “representative of all and 
every one of the Multitude" (2012: XIX. 284; see also Martinich, 2016), which 
suggests that the sovereign represents each subject in addition to the state. Be 
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There is a tendency to think that governments represent individual 
subjects. For example, many Americans have disavowed Donald Trump using the 
phrase, “not my president”, the implication being that Trump does not personally 
represent them (Gold, Berman, and Merle, 2016). This is certainly true, but it is 
equally true of Trump’s supporters, because the president does not represent 
Americans as individuals.50 This point is borne out in our common language (see 
Fleming, 2017a). Although we attribute the actions of presidents to their states, 
we do not attribute their actions to individual subjects. When Trump announced 
his plan to withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Agreement, the act of 
withdrawing was attributable to the United States. Headlines accordingly read 
that the “US withdraws from Paris climate change agreement” (Sharman, 2017). 
However, the act of withdrawing was not attributable to any particular American 
other than Trump himself. We would not say of a Trump supporter—say, 
Michael from Pittsburgh—that he withdrew from the Paris Agreement. The fact 
that Trump represents the state, not individual Americans, explains why he need 
not be authorized by every single American. Political authorization is not and 
need not be unanimous. This is what makes it political. 
Williams’ (2005) idea of the Basic Legitimation Demand (BLD) provides 
an account of authorization that recognizes the fact that political authority is 
always partial and contested. Although he mainly uses ‘legitimacy’ rather than 
‘authority’, his account of legitimation is essentially an account of authorization. 
For Williams, legitimate power is authority.51 The BLD fits well into a Hobbesian 
framework, not least because Williams identifies “the ‘first’ political question in 
Hobbesian terms as the securing of order, protection, safety, trust, and the 
conditions of cooperation” (Ibid. 3). What follows is a Hobbesian adaptation of 
                                                                                                                                                              
that as it may, unanimous authorization is not logically or conceptually necessary 
for representation of the state. 
50 This point is inspired by Runciman’s (2007: 101-2) discussion of the “not in 
my name” campaign against the 2003 Iraq War.  
51 For instance, Williams (2005: 11) writes that “what we acknowledge as LEG 
[legitimate], here and now, is what, here and now, MS [makes sense] as a 




the BLD.52 It might alternatively be called the Basic Authorization Demand (BAD) 
if not for the unfortunate acronym.  
 The BLD says that there must be “an ‘acceptable’ solution to the first 
political question” (Ibid. 4). In order to count as authorized, the government 
must provide a justification of its power that its subjects accept—one that 
“makes sense” to them according to their own culture, history, and political 
vocabulary (Ibid. 10-11). There are three insights that we can take from Williams 
about the form that authorization must take: (1) it requires ‘acceptance’ of the 
government (as opposed to explicit consent or mere acquiescence); (2) 
acceptance is never unanimous, so the criterion for authorization is whether a 
“substantial number” of subjects accept the government; and (3) authorization 
depends on whether subjects actually accept the government, not on whether 
they would or should accept it.  
First, ‘acceptance’ is more demanding than acquiescence but weaker than 
consent. Acquiescence, or the absence of resistance against the government, is 
not sufficient for authorization because it need not be voluntary. Merely obeying 
someone who exercises power—whether a police officer or a highway robber—
does not make one an author of her actions. Many Cambodians acquiesced to the 
Khmer Rouge, but they clearly did so against their wills. Consent, or 
endorsement of the government, is sufficient but not necessary for authorization. 
It is too demanding, not least because most subjects have never consented to be 
governed at all (Simmons, 2009). The criterion for authorization is whether 
subjects accept the government, or recognize it as a legitimate representative of 
the state. Whereas consent requires an action or omission, acceptance is an 
attitude or disposition. Subjects can accept a government (e.g., by recognizing an 
election result as legitimate), and thus authorize it, without consenting to it (e.g., 
by voting for it or taking a pledge of allegiance). For example, although most 
Canadians did not vote for the Liberal Party in 2015, the vast majority of them 
accept that the Liberal government legitimately represents Canada. If consent—
or even the consent of the majority—were the standard for authorization, then 
the government of the Canada would not count as authorized, since the majority 
of voters (to say nothing of Canadians in general) did not vote for the Liberal 
                                                        
52 See Sagar (2017) and Hall (2015) for analyses of Williams’ BLD. 
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Party or consent to be governed by it in any other way. The fact that most 
Canadians accept the Liberal government as legitimate is sufficient to implicate 
their wills and thus to make them its authors. I say more below about how we 
can judge whether subjects accept the government. 
Second, given that acceptance is never unanimous, the criterion for 
authorization is acceptance of the government by “a substantial number of the 
people” (Williams, 2005: 136). Ideally, this “substantial number” should include 
a diverse cross-section of the subjects, including some members of minority and 
opposition groups. But as Williams argues, we cannot be more precise than this. 
What counts as a sufficient number of the people “is a political question, which 
depends on the political circumstances” (Ibid.). Judgments about whether a 
government passes the threshold for authorization are contextual and difficult, 
and this is what makes the idea of unanimous authorization so tempting. It 
allows the political theorist to eliminate the need for messy political judgments. 
Stilz’s (2011: 200) “authorization account” of state responsibility succumbs to 
this temptation: “if a state that credibly interprets my basic right exists, then I 
necessarily authorize it” (emphasis in original). With the claim that no subject can 
possibly withhold authority from a “democratic legal state”, she eliminates the 
need to consider whether subjects actually accept their government as 
legitimate. She also eliminates the need to consider subjects who credibly and 
consistently disavow their governments (Pasternak, 2013: 367). The problem 
with Stilz’s argument is that it conflates the issue of whether the state is just and 
the issue of whether its government is authorized.53 Although the governments 
of just states are almost always authorized, there are countless examples of 
authorized governments that represent unjust states. The pre-Civil War United 
States was obviously unjust, but the governments that represented it were 
nevertheless authorized. A substantial number of Americans accepted these 
governments as legitimate representatives of the United States, even though a 
substantial number of Americans were enslaved and disenfranchised. If we deny 
that these slavery-era governments were authorized, and hence that their 
                                                        
53 A consequence of this conflation is that Stilz takes subjects to authorize the 
state. But since the state cannot act on its own, nothing follows from authorizing 
it. They might as well authorize a bridge or a lamppost. Subjects in fact authorize 
presidents, legislators, and other representatives of the state. 
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actions were attributable to the state, then it is difficult to see how the United 
States could be responsible for slavery. Conflating just states with authorized 
governments rules out state responsibility for historical injustice from the 
outset. Justice concerns whether the structure of the state is fair. Authorization 
concerns whether subjects accept the government as a legitimate representative 
of the state.  
Third, authorization requires actual rather than hypothetical acceptance 
of the government. Whether subjects would or should accept the government 
under idealized conditions might matter for determining whether the state is 
just (e.g., Rawls, 1971), but it has no bearing on whether the government of the 
state is authorized. Thought experiments and counterfactuals—even of the 
modest sort, as in Williams’ (2002, 2005) critical theory principle—are 
irrelevant to the question of authorization. So, too, are universal moral 
principles, such as human rights. Subjects certainly should not authorize 
governments that do not respect human rights, but this does not mean that they 
do not. The claim that only rights-respecting governments can be authorized 
implies that states cannot be responsible for violations of human rights. For 
example, if the Milošević government’s treatment of minorities disqualified it 
from being authorized, then Serbia could not be responsible for ethnic cleansing 
during the Yugoslav Wars, since the actions of the Milošević government could 
not be attributed to the state. We must not fall into the trap of thinking that an 
authorized government is necessarily a ‘good’ one. An authorized government is 
one that a substantial number of subjects actually accept; it need not be 
democratic, liberal, or even rights-respecting.  
Although there is no precise test for determining whether subjects accept 
the government as legitimate, it is possible to sketch some general principles, 
which might more accurately be called ‘presumptions’. They indicate where the 
burden of proof lies, but they must be supplemented by contextual judgments.  
The first presumption is that elected governments are authorized. Where 
there are institutionalized procedures for aggregating and allocating political 
authority, there is a presumption that the representatives who are chosen by 
these procedures are authorized representatives of the state. Institutionalized 
procedures typically reflect a shared idea of what constitutes ‘acceptance’ in a 
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given society (although these procedures are also, to some extent, products of 
power). There is also a presumption that the subordinates of these political 
representatives, such as civil servants, police officers, and soldiers, are 
authorized representatives of the state. The less democratic and less 
institutionalized the authorization procedures are, the weaker the presumption 
of authorization becomes. Restricted suffrage weakens the presumption in 
proportion to the restriction, since it makes the authorization procedure a less 
accurate measure of whether subjects actually accept the government as 
legitimate. Similarly, unreliable or rigged elections weaken the presumption of 
authorization in proportion to the extent of the unreliability or rigging. In short, 
there is a presumption that elected governments are authorized governments, 
but the strength of the presumption depends on the character of the elections. 
The presumption of authorization is reversed for unelected rulers, such as 
hereditary monarchs and military dictators. If a government circumvents the 
institutionalized authorization procedures (as in a coup), or if the authorization 
procedures do not in any way measure whether subjects accept the government 
(as in hereditary rule), then there is a presumption that the government is not 
authorized. However, this presumption can be overturned if there is compelling 
evidence that subjects do accept the government. For example, although Oman is 
a hereditary monarchy, subjects’ apparent loyalty to the Sultan (even through 
the Arab Spring) is evidence that he is an authorized representative (Tennent, 
2015). Democratic elections provide especially strong evidence of authorization, 
but they are not the only possible evidence. 
The picture of political authorization so far is as follows. In order to count 
as authorized, a government must first meet the coercion and indoctrination 
conditions, which, in practice, means that it must allow some dissent and some 
exchange of information among subjects. In addition, there must be evidence that 
a substantial number of subjects actually accept the government as a legitimate 
representative of the state. Elected governments are presumably authorized, but 
the strength of this presumption depends on how institutionalized and how 
democratic the elections are. Unelected governments are presumably 
unauthorized, but this presumption can be overturned if there is compelling 
evidence that subjects do accept the government as legitimate. There is one part 
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of the Hobbesian account of authorization that remains to filled in: the content of 
authorization, or what the representatives of the state are authorized to do.  
 
3.3.3 The Content of Authorization 
 According to Hobbes (2012: XVII. 260), subjects authorize the sovereign 
to do anything that is necessary for their “Common Peace and Safetie”. Since the 
sovereign is the sole judge of what is necessary, this effectively means that 
subjects authorize “all the Actions, and Judgments of the Soveraigne” (Ibid. XVIII. 
270). The authority of the sovereign is absolute; he is authorized to do anything 
that he sees fit.54 
 One important implication of Hobbes’ absolutism is that the authority of 
the sovereign is irrevocable. Subjects cannot withdraw authority because, once 
they have authorized a sovereign, the right to revoke this authority belongs 
exclusively to the sovereign (Ibid. XVIII. 264). Nor can the sovereign forfeit his 
authority by exceeding it, because his authority has no limits (Ibid. XVIII. 266). 
Subjects do not even get their authority back when the sovereign dies, since the 
authority to choose a successor belongs to the current sovereign (Ibid. XIX. 298). 
There is no reason why we must accept Hobbes’ absolutism or the 
implication that political authority is irrevocable. As Runciman (2009: 26) points 
out, Hobbes’ absolutism can be separated from the formal structure of his theory 
of the state.  
What can be dispensed with from Hobbes’s account is the idea that 
 authorization must be a once-for-all event, rather than an ongoing 
 process. But what can be retained is the idea that those whom we 
 authorize to act for us act not in our name as individuals, but in the name 
 of the state, though it is as individuals that we pass judgment on their 
 actions. 
 
Political authority is always temporary, both because the conditions under which 
authorization occurs are temporary and because the subjects themselves are 
temporary. Although it is not possible to precisely specify the shelf-life of 
authority, there are two universally relevant considerations. The first is the 
                                                        
54 This does not mean that subjects must obey any command of the sovereign. As 
Hobbes (2012: XXI. 336-40) later adds, subjects are not obligated to kill, injure, 
or accuse themselves. Nor are they obligated to refrain from defending 
themselves against force, even when the force is that of the sovereign. 
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human lifespan. Authority cannot possibly outlive the authors, so it fades with 
the passage of time. The fact that Alexander Lukashenko, President of Belarus, 
was democratically elected in 1994 has little bearing on whether he is authorized 
today. Many of the Belarusians who voted for him (and others who accepted the 
election result as legitimate) in 1994 have since died, and others have emigrated. 
Even those who did authorize him then might not authorize him now. The 
second consideration is that there are always new subjects. Reauthorization is 
necessary in order to account for children who have come of age and immigrants 
who have become subjects. Given that the voting age in Belarus is 18, Belarusians 
who were born after 1976 have never had the opportunity to vote in a fair 
election, so they cannot be counted as authors of the government unless they 
have authorized it in some other way. All governments must be reauthorized 
‘every few years’, but what counts as ‘a few’ is determined by the conventions in 
each state. In the UK, there must be an election every five years; in Canada, every 
four years. The ‘reauthorization interval’ varies even though the requirement for 
reauthorization is universal. 
In addition to being temporary, political authority is always limited and 
conditional. The limits and conditions are prescribed, first, by the concept of 
representation (section 3.2.1) and, second, by the role of each representative. For 
example, the role of ‘British prime minister’ has different limits than the role of 
‘British soldier’. A British prime minister has the authority to negotiate treaties 
but not the authority, which a British soldier has, to kill enemy combatants. 
These role-specific limits to authority are also context-specific. A British soldier 
in Afghanistan had different rules of engagement than a British soldier in 
Northern Ireland during the Troubles. We can usually defer to the laws and 
policies of a state in determining the precise limits of each representative’s 
authority. Where laws and policies are silent or corrupt, we can turn to the 
inherent limits of each role, such as ‘prime minister’ and ‘soldier’. A soldier acts 
outside of his authority if he extorts money from civilians, and a prime minister 
acts outside of her authority if she buys herself a sports car using public funds, 
regardless of whether the laws say otherwise. 
A less obvious consequence of Hobbes’ absolutism is that it vitiates the 
distinction between representatives who exceed their authority, or act ultra 
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vires, and representatives who are not authorized at all. This distinction is simply 
inapplicable to sovereign representatives. ‘Unauthorized sovereign’ is a 
contradiction in terms, and a sovereign cannot exceed his authority because, 
according to Hobbes, his authority is limitless. A distinction between 
unauthorized and ultra vires actions could be drawn for public ministers, but 
Hobbes refuses to do so. He insists that public ministers “can doe nothing against 
[the sovereign’s] Command, nor without his Authority” (2012: XXIII. 378). If a 
minister exceeds his authority, then his actions are not attributable to the 
sovereign, nor therefore to the state. The underlying principle is that the actions 
of agents bind their authors “so far-forth as is in their Commission, but no 
farther” (Ibid. XVI. 246). According to Hobbes, ministers who exceed their 
authority are no different than private individuals who usurp the sovereign’s 
authority. 
 Although the principle that ultra vires actions are not attributable to the 
state might seem obvious and unobjectionable, it has some counterintuitive and 
troublesome implications. For one thing, it makes the distinction between 
authorized and unauthorized actions too sharp. If a police officer has jurisdiction 
only within a particular city, but he arrests a suspect a few metres outside of city 
limits, is the act of arresting the suspect not an act of state? The police officer 
clearly exceeded his authority, but it would be inappropriate to treat him as a 
private individual. A police officer who acts ultra vires is not the same as a 
vigilante. Further, if ultra vires actions are not attributable to the state, then it is 
difficult to see how states could commit wrongful actions. Suppose that the 
police officer used excessive force against the suspect—say, by Tasering him 
after he had already surrendered. Since the police officer did not have the 
authority to Taser the suspect, we would have to conclude that Tasering him was 
not an act of state. The fact that the police officer exceeded his authority would 
mean that the state is not in any way responsible for his actions. The suspect 
could sue the officer, just as he could sue a private individual who Tasered him, 
but he could not sue the state. Much less could the state be responsible for 
atrocities that its soldiers commit, such as abusing civilians or committing 
genocide, since no one has the authority to do these things. The absence of a 
distinction between unauthorized actions and ultra vires actions effectively 
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makes the state an ‘artificial angel’: it can do no wrong, since the wrongs that its 
representatives commit are not attributable to the state. 
The root of the problem is that Hobbes considers authority to be a license 
to perform specific actions. The verb, ‘to authorize’, takes an agent (such as John 
Smith) as its direct object and an action (such as signing a contract) as its 
indirect object, as in ‘I authorize John Smith to sign a contract in my name’ 
(Martinich, 2016: 317). Although authorization of accountants and estate agents 
works this way, political authorization does not. We do not authorize political 
representatives to perform specific actions; we authorize them to perform roles. 
The indirect object of the verb, ‘to authorize’, is a role rather than an action, as in 
‘the people of France have authorized Emmanuel Macron to be president’. Within 
the limits of their roles, we allow political representatives to use discretion and 
judgment. The same is true of subordinate representatives, such as police 
officers and civil servants. In Pettit’s (2009: 65) terms, representatives of the 
state are “trustees” rather than “delegates”. Instead of ‘delegating’ the 
performance of specific actions to political representatives, subjects ‘entrust’ 
these representatives with the authority to make judgments about how to 
perform their roles. 
This role-based notion of authorization allows us to distinguish ultra vires 
actions from unauthorized actions. Since political representatives are authorized 
to perform roles, not to perform specific actions, it is possible for them to exceed 
their authority in a particular instance while remaining authorized 
representatives. The difference between an ultra vires action and an 
unauthorized action is the difference between performing a role poorly and not 
performing it at all. The police officer who acts outside of his territorial limit is 
still acting as a police officer, and his actions are still attributable to the state, 
because he is still plausibly performing the role of a police officer. The same goes 
for the police officer who uses excessive force against a suspect. However, a 
police officer who extorts money from civilians is no longer acting as a police 
officer, since there is no connection between his actions and his role; he is a 
‘rogue official’. While the actions of representatives who act ultra vires are 
attributable to the state, the actions of rogue officials are not. I examine the 
106 
 
consequences of misrepresentation and unauthorized representation of the state 
in section 3.5. 
 
3.3.4 “Bodies Politique” and Non-State Corporate Entities 
So far, I have assumed that the representatives of states are all 
individuals. Yet the actions of other corporate entities can also be attributed to 
the state. Just as it is necessary to distinguish the public and private actions of 
individuals, it is necessary to distinguish the public and private actions of 
corporate entities.  
Hobbes distinguishes two types of non-state corporate entities. First, 
there are private bodies, “which are constituted by Subjects amongst themselves, 
or by authoritie from a stranger [i.e., a foreign sovereign]” (2012: XXII. 348). 
Some private bodies, such as “Corporations of Beggars, Theeves and Gipsies” 
(Ibid. XXII. 368), are prohibited by law. Others, such as families, are permitted 
(though not recognized or chartered) by law. In neither case are the actions of 
private bodies attributable to the state.  
Second, there are “Bodies Politique” or “Persons in Law … which are made 
by authority from the Soveraign Power of the Common-wealth” (Ibid. XXII. 348). 
These include provinces, colonies, cities, universities, churches, and companies, 
all of which are chartered by “Letters from the Soveraign” and regulated by law 
(Ibid. XXII. 350). Hobbes’ account of subordinate corporate bodies appears to be 
similar to the “concession theory” of corporations (Dewey, 1926: 666-68). Like 
proponents of the concession theory, he considers most corporate bodies to be 
creations of the sovereign. However, going well beyond the concession theory, he 
considers the actions of these bodies to be attributable to the sovereign. As 
Hobbes (2012: XXII. 352) says, “the act of [a representative of a corporate body] 
that recedes not from the Letters of the Soveraign, is the act of the Soveraign”. 
The clear implication is that an act of a corporate body is an act of state. What 
makes these bodies “Politique” is that they are extensions of the state. It is 
striking that Hobbes puts “colonies” and “companies of merchants” in the same 
category; both are political bodies. For Hobbes, chartered corporations are much 
like public ministers: they are authorized by the sovereign, and their actions are 
attributable to the artificial person of the sovereign and hence to the state. There 
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is a reason why he discusses bodies politic and public ministers in successive 
chapters. 
Hobbes’ account of corporate bodies no longer bears any resemblance to 
reality, if it ever did. Corporations are ‘governmental’ in the sense that the state 
creates the conditions for their existence (Ciepley, 2013), but they are not merely 
extensions of the state. It makes little sense to treat the actions of Apple and 
Google as actions of the United States simply because these corporations are 
incorporated, and thus authorized, under American law. The fact that a 
corporation is authorized by the government does not necessarily mean that it 
represents the state. Hobbes’ account of subordinate corporate bodies is far too 
simplistic: if the body is authorized by the sovereign, then its actions are acts of 
state; if it is not so authorized, then its actions are not acts of state. What is 
needed for attribution, in addition to authorization, is evidence of 
representation. The best evidence of representation is control. If a state controls 
another corporate entity, then there is a presumption that the entity represents 
the state. This presumption applies to the full range of sub-state and non-state 
corporate entities, from government agencies to private companies, from puppet 
states to rebel groups, and from intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) to 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).  
At one end of the spectrum are government agencies, or corporate 
entities that are parts of the state. Hobbes lists colonies and provinces, but we 
could add many more. Some of these bodies are representative assemblies, such 
as legislatures, courts, cabinets, committees, boards, and tribunals. Others are 
represented by fiction, like the state itself; they are like “many lesser Common-
wealths in the bowels of a greater” (Hobbes, 2012: XXIX. 516). The latter include 
departments, cities, armies, police forces, and the dozens of subunits within each. 
The representatives of the state often represent several of these fictional persons 
simultaneously. For example, a constable might simultaneously represent the 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Drug Squad, and Canada. His act of 
arresting a suspect is attributable to all three of these corporate bodies. In some 
contexts, we say that the Drug Squad arrested the suspect, such as when we 
count how many people the Drug Squad arrested in a given year. In other 
contexts, we say that the RCMP arrested the suspect, as a journalist probably 
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would if she were writing a story about the case. In still other contexts, we say 
that Canada arrested the suspect, such as when we count how many people 
Canada has arrested for drug offences. Since a corporate body normally controls 
its subunits, attribution normally runs from the smallest body to the largest. The 
constable’s actions are attributable to the Drug Squad, the Drug Squad’s actions 
are attributable to the RCMP, and the RCMP’s actions are attributable to Canada. 
There is a strong presumption that the actions of government agencies are 
attributable to the state. 
At the other end of the spectrum are private companies. Although private 
companies are incorporated, and thus authorized, by the laws of their parent 
states, this does not imply that they represent their parent states. Authorization 
does not necessarily imply representation. Being incorporated under the laws of 
a state does not make a corporation a representative of that state, any more than 
being licensed to drive makes a driver a representative of the state that issued 
the license. Although British Petroleum bears the name of Britain and is 
headquartered in London, it does not represent the United Kingdom because it is 
not controlled by the United Kingdom. It would obviously have been a mistake to 
say, after the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill, that the United Kingdom spilled 
4.9 million barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico. There is a strong presumption 
that the actions of private companies are not acts of state. 
There are many corporate bodies that lie somewhere between 
government agencies and private companies. Near the former end of the 
spectrum are state-owned companies. Ownership creates a presumption of 
attribution to the state, since ownership allows the state to control the company 
as well as profit from it. The strength of this presumption varies according to 
how much equity the state has and how much control it exercises. The 
presumption of attribution is weaker for Norway’s Statoil, which is only two 
thirds state-owned, than for Malaysia’s Petronas, which is wholly state-owned. 
There is a similar presumption of attribution for private companies that states 
have hired or contracted. We would obviously count inmates of private prisons 
among the people whom the United States has incarcerated. For the same reason, 
we should count Iraqi civilians killed by Blackwater, a private security company 
hired by the United States, among those killed by the United States. If a state 
109 
 
commissions another corporate entity to act on its behalf, then the actions of that 
corporate entity are attributable to the state.  
This principle applies equally to rebel groups. Since Iran funds, arms, and 
gives orders to Hezbollah, the actions of Hezbollah are presumptively 
attributable to Iran. In other words, Hezbollah is presumed to represent Iran 
unless there is a compelling reason (such as disobedience of Iranian orders) to 
believe that Hezbollah is acting independently. This is not to say that the actions 
of all rebel groups that are associated with a state are presumptively attributable 
to that state. The Provisional IRA does not represent the Republic of Ireland, 
which has outlawed the Provisional IRA for decades. The presumption of 
attribution applies only to rebel groups that are, at least in part, controlled by a 
state.  
The actions of puppet states are presumptively attributable to their 
puppeteer states. Since the ‘Independent’ State of Croatia was created, sustained, 
and partly controlled by Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, the atrocities that the 
Independent State committed were also attributable to Italy and Germany. For 
the same reason, the actions of apartheid South Africa’s Bantustans were 
attributable to South Africa. However, the presumption of attribution is much 
weaker for client states, which are partly dependent on but not created or 
controlled by their patron states. Although Israel receives a great deal of funding 
and military support from the United States, it is also substantially autonomous. 
It would be a mistake to say that the United States invaded Gaza in 2014. 
However, if the United States did, in certain instances, direct or control Israel’s 
actions, then these actions would be attributable to the United States. The 
primary consideration in each case is control.  
The case is more complex and varied for international organizations. 
There is a presumption that the actions of NGOs, like the actions of private 
companies, are not attributable to the states in which the organizations are 
based or in which they operate. After all, they are nongovernmental. The 
exception is when a state exercises control over an NGO or commissions it to act. 
Under normal circumstances, the actions of the American Red Cross are not 
attributable to the United States. But if the United States commissions the 
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American Red Cross to distribute aid, then the act of distributing aid is an act of 
state.  
The actions of an IGO are not normally attributable to its member-states. 
Rather, attribution normally runs from member-states to the IGO. The relation 
between an IGO and its member-states states is structurally similar to the 
relation between a state and its agencies. If subordinate corporate bodies are like 
“many lesser Common-wealths in the bowels of a greater” (Hobbes, 2012: XXIX. 
516), then IGOs are like greater commonwealths made up of many lesser. Just as 
a government department represents its parent state, a member-state can 
represent the IGO of which it is a member. For instance, when Canada sent 
troops to Kosovo in 1999, it did so in the name of NATO. The act of sending 
troops was therefore attributable to NATO, just as the actions of Canadian 
soldiers were attributable to Canada. However, the connection between an IGO 
and its member-states is much weaker than the connection between a state and 
its agencies. Government agencies almost always represent their parent states, 
but the member-states of an IGO only represent the organization in certain cases 
and in very narrow domains. Although the actions of the Canadian Army are 
almost always attributable to Canada, the actions of Canada are rarely actions of 
NATO or the United Nations. It is necessary to distinguish the ‘sovereign’ from 
the ‘intergovernmental’ actions of states. For instance, the United States acted in 
the name of NATO when it invaded Afghanistan in 2001, but not when it invaded 
Iraq in 2003. The question in each case is whether the representatives of the 
state also acted as authorized representatives of the IGO.  
Responsibility for the actions of an IGO is distributed among its member-
states, just as responsibility for the actions of a state is distributed among its 
subjects. The member-states of an IGO ought to bear responsibility for its actions 
in proportion to the control that they exert over the organization. For instance, 
the members of NATO bear responsibility for the 1999 intervention in Kosovo in 
proportion to their roles in authorizing, planning, and executing the intervention. 
Although the United States looms large among NATO members, decisions of the 
organization are made by consensus, which calls for a broad distribution of 
responsibility. The United States clearly bears a much greater share of 
responsibility for the intervention in Kosovo than does Poland, which did not 
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participate in the intervention, but every member of NATO bears some share of 
the responsibility.  
 The actions of organizations that are neither intergovernmental nor 
nongovernmental, such as international courts and tribunals, are not normally 
attributable to states. Judgments of the International Court of Justice are 
sometimes directly authorized by states, as when two states submit a dispute to 
the Court, but these judgments are made only in the name of the Court. Its 15 
judges represent neither the states who submit disputes to them nor the United 
Nations General Assembly, which elects them. The Court is the only corporate 
person to which the decisions of its judges can be attributed. However, if a 
judicial body is coopted or controlled by a state, then its actions ought to be 
attributed to that state. Although the International Narcotics Control Board 
(2018) purports to be “an independent, quasi-judicial expert body” whose 
“members serve impartially in their personal capacity, independently of 
Governments”, it has been described as a “conservative mouth piece of the US 
State Department” (Koutsoukis and Riley, 2000) on matters of drug policy. This 
might be an exaggeration, but, as Bewley-Taylor (2012: 271) finds, the claim 
“that the US has exceptional and direct influence upon the operation of the Board 
is plausible”. To the extent that the United States exerts control over the Board, 
the Board’s actions ought to be attributed to the United States. The same is true 
of other states that hold special influence over the Board, such as Russia. The 
actions of a ‘puppet organization’, like those of a puppet state, are attributable to 
the puppeteers. 
    *** 
The Hobbesian account of attribution provides a set of principles for 
determining what counts as an act of state. The same heuristic applies to every 
case: was the agent, at the time of the action, an authorized representative of the 
state? This heuristic can be used to fill in any remaining gaps and to guide our 
contextual judgments in particular cases.  
 
3.4 From Attribution to Responsibility 
 A person to which an action is attributed is always, in some sense, 
responsible for it. However, this responsibility can take several different forms: 
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(1) ownership, meaning that nominal responsibility for the action attaches to the 
person; (2) culpability, meaning guilt or blame; (3) accountability, meaning an 
obligation to provide reasons for the action; and (4) liability, meaning an 
obligation to bear the costs. These four kinds of responsibility are seldom 
distinguished because they usually go together in cases of individual 
responsibility.55 For example, holding a thief responsible involves all four kinds 
of responsibility: we simultaneously attribute ownership to him (by calling him a 
thief and putting the theft on his record), hold him culpable (by sentencing and 
punishing him), hold him accountable (by asking him to explain his actions or to 
apologize), and hold him liable (by making him return the stolen goods or 
compensate the victim). Yet there are a variety of circumstances in which the 
kinds of responsibility come apart. One is when an employer delegates authority 
to an employee. If the employee is reckless and injures someone on the job, both 
she and her employer are responsible, but in different ways. The employee owns 
the reckless act (it goes on her criminal record), and she is both accountable 
(must apologize) and culpable (guilty and punishable) for it, but the employer 
may be partly liable (for compensating the victim). The kinds of responsibility 
often come apart in principal-agent relationships. They come apart to an even 
greater extent for persons that are represented by fiction, such as states and 
corporations. The state, its representatives, and its subjects are all responsible 
for acts of state, but in different ways: ownership lies with the state; 
accountability and culpability lie with its representatives; and liability is 
distributed among its subjects. 
States own the actions of their authorized representatives, which means 
that nominal responsibility for these actions attaches to the state. When the 
government of Canada borrows money, Canada owes the money; the debt does 
not belong to the government or to individual Canadians (section I.1). Similarly, 
when the Chancellor of Germany signs a treaty, Germany is bound by the treaty; 
the obligation does not belong to Angela Merkel, even though she was the one 
who signed her name on the page. Nor does the obligation belong to the subjects 
of Germany or to any subset thereof, past or present. In some cases, ownership 
                                                        
55 See Shoemaker (2011) for an influential attempt to distinguish the 
components of responsibility.  
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lies with both the agent who performed the action and the state that she 
represents. Just as the same action can be attributed to more than one person 
(section 3.3.4), more than one person can share ownership of the same 
responsibility. For example, when soldiers carry out ethnic cleansing, we say 
both that the soldiers committed ethnic cleansing and that their state did. 
Ownership is non-exclusive: assigning responsibility to state officials for their 
part in wrongdoing does not preclude assigning that wrongdoing to the state, 
and vice versa. Nor, as I argue below, does holding individuals responsible 
render state responsibility redundant. Although ownership is a very thin kind of 
responsibility, the fact that states can have nominal responsibilities has very 
important consequences. 
States cannot be culpable, accountable, or liable any more than bridges, 
rivers, or other persons that are represented by fiction can. First, culpability 
requires intent, and states do not have intentions, or “natural wills”. As Hobbes 
(1998: VII.14) says, 
if a decision contrary to a natural law is made in the case of a people 
[democracy] or a council of optimates [aristocracy], the offender is not the 
commonwealth itself, i.e. the civil person, but the citizens who voted for 
the decision. For an offence issues from an expression of natural will, not 
from a political will, which is artificial56  
 
He adds that, “in a Monarchy, if the Monarch makes a decision contrary to the 
natural laws, he is himself at fault, because in him the civil will is the same as the 
natural” (Ibid.). Culpability is ‘agent-specific’; it accrues only to the agent who 
intended the wrongful action. While ownership and liability can be incurred 
vicariously, culpability cannot be, because intent cannot be transferred from a 
representative to a representee. For example, if an employee defrauds a 
customer, her intent to commit fraud is not attributable to her employer. The fact 
that she represents him does not imply that he intended to commit fraud. The 
employer might be vicariously liable for compensating the victim, but he cannot 
be culpable for the fraud unless his own intentions are involved (e.g., he 
conspired with the employee). Vicarious culpability is what we commonly call 
‘guilt by association’. For the same reason, a state cannot be culpable for a 
                                                        
56 Hobbes (1994: XXI.4) makes the same point in The Elements, except he 
describes the wills of sovereign assemblies as “fictitious” instead of “artificial”. 
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murder that one of its soldiers commits. Although the soldier’s action can be 
attributed to the state, his intention cannot be, because intentions are not 
attributable or transferable. The state can therefore own the act of killing but 
cannot be culpable for it. If an act of state is a criminal act, then culpability lies 
with the individual agents who intended the act.  
 The issue of whether states can be culpable marks an important point of 
disagreement between proponents of the agential and functional theories.57 
Although states can be held responsible under international law, they cannot be 
held criminally responsible. The Nuremberg Tribunal’s (1947: 221) often-quoted 
declaration that “[c]rimes against international law are committed by men, not 
by abstract entities” remains the rule. As Crawford and Watkins (2010: 285) 
describe, “there has been no development of corporate criminal responsibility to 
parallel the introduction of individual criminal responsibility on the 
international plane, nor has there been any trend among arbitral tribunals to 
impose punitive damages on states”. Since the functional theory, like the 
Hobbesian theory, rejects the idea that states have intentions (section 1.2), it 
rules out the possibility that states can be culpable. The agential theory, on the 
other hand, implies that states can be culpable. If the state is a “corporate agent, 
which in an important sense has a mind of its own”, then it can “exhibit the types 
of mens rea attitudes that are deemed so central to modern criminal 
culpability—namely, intention, recklessness, negligence, and the like” (Tanguay-
Renaud, 2013: 262; see also Lang, 2007, 2011).  
 Even if it were conceptually coherent to assign culpability to states, our 
attempts to hold them culpable, or to punish them, would be in vain. The 
psychological and material components of culpability are lacking, since states 
cannot feel guilt or suffer the pain of punishment. Iraq was certainly responsible 
for the 1990 invasion of Kuwait, but it was Iraqis who suffered from the resulting 
sanctions and reparations. Even the burdens of uniquely corporate 
‘punishments’, such as institutional reform or dissolution, are borne by subjects. 
When the Allies dismantled and rebuilt the Japanese and German states after the 
Second World War, the subjects of Japan and Germany paid the price. Forcing 
                                                        
57 See Fleming (2017b) for a comparison of the agential and functional 
approaches to the concept of state crime. 
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these states to reform meant depriving their subjects of political rights. The 
burdens of punishment are inevitably borne, in some form or another, by the 
subjects of the target state. It seems implausible to describe these burdens as 
mere “overspill” or “misdirected harm” from punishing the state (Erskine, 
2010)—analogous to the harm that a criminal’s dependents suffer when he is 
imprisoned—because the harm to subjects is inextricable from the punishment 
of their state (Alschuler, 2009: 14-15). It is possible to punish a criminal without 
harming his dependents: he might be given a weekend sentence or a job in 
prison so that he can earn money for his family, and they might be given ample 
opportunities to visit him. Even the infliction of physical pain on a criminal does 
not necessarily harm his dependents. But punishing a state without harming its 
subjects is almost unimaginable. 
 Hobbes grappled with the issue of corporate punishment is his discussion 
of subordinate corporate bodies. Although he did not think corporate entities 
could be culpable, he did say that a corporate entity “may be punished, as farre-
forth as it is capable, as by dissolution, or forfeiture of their Letters, (which is to 
such artificiall, and fictitious Bodies, capitall,)” (Hobbes, 2012: XXII. 352). He 
added the caveat that “from corporall penalties Nature hath exempted all Bodies 
Politique” (Ibid.), by which he meant that corporate entities cannot bear the 
material consequences of punishment. These consequences are inevitably borne 
by the members of the corporate entity, which is why he insisted that a fine 
against a corporation should only be levied against “a Common stock, wherein 
none of the Innocent Members have propriety” (Ibid.). Yet if the material element 
of punishment (not to mention culpability) cannot be borne by corporate 
entities, then it is not clear why we should consider corporate fines or reform to 
be punitive (cf. Schwenkenbecher, 2010). It seems more appropriate to treat 
‘fines’ as payments of restitution and institutional reform as rehabilitation. 
Dissolving a corporate entity is more like dismantling a machine than it is like 
capital punishment: the former members of a dissolved corporation, unlike the 
executed criminal’s cells, can form a new body. Using the language of punishment 
to describe state and corporate responsibility has no obvious benefit, but it does 




 The burdens of responsibilities that do not involve wrongdoing are also 
borne by subjects. States cannot be liable any more than they can be culpable. 
Subjects ultimately bear the costs of their state’s responsibilities, usually through 
taxation or inflation. Although Greece is indebted, Greeks suffer the 
consequences. I discuss the distribution of liability to subjects in Chapter 5. 
 Accountability, like culpability, lies with the state’s representatives. The 
state cannot answer for its actions because it is incapable of speaking on its own. 
Nor can most of its subjects answer for their state’s actions, since most subjects 
do not have any direct role in their state’s actions and do not even know the 
reasons for them. The task of explaining, justifying, and, if necessary, apologizing 
for acts of state therefore belongs to the state’s representatives. In some cases, 
representatives answer for themselves, or in their own names. Tony Blair 
apologized for the mistakes that he made in planning the 2003 invasion of Iraq. 
In other cases, representatives answer for the state, as in the case of official 
apologies. Stephen Harper apologized in the name of Canada for the abuse that 
indigenous children suffered in ‘residential schools’. The people who established 
and administered these schools are culpable; Canada owes reparations to the 
victims; the subjects of Canada are liable for the costs; but the current prime 
minister is accountable. The same division of responsibility occurs in every case: 
ownership lies with the state, culpability and accountability with its 
representatives, and liability with its subjects.  
 State responsibility is a peculiarly intangible and unstable form of 
responsibility. It inevitably collapses into the accountability of the state’s 
representatives of the liability of its subjects. When the state does wrong, its 
representatives are expected to apologize. When the state has obligations, its 
subjects are expected to bear the costs. We might therefore think that attributing 
ownership to the state is just a figure of speech, or a kind of shorthand. It is 
tempting to think that the state’s responsibilities could, in principle, be 
expressed in terms of individuals. This would be a mistake.58 As Carr (1946: 151) 
recognized, “[t]he obligation of the state cannot be identified with the obligation 
of any individual or individuals”. He illustrates this point using the case of 
                                                        
58 See Fleming (2017a) for a semantic argument for why the actions and 
responsibilities of states cannot be expressed in terms of individuals. 
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“whether the Belgian Guarantee Treaty of 1839 imposed an obligation on Great 
Britain to assist Belgium in 1914”. 
 [T]he obligation rested neither personally on Palmerston who signed the 
 treaty of 1839, nor personally on Asquith and Grey who had to decide the 
 issue in 1914, neither on all individual Englishmen alive in 1839, nor on 
 all individual Englishmen alive in 1914, but on that fictitious group-
 person "Great Britain", which was regarded as capable of moral or 
 immoral behaviour in honouring or dishonouring an obligation. (Ibid. 
 150) 
 
Britain’s obligation was not equivalent to Palmerston’s obligation, since Britain 
remained bound by the Treaty after he left office, and even after he died. Nor was 
Britain’s obligation equivalent to the sum of Asquith and Grey’s obligations, both 
because the Treaty preceded them and because Britain would still have been 
bound by it if someone else had been prime minister or foreign secretary. Nor, 
for a similar reason, can the obligation be identified with the obligations of 
British subjects. Britain remained bound by the Treaty even though most of the 
Britons of 1839 had since died and most of the Britons of 1914 had not yet been 
born when the Treaty was signed. An obligation of a state cannot be identified 
with the obligations of any set of individuals, past or present.  
 Although “moral or immoral behaviour” can be attributed to a state only 
in a very thin sense, the supposition that states can behave morally or immorally 
is nevertheless a crucial one. The fact that ownership attaches to the state allows 
responsibilities to be transmitted through time. As Carr (1946: 148-49) also 
recognized, “[p]ersonification is the category of thought which expresses the 
continuity of institutions; and of all institutions the state is the one whose 
continuity it is most essential to express”. Although the individual subjects and 
representatives of a state ultimately bear the consequences of its actions, the 
individuals who bear the consequences are not necessarily the ones who 
authorized or performed the actions in the first place. I discuss the transmission 
of responsibilities over time in the next chapter. 
 
3.5 Impersonation of the State 
 Before turning to the Question of Identity, there is one final issue of 
attribution that must be addressed. Who or what is responsible for the actions of 
unauthorized representatives and rogue officials? The Hobbesian theory 
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provides an account of misattribution as well as an account of attribution. There 
are two types of impersonation of the state, each with different consequences: 
unauthorized representation and misrepresentation. 
 Unauthorized representation occurs when an agent acts in the name of 
the state but lacks the authority to do so. Examples include rebels who purport 
to represent the state but have not been authorized by its subjects (such as the 
Provisional IRA) and presidents who fail to meet the background conditions for 
authorization (such as the Supreme Leader of North Korea). Although the actions 
of these unauthorized representatives are not attributable to the state, they may 
be attributable to other corporate entities. For example, although members of 
the Provisional IRA were not authorized representatives of the Republic of 
Ireland, they were authorized representatives of the Provisional IRA itself. This 
is why it makes sense to say that the Provisional IRA bombed the Grand Hotel in 
Brighton but not that Ireland did. The Provisional IRA owns the bombing 
because its members authorized the bomber. Unauthorized representation of the 
state can thus generate other kinds of corporate responsibility.  
 The principle that the actions of governments and government agencies 
are attributable to the state (section 3.3.4) does not apply in cases of 
unauthorized representation. In these cases, state responsibility gives way to 
‘governmental responsibility’. For example, since the Supreme Leader fails to 
meet the background conditions for authorization, his actions are not 
attributable to North Korea. However, he might nevertheless count as an 
authorized representative of the Workers’ Party of Korea or some subgroup 
thereof. The Workers’ Party might therefore be responsible for Kim’s nuclear 
tests even though North Korea is not. Even the most personalized forms of rule 
are, to some extent, corporate; individuals do not conduct nuclear tests on their 
own. But the relevant corporate entity for the purpose of responsibility is often 
the party or the government rather than the state.  
 Misrepresentation occurs when an authorized representative of the state 
‘goes rogue’, or acts outside of the boundaries of his prescribed role (section 
3.3.3). Such feigned acts of state are attributable only to the agents who perform 
them. For example, when a soldier extorts money from civilians, his actions are 
so far outside of his role that his claim to represent the state is no longer 
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plausible. The act of extorting money is his alone, as if he were a criminal. Yet a 
rogue soldier is not just a criminal. The fact that the soldier has been authorized 
to represent the state means that the state has a (general) duty to prevent him 
from going rogue in the first place. Although the actions of rogue officials are not 
acts of state, the state may be responsible for failing to keep its officials under 
control. France is clearly responsible for failing to prevent its peacekeepers from 
sexually abusing civilians in the Central African Republic even though these 
peacekeepers were rogue officials. But when the ‘victim’ of the act of 
misrepresentation is the state itself, as in cases of corruption, responsibility lies 
entirely with the agent who performed the action. To hold a state responsible for 
failing to prevent its own officials from embezzling public funds would be to 
blame the victim.  
 In some cases of misrepresentation, the responsibilities involved are 
much too large for individuals to bear. This is especially true for sovereign debts. 
Consider the $14 billion USD that the Mobutu government borrowed in the name 
of Zaire between 1965 and 1997 (Ndikumana and Boyce, 1998). Even if Mobutu 
were an authorized representative of Zaire, many of his actions would still have 
been egregious misrepresentations of the state. Since he embezzled and 
otherwise misused a large portion of the money that he borrowed in the name of 
Zaire, and much more besides, the debt ought to have been attributed to him. 
Mobutu was a rogue official in the highest office. Yet Mobutu obviously could not 
have paid back the money that he borrowed, especially after he was ousted. Who 
should bear the costs in cases such as this? 
 According to current practice, the state is always obligated to repay 
money that its government borrows, no matter whether the government was 
authorized or what it did with the money. 
 [C]reditors have the unlimited privilege to lend to whichever sovereign 
 regimes they wish, in whatever amounts they deem fit, and on whatever 
 terms they consider desirable. Their claims against the countries that 
 have borrowed from them are in no way affected by either the nature of 
 the political organization of the country to which they lend, the 
 circumstances that it confronts, or the uses to which it puts the borrowed 
 resources. (Barry and Tomitova, 2007: 52) 
 
Given that liability for debt ultimately distributes to the subjects of a state, it is 
they who ultimately bear the costs. The Hobbesian account of attribution implies 
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that the creditors should instead bear the costs when the state has been 
impersonated. Since only the actions of authorized representatives can bind the 
state, those who make agreements with state officials had better make sure (1) 
that these officials are authorized and (2) that they represent the state in a 
credible way. As Hobbes (2012: XVI. 246) says, “he that maketh a Covenant with 
the Actor, or Representer, not knowing the Authority he hath, doth it at his own 
perill”. The Hobbesian account of attribution thus lends support to the doctrine 
of “odious debt”, which says that “some sovereign debt claims are not binding or 
enforceable on account of the creditor’s awareness of the fact that the proceeds 
of the loan would be used to oppress the population of the debtor state, or would 
be used for personal enrichment rather than public purposes” (King, 2016: 2). 
Creditors have an obligation to ensure that the money they lend will be used for 
public purposes, such as infrastructure or services. If they fail to verify that the 
borrowing government credibly represents the state, then the debtor state’s 
obligation to repay the money is void. The Hobbesian theory implies a similar 
rule for other kinds of responsibilities, such as treaty and contractual obligations. 
A self-serving investment treaty that is signed by an unauthorized or rogue 
president should not bind the state any more than an odious loan. Anyone who 
makes any kind of agreement with a government of questionable legitimacy 
“doth it at his own perill”. I return in Chapter 5 to the issue of when it is 
legitimate for states to repudiate responsibilities. 
     *** 
 The aim of this chapter has been to develop a Hobbesian answer to the 
Question of Ownership. In addition to demonstrating the theoretical plausibility 
of the Hobbesian account of attribution, I have tried to show that it can guide our 
practical judgments of attribution. The Hobbesian account has both theoretical 
and practical advantages over the agential and functional alternatives.  
 One advantage of the Hobbesian account of attribution over the agential 
account is that it eliminates the need to posit corporate intentions. It explains 
how states can act using only the basic concepts of authorization and 
representation. As well as sparing us from ontological commitments and difficult 
metaphysical issues, the Hobbesian account provides better guidance for our 
judgments about what counts as an act of state. The vast literature on the 
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agential theory contains very few attempts to develop specific criteria for 
attribution (Harbour, 2004), in large part because the concepts of corporate 
agency and intentionality are difficult to operationalize. We might, as Wendt 
(1999: 222-23) suggests, infer the state’s intentions from its laws and policies. 
For example, the United Kingdom’s invasion of Iraq in 2003 could be called 
‘intentional’ because it was approved by an Act of Parliament. But this answer 
does not always work. For one thing, it is much less plausible to infer corporate 
intentions from the laws and policies of non-democratic states (section 1.1.1), 
since the distinction between the state’s intentions and the individual intentions 
of its leaders is blurred. Did Russia intend to invade Crimea, or was the relevant 
intention Putin’s? Unlike the agential account of attribution, the Hobbesian 
account applies equally to all kinds of states, from monarchies to democracies.  
 Further, even in democracies, most actions that state officials perform are 
not specifically prescribed by laws or policies. This is especially true of wrongful 
actions, which often violate the state’s laws and policies. If a British soldier kills a 
civilian, or even an enemy soldier, how would we judge whether this act 
implicates the United Kingdom’s intention? Curiously, Wendt (1999: 220-21) 
resorts to the concepts of authorization and representation to account for cases 
such as this: “Authorization means that individuals’ actions are constituted as the 
actions of a collective. For example, we do not hold the soldier who kills an 
enemy in war responsible for his actions because he is authorized to kill by his 
state”. What he fails to realize is that the concepts of authorization and 
representation render the idea of corporate intention superfluous. The 
Hobbesian account of attribution uses only the concepts of authorization and 
representation because these do all of the work. 
  The functional account of attribution, on the other hand, does propose 
specific rules of attribution. The conceptual scheme of ‘organs’ and ‘functions’ 
has been used to develop an extensive set of legal rules about whether particular 
actions count as acts of state (ILC, 2001; Olleson, forthcoming). But whereas the 
agential account applies poorly to non-democracies, the functional account 
makes no distinction between types of governments, which makes it far more 
pernicious. The functional account allows corrupt officials and predatory 
governments to impersonate the state; Mobutu was no less an ‘organ’ of Zaire 
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than Bill Clinton was of the United States. The Hobbesian account of attribution 
avoids the traps of both the agential account and the functional account. 
Although it applies to all types of states, it also distinguishes attribution from 
misattribution. 
 The Hobbesian account of attribution explains how states can act, and 
thus how they can incur responsibilities. But in order for a state to be held 
responsible, it must be the same corporate entity as the one that incurred the 
responsibility in the first place. Every judgment of state responsibility depends 
on a judgment of state identity. If the United Kingdom is not the same state as the 
British Empire, then it is difficult to see how the present-day United Kingdom 
could be responsible for colonialism or the slave trade. And if the Republic of 
Turkey is not the same state as the Ottoman Empire, then it is difficult to see how 
present-day Turkey could be responsible for the Armenian genocide. The next 
chapter develops a Hobbesian account of corporate identity that explains how 
states can persist over time despite changes in their populations, territories, 





















SUCCESSION: THE QUESTION OF IDENTITY 
 
 
“[A]s there was order taken for an Artificiall Man, so there be order also taken, 
for an Artificiall Eternity of life; without which, men that are governed by an 
Assembly, should return into the condition of Warre in every age; and they that 
are governed by One man, assoon as their Governour dyeth. This Artificiall 
Eternity, is that which men call the Right of Succession.” (Hobbes, 2012: XIX. 298) 
 
 On what does the identity of the state depend? The agential account of 
corporate identity relies on an analogy with personal identity: the identity of the 
state depends on its self-conception or national narrative, much as the identity of 
an individual depends on her psychological unity. The functional account relies 
on an analogy with the identity of a physical object: the identity of the state 
depends on its matter (territory and population) or its form (constitution). For 
Hobbes, corporate identity is not closely analogous to personal or physical 
identity. The identities of states and other corporate entities are peculiar in that 
they are created and sustained by their representatives. Just as representation 
transforms a multitude of individuals into one person, representation sustains 
the identity of this corporate person over time. The criterion for state continuity 
is ‘succession’: a state persists as long as it has a continuous series of 
representatives.59  
 Like his account of attribution, Hobbes’ account of succession has many 
ambiguities and complications. How can we tell whether a new government is a 
‘successor’ to the old government or, instead, the government of a new state? 
Does a revolution imply the replacement of one state with another? Can a ‘dead’ 
state be ‘resurrected’, as the Baltic states appeared to be at the end of the Soviet 
occupation? This chapter reconstructs Hobbes’ account of succession and argues 
that it provides a novel and compelling answer to the Question of Identity. 
                                                        
59 International lawyers use ‘succession’ to refer to ‘state succession’, or “the 
replacement of one State by another in the responsibility for the international 
relations of territory” (UN, 1978: Art. 2.1b). I follow Hobbes in using ‘succession’ 
to refer to the replacement of one government with another, which implies the 
continuity of the state. I use ‘discontinuity’ and ‘non-identity’ to denote the 
replacement of one state with another. 
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 The chapter has five sections. The first explains the importance of 
corporate identity for state responsibility. It distinguishes corporate identity 
from the more common, constructivist idea of social identity; analyzes the 
concept of corporate identity into its two components—unity and continuity; 
and rebuts the argument that the Question of Identity is a pseudo-problem. The 
second section reconstructs and develops Hobbes’ account of corporate identity. 
For Hobbes, the unity and continuity of the state are both products of 
representation. The next two sections apply the Hobbesian account of corporate 
identity to a series of common identity problems. The third section addresses 
cases of change in a single state, such as territorial changes and revolutions. The 
fourth section addresses cases of ‘relational’ change, such as secession, 
absorption, and unification. The fifth section develops a Hobbesian account of 
non-identity, which determines what happens to a state’s responsibilities when 
it ceases to exist.  
 
4.1 The Concept of Corporate Identity 
 ‘Identity’ has many meanings. It is first necessary to distinguish corporate 
identity from social identity, which is the kind of state identity with which 
constructivist IR scholars are usually concerned. As Wendt (1994: 385) explains, 
while “[s]ocial identities are sets of meanings that an actor attributes to itself 
while taking the perspectives of others”, “[c]orporate identity refers to the 
intrinsic, self-organizing qualities that constitute actor individuality” (emphasis 
in original). The social identity of a state is its status or role within the society of 
states. The corporate identity of a state is its character as a unitary and 
continuous entity.  
 Whereas the social identities of states are constituted through interaction 
with other states, their corporate identities are necessarily prior to social 
interaction (Wendt, 1999: 198). Social interaction presupposes that the 
interacting entities already have distinct identities. For example, although 
Canada’s social identity as a peaceful, Western state is a product of its relations 
with other states, its corporate identity as this particular state necessarily 
precedes these characteristics. Ascribing peacefulness or Western-ness to 
Canada presupposes that it is already a single entity that can be distinguished 
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from other states and that has continuity over time. The corporate identity of a 
state is the peg on which its social identity hangs. As I explain below, it is also the 
peg on which the state’s responsibilities hang. 
 Corporate identity has two components. A group has unity if it has an 
identity that is distinct from the identities of its members, and it has continuity to 
the extent that this identity persists over time. State responsibility presupposes 
both unity and continuity. First, states must have distinct identities in order to 
have distinct responsibilities. The distinction between ‘the debts of Russia’ and 
‘the debts of Russians’ is meaningful only if ‘Russia’ is something more than 
shorthand for a list of particular Russians (see Fleming, 2017a). Second, states’ 
identities must persist over time in order for their responsibilities to persist.60 It 
makes sense to hold present-day European states responsible for colonialism 
only if these states are continuous with the colonial states of the past. A theory of 
state responsibility thus requires accounts of both the unity and the continuity of 
the state. 
 The Question of Identity is sometimes thought to be a pseudo-problem. 
The question of whether ‘Canada in 2018’ is identical to ‘Canada in 1900’ arises 
only if we treat Canada as an entity that is distinct from its individual subjects 
and officials, so it might be thought that the problem of corporate identity can be 
dissolved if we simply refrain from reifying groups, or treating them as entities 
‘over and above’ their members. Parfit makes a version of this argument. 
Suppose that a certain club exists for some time, holding regular 
 meetings. The meetings then cease. Some years later, several people form 
 a club with the same name, and the same rules. We can ask, ‘Did these 
 people revive the very same club? Or did they merely start up another 
 club which is exactly similar?’ Given certain further details, this would be 
 another empty question. We could know just what happened without 
 answering this question. Suppose that someone said: ‘But there must be 
 an answer. The club meeting later must either be, or not be, the very same 
 club.’ This would show that this person didn’t understand the nature of 
 clubs. (2016: 95-96; see also Parfit, 1984: 212-13) 
 
Since a club is nothing ‘over and above’ its members and rules, the question 
about its identity is an empty one. If we know all of the facts about the 
membership and the rules of the Book Club, then we know all there is to know. It 
                                                        
60 I discuss some limited exceptions to this rule in section 4.5. 
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does not matter, according to Parfit, whether today’s Book Club is identical to or 
merely similar to the Book Club from years ago. There might not even be a 
determinate answer to this question. Parfit (1984: 211-12) makes the same point 
about ‘nations’ (by which he means ‘states’): “Though nations exist, a nation is 
not an entity that exists separately, apart from its citizens and its territory … A 
nation just is these citizens and this territory”.61 What matters is not whether 
‘Canada in 2018’ is identical to ‘Canada in 1900’; there might not even be a 
determinate answer to this question. What matters are the facts about Canada’s 
subjects, laws, territory, and institutions. 
It is not true that questions about the identity of the Book Club or of 
Canada do not matter, much less that the person who asks them does not 
understand the nature of clubs or states. If the old Book Club had debts, 
contractual obligations, or property, then it would matter a great deal whether 
the new Book Club is the same club. And unless ‘Canada in 2018’ is identical to 
‘Canada in 1900’, it is difficult to see how present-day Canada could be 
responsible for the wrongs, debts, or treaty obligations of the Canada of the past. 
It is true that the answers to questions about the identity of the Book Club or of 
Canada might sometimes be indeterminate, just as the answers to questions 
about the identity of a human being or even a table might sometimes be 
indeterminate (Kripke, 1980: 50-51, note 18). Yet this does not imply that the 
answers—elusive as they may be—do not matter.  
The fundamental problem with Parfit’s argument is that it depends on a 
reductionist view of corporate identity, or the claim that “the existence of a club 
is not separate from the existence of its members, acting together in certain 
ways” (1984: 213). In one sense, this is obviously true: a club is a group of people 
who act together according to certain rules. But what distinguishes a club from a 
non-corporate group is precisely that its identity is not reducible to its members 
and rules. There is a difference between the Book Club and a reading group, just 
as there is a difference between a company and a partnership. The rights and 
obligations of a reading group or a partnership are nothing more than the rights 
                                                        
61 Kripke (1980: 50) makes a similar argument: “a description of the world 
mentioning all facts about persons but omitting those about nations can be a 
complete description of the world, from which the facts about nations follow” 
(emphasis in original). 
127 
 
and obligations of its members. If the reading group owes money, then each 
member owes a share. But the rights and obligations of a club or a company are 
distinct from the rights and obligations of its members. The fact that the Book 
Club owes money does not imply that any of its members owe money; the debt 
attaches to the Book Club as distinct from its members. Clubs and companies are 
corporate groups: “that form of human association which is not constituted by its 
component parts—by its members, its officers, its property, its rules—but is 
separate from all these” (Runciman, 2000a: 91). Parfit’s mistake is to elide the 
difference between corporate and non-corporate groups. It might not matter 
whether today’s reading group is the same as or merely similar to yesterday’s 
reading group, but it does matter whether today’s Book Club is the same or 
merely similar. 
States are also corporate groups. It is not true that the existence of the 
state “just involves the existence of its citizens, living together in certain ways, on 
its territory” (Parfit, 1984: 211-12). Although a state must have a population, a 
territory, and a government in order to exist at all, its identity is not the sum of 
these parts. It might not matter whether today’s ‘society’ or ‘nation’ is the same 
as or merely similar to yesterday’s, but it matters a great deal whether today’s 
state is the same or merely similar. The continuity of debts, treaty obligations, 
and reparative obligations—as well as rights and institutional memberships—
depends on the continuity of the state. In short, corporate responsibility 
presupposes corporate identity. 
 
4.2 The Conditions for Corporate Identity 
 Corporate identity is usually taken to be analogous to either personal 
identity or physical identity. The first view is exemplified by Wendt (1999: 225), 
who argues that “what really distinguishes the personal or corporate identity of 
intentional actors from that of beagles and bicycles is a consciousness and 
memory of Self as a separate locus of thought and activity”. I have already 
discussed the problems with the analogy between personal identity and 
corporate identity (section 1.1.2). One is that the common criterion for personal 
identity—psychological connectedness—does not apply to the state. Even if 
states are agents, they do not have anything like subjectivity or consciousness. 
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Another problem is that, unlike human beings, states merge and divide. Even if 
psychological connectedness did have a corporate analogue, unification and 
secession have no human analogues. The analogy between corporate identity 
and personal identity would be of limited use even if it were conceptually sound. 
The second, more common view is that the identity of a state is analogous 
to the identity of a physical object. This view has two variants. The ‘essentialist’ 
variant holds that the identity of the state depends on its core features, 
particularly the ‘nucleus’ or ‘essential part’ of its territory (section 1.2.2). For 
example, some international lawyers argue that the Republic of Turkey is the 
same state as the Ottoman Empire because “in spite of considerable territorial 
losses … the former capital and the surrounding regions, as well as other zones of 
historical significance constituting the genuine nucleus of the state, remain 
untouched” (Öktem, 2011: 575; see also Dumberry, 2012: 248-50). The organic 
metaphor lurks just beneath the surface: a state retains its identity despite a loss 
of appendages (colonies and outlying territories), but it is no longer the same 
state if it loses its vital organs (the “capital and the surrounding regions”).  
Aristotle’s account of corporate identity exemplifies the ‘formalist’ variant 
of the physical identity view. He argues that the criterion for corporate identity 
cannot be sameness of population or territory—in whole or in part—because “it 
is quite possible to divide both population and territory in two” (1992: III.3, 
175). Even the nucleus of a state’s population or territory can be divided, as 
Germany’s was at the end of the Second World War. The identity of a state, like 
the identity of a river, depends on its “form”—the way in which its constituents 
are organized—rather than its particular constituents. The identity of a river 
depends on the source from which it flows rather than the particular water that 
it contains.62 The identity of a state depends on its constitution rather than the 
particular population and territory that it has: “the main criterion of the 
continued identity of a state ought to be its constitution” (Ibid. III.3, 176). Just as 
a river retains its identity as different water passes through it, a state retains its 
identity as its population and territory change. But “when the constitution 
changes and becomes different in kind”, such as when there is a change from 
                                                        
62 Aristotle takes the example of the river from Heraclitus. 
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aristocracy to democracy, “the state also would seem necessarily not to be the 
same” (Ibid.).  
Aristotle’s analogy between corporate identity and physical identity has 
set the terms for most subsequent thought about corporate identity. As Tuck 
(2016: 76) describes, Grotius adopted the idea that “[a] people possess identity 
over time, like a river or the Argonauts’ ship”. Contemporary philosophers 
“compare the identity of corporations with that of ordinary physical objects” 
(Welch, 1989: 412). The identity of a corporation “is no different in principle 
from the identity of other physical objects. Rocks, rivers, algae, people, hats, 
bugs, birds—all retain their identities despite changes in composition” (Ibid. 
413). Aristotle’s analogy even appears in legal thought about corporate identity: 
“A State, like Heraclitus’ river, is in a constant state of flux … the criterion of this 
relative identity cannot be one of substance, but only one of form” (Marek, 1968: 
4-5; see also Cheng, 2011: 37).  
Hobbes, too, takes Aristotle’s discussion of corporate identity as his point 
of departure. He suggests that there is a fundamental similarity between the 
identities of men, rivers, and cities. 
[I]f the name be given for such form as is the beginning of motion, then, as 
long as that motion remains, it will be the same individual thing; as that 
man will be always the same, whose actions and thoughts proceed all 
from the same beginning of motion, namely, that which was in his 
generation; and that will be the same river which flows from one and the 
same fountain, whether the same water, or other water, or something else 
than water, flow from thence; and that the same city, whose acts proceed 
continually from the same institution, whether the men be the same or no. 
(Hobbes, 1839: XI.7, 137-38)63 
 
Hobbes’ account of identity might be called ‘nominalist’, as opposed to Aristotle’s 
formalist account. His key claim is that “we must consider by what name 
anything is called, when we inquire concerning the identity of it” (Ibid. 137; see 
also Hobbes, 1976: 139).64 The answer to a question about the identity of an 
entity depends on how that entity is categorized. As he says, “it is one thing to 
ask concerning Socrates, whether he be the same man, and another to ask 
                                                        
63 I cite De Corpore according to the chapter and paragraph numbers as well as 
the page numbers from the Molesworth edition. 
64 I cite Thomas White’s De Mundo Examined according to the page numbers of 
the 1976 Jones translation. 
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whether he be the same body” (Hobbes, 1839: XI.7, 137). If the relevant category 
is ‘body’, then the old Socrates is not identical to the young Socrates, “for his 
Body when he is Old, cannot be the same it was when he was an Infant, by reason 
of the difference of Magnitude” (Ibid.). However, if the relevant category is ‘man’ 
or ‘person’, then the old Socrates is identical to the young Socrates, since his 
“actions and thoughts proceed all from the same beginning of motion” (Ibid.). 
Whereas the identity of a body depends on its particular matter, the identity of a 
man depends on his “generation”, or the motion that originally gave him life. 
 Hobbes also applies his nominalist account of identity to the state: “When 
any citizen dies, the material of the state is not the same, i.e. the state is not the 
same ens [or matter]. Yet the uninterrupted degree and motion of government 
that signalise a state ensure, while they remain as one, that the state is the same 
in number” (Hobbes, 1976: 141). If the relevant category is ‘population’ or 
‘territory’, then there is a different state whenever a subject dies or a border 
changes. But if the relevant category is ‘person’, then the state persists as long as 
its “acts proceed continually from the same institution” (Hobbes, 1839: XI.7, 
138).  
  For Hobbes, unlike for Aristotle, the ‘institution’ on which the identity of 
the state depends is not its constitution. In his famous discussion of the Ship of 
Theseus, he argues that the form of an entity cannot, by itself, be the basis for its 
identity. 
[I]f, for example, that ship of Theseus … were, after all the planks were 
changed, the same numerical ship it was at the beginning; and if some 
man had kept the old planks as they were taken out, and by putting them 
afterwards together in the same order, had again made a ship of them, 
this, without doubt, had also been the same numerical ship with that 
which was at the beginning; and so there would have been two ships 
numerically the same, which is absurd. (Ibid. 136-37) 
 
If sameness of form were a sufficient condition for identity, then the ship with 
new planks and the ship made of the old planks would both be identical to the 
original Ship of Theseus. And since identity is a transitive relation, this would 
imply that the two distinct ships are identical to each other. The same line of 
argument shows that the identity of the state cannot depend entirely on its 
constitution. Suppose that the subjects of a state gradually emigrate to another 
territory, where they create a new state that is identical in form. If sameness of 
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constitutional form were a sufficient condition for identity, then both the new 
state and the old state would be identical to the original state, and hence to each 
other.   
 For Hobbes, the ‘institution’ on which the identity of the state depends is 
sovereignty. A state retains its identity as long as its actions proceed from “the 
same beginning of motion” (1839: XI.7, 137), and the source of the state’s motion 
is sovereignty. As Hobbes (2012: XXIX. 518) says, “the Soveraign, is the publique 
Soule, giving Life and Motion to the Common-wealth”. Having a sovereign gives a 
multitude a corporate identity, and this corporate identity persists as long as the 
sovereignty does. As I explain below, Hobbes uses the ideas of representation 
and succession to develop this account of corporate identity in his political 
works. 
 Although Hobbes compares the identity of a state to both the identity of a 
human being and the identity of a river, neither analogy can capture the logic of 
his account of corporate identity. Personal, physical, and corporate identity are 
similar only in the most general sense: the identities of human beings, rivers, and 
states all depend on the motion that generates them. Hobbes is, after all, a 
materialist. But corporate identities are also unique. The identity of the state 
depends neither on its matter nor on its form—neither on its particular 
population or territory, nor on its constitution—but only on its sovereign. 
Hobbes thus uses the concept of representation to account for both components 
of corporate identity. The state has unity because it has a single representative: 
“it is the Unity of the Representer, not the Unity of the Represented, that maketh 
the Person One” (Hobbes, 2012: XVI. 248). The state has continuity as long as it 
has an unbroken series of representatives: “the uninterrupted degree and 
motion of government that signalise a state ensure, while they remain as one, 
that the state is the same in number” (Hobbes, 1976: 141). What follows is not a 
wholesale endorsement of Hobbes’ account of corporate identity, but an attempt 
to construct a ‘Hobbesian’ account of corporate identity using the core idea that 
the identity of the state depends on political representation. The remainder of 






In order for a multitude to be united, its members must have a single 
representative: “A Multitude of men, are made One Person, when they are by one 
man, or one Person, Represented” (Hobbes, 2012: XVI. 248). But having a single 
representative is not sufficient for unity. An accountant may represent many 
clients, but this does not make his multitude of clients one person. Since he 
represents each client as an individual, he is only an agent with many principals. 
Unity requires that the representative of the multitude act in the name of the 
group rather than in the name of each individual; he must “beare their Person” 
(Ibid. XVII. 260) instead of their individual persons. There are thus two 
necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the unity of a multitude: it must be 
represented both by one person and as one person. 
 Hobbes (1990: 34-35A) draws out the implications of his account of unity 
in Behemoth. 
 [T]he Scots have their Parliaments, wherein their assent is required to the 
 Laws there made, which is as good. Have not many of the provinces of 
 France their several parliaments and several constitutions? And yet they 
 are all equally natural subjects of the King of France. And therefore for my 
 part I think they were mistaken, both English and Scots, in calling one 
 another foreigners. 
 
Just as the French provinces share an overarching corporate identity—the 
identity of France—so Scotland and England share the corporate identity of the 
United Kingdom. It is a mistake for the English and the Scottish to call each other 
foreigners because they share a sovereign, and hence a corporate identity. But 
like the provinces, which have distinct corporate identities within France 
because each has its own provincial representatives, Scotland and England have 
distinct corporate identities within the United Kingdom. The fact that the English 
and the Scottish have different national identities is entirely beside the point for 
Hobbes, since corporate identities are constituted by representation rather than 
by the characteristics of the people who are represented. Even a random 
collection of individuals would have a corporate identity if it had a single 
representative. What gives states (as well as provinces, cities, and counties) 
distinct corporate identities is that they have distinct representatives, not that 
their inhabitants belong to distinct national or cultural groups. 
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For Hobbes, unity is a consequence of attribution rather than a 
precondition for it. A multitude is united because it has a representative whose 
actions are attributed to the whole group; it is not the case that actions can be 
attributed to the group because it has some preexisting unity. The Hobbesian 
account of attribution in the previous chapter thus lays the groundwork for the 
Hobbesian account of corporate identity.  
Hobbes stipulated that the representative of the multitude had to be 
authorized in order for the multitude to be united. Yet this stipulation was of 
little consequence because he set the bar so low for authorization. Being 
“represented” by a conqueror who threatens the members of the multitude into 
“authorizing” him is sufficient to unite them (Hobbes, 2012: XX. 306). But if we 
set more demanding conditions for authorization, as I have done in the previous 
chapter (section 3.3), then the conditions for unity also become more 
demanding. A government that coerces or indoctrinates its subjects into 
submission does not meet the background conditions for valid authorization, so 
its actions cannot be the basis for the unity of the state. Since the North Korean 
government is not an authorized representative of North Korea, it cannot give 
North Koreans a corporate identity, any more than the actions of a self-appointed 
King of Humanity could give humanity a corporate identity. The identity of North 
Korea is fraudulent, not just fictional. Only states whose governments pass the 
minimal conditions for authorization can legitimately have actions and 
responsibilities attributed to them in the first place (section 3.5).  
Hobbes also stipulated that the unity of a multitude requires a single 
authorized representative—either one man or one assembly. He drew a sharp 
distinction between the sovereign, who represents the state directly, and public 
ministers, who represent the state only through the sovereign (section 2.3). A 
united multitude can have many public ministers, but it can have only one 
sovereign. For the same reason that a multitude with one sovereign is one 
person, a multitude with three sovereigns is three persons. 
[I]f the King bear the person of the People, and the generall Assembly 
bear also the person of the People, and another Assembly bear the person 
of a Part of the people, they are not one Person, nor one Soveraign, but 




During the English Civil War, when both Parliament and the King purported to 
represent England, the country was “two Common-wealths, of one & the same 
Subjects; which is a Kingdome divided in it selfe, and cannot stand” (Ibid. XXIX. 
510). For Hobbes, the unity of the state depends on the unity of the sovereign. 
However, as I have argued in the previous chapter, the modern sovereign 
is elusive. The distinction between supreme and subordinate representatives, or 
between the sovereign and the public ministers, is no longer so clear (section 
3.2.1). The idea that the identity of the state depends on the identity of a single, 
sovereign individual or assembly is no longer plausible. Yet we can retain the 
core idea that the identity of the state depends on its being represented. There 
need not be a single representative; all that is required for unity is a single 
‘system of representation’.  
Representatives are part of the same system of representation provided 
that they recognize each other as authorized representatives of the same state. In 
other words, unity requires mutual recognition: each representative must tacitly 
or explicitly accept the others’ claims to act in the name of the state. Recognition 
between representatives can often be inferred from hierarchies: a soldier and a 
general both represent the state, but this does not imply disunity because the 
soldier and the general are part of the same chain of command. The practice of 
giving and taking orders implies mutual recognition. Where there is no hierarchy 
among representatives, mutual recognition can be inferred from other tacit 
signs. Although Congress and the president represent the United States 
independently of each other, each recognizes that the other is an authorized 
representative of the United States. The president might veto a bill, but he 
nevertheless recognizes that Congress has the authority to pass bills. Likewise, 
Congress might override the president’s veto, but it nevertheless recognizes that 
the president has the authority to exercise his veto. Similarly, the Supreme Court 
strikes down laws, but it does not deny that Congress has the authority to make 
them. There is mutual recognition between the branches of the American 
government despite the fact that they often act at cross-purposes. Mutual 
recognition between representatives marks the difference between a state with a 




In sum, there are two conditions for unity, or for the state to have a 
corporate identity in the first place. The representatives of the state must (1) be 
authorized and (2) constitute a coherent system of representation. States that 
fail to meet the ‘authorization condition’, such as North Korea and Turkmenistan, 
have only fraudulent unity. States that fail to meet the ‘coherence condition’, such 
as Somalia and Syria, do not even have a semblance of unity. Neither have 
identities that are capable of sustaining responsibilities. Attributing 
responsibilities to states such as Somalia is largely futile, while attributing 
responsibilities to states such as North Korea is insidious: it gives the ruling 
party a corporate veil behind which to hide. When a state fails to meet the 
conditions for unity, the actions of the factions within it are attributable only to 
those factions themselves.  
 
4.2.2 Continuity 
Hobbes’ account of continuity is a consequence of his account of unity. 
Just as having a single representative (or system of representation) gives the 
multitude unity, having a continuous series of representatives gives the united 
multitude continuity. 
 Of all these Formes of Government, the matter being mortall, so that not 
 onely Monarchs, but also whole Assemblies dy, it is necessary for the 
 conservation of the peace of men, that as there was order taken for an 
 Artificiall Man, so there be order also taken, for an Artificiall Eternity of 
 life; without which, men that are governed by an Assembly, should return 
 into the condition of Warre in every age; and they that are governed by 
 One man, assoon as their Governour dyeth. This Artificiall Eternity, is 
 that which men call the Right of Succession. (Hobbes, 2012: XIX. 298) 
 
Hobbes goes on to say a great deal about how disputes about succession can be 
avoided, but he says nothing further about how exactly the succession of 
representatives sustains the identity of the state. Yet the logic of the argument is 
clear: if “it is the Unity of the Representer, not the Unity of the Represented, that 
maketh the Person One” (Ibid. XVI. 248), then it is the continuity of the 
representer, not the continuity of the represented, that keepeth the person one. 
The persistence of the state’s corporate identity requires an unbroken ‘chain of 
succession’, or series of representatives.  
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 The principle that the continuity of a person requires continuity of 
representation appears elsewhere in Hobbes’ thought. In his discussion of the 
Holy Trinity, he uses the idea of succession to explain how God can “be said to be 
three persons” even though he has had more than three representatives (Ibid. 
XLII. 776). The first person of God was represented by “Moses, and his successors 
the High Priests, and Kings of Judah, in the Old Testament”, and the third person 
of God by “the Apostles, and their successors, from the day of Pentecost (when 
the Holy Ghost descended on them) to this day” (Ibid. XXXIII. 602). Like the 
person of the state, each person of God remains the same person as long as it has 
an unbroken series of representatives. The heretical corollary of this principle is 
that God ceases to be a person if he ceases to be represented. “The true God may 
be Personated” (Ibid. XVI. 248)—just as, in his previous example, “An Idol, or 
meer Figment of the brain, may be Personated” (Ibid.)—but this does not mean 
that he will be personated. And if God is not personated, then he is no longer a 
person. The political implication of the principle of succession is that the identity 
of the state persists only as long as it is represented. If the chain of succession is 
broken, such as when a monarch abdicates without a successor, then the 
multitude ceases to be one person, and the state consequently ceases to exist.  
But how can we determine whether a new government is a ‘successor’ to 
the old government or, on the contrary, the government of a new state? Hobbes 
does not provide an answer, and his assumption seems to be that the answer will 
be obvious. This is often the case: it is obvious that Theresa May’s government is 
the successor to David Cameron’s government and hence that May’s United 
Kingdom and Cameron’s United Kingdom are the same state. Yet in exceptional 
cases, such as revolutions and contested elections, it is not obvious whether the 
new government is the successor to the old. In these cases, Hobbes’ rather vague 
notion of succession is of little help. The remainder of this section develops a 
more precise notion of succession. 
 The clearest indication that a new government is the successor to the 
previous government is mutual recognition: the outgoing government recognizes 
the incoming government as its successor, and the incoming government 
recognizes the outgoing government as its predecessor. Just as mutual 
recognition between representatives at a given time implies that they are parts 
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of the same system of representation, mutual recognition between 
representatives across time implies that they are parts of the same chain of 
succession. The ritual of ‘handing over power’, such as when the outgoing 
American president gives the White House keys to the incoming president, is a 
sign that each recognizes the other. A coronation ceremony serves a similar 
function in a monarchy. In addition to encouraging a peaceful transfer of power, 
mutual recognition between the incoming government and the outgoing 
government indicates the continuity of the state. 
 Some forms of recognition are unidirectional rather than mutual. 
Prospective recognition occurs when the outgoing government recognizes the 
incoming government as its successor. The archetypes of prospective recognition 
in a democracy are concession speeches and congratulatory post-election phone 
calls; the archetype in a monarchy is a queen’s naming of her successor. 
Retrospective recognition occurs when the incoming government recognizes the 
outgoing government as its predecessor, such as by maintaining its titles and 
offices or by claiming rights that attach to the antecedent state. For instance, the 
fact that Trump calls himself the 45th President of the United States (and, despite 
his earlier objections, admits that Obama was the 44th) implies that Trump 
recognizes Obama as his predecessor. Similarly, the fact that the first 
government of the Russian Federation claimed the Soviet Union’s seat at the 
United Nations implies that it recognized the Soviet government as its 
predecessor. As I discuss in the next section, governments often tacitly recognize 
their successors and predecessors, and these tacit signs of recognition carry 
more weight than their explicit statements. Succession is determined by what 
representatives do, not by what they say. 
 In cases of mutual recognition, it is clear that the new government is the 
successor to the old and hence that the identity of the state remains the same. 
‘The United States in 2018’ is the same state as ‘the United States in 2015’ 
because Trump and Obama recognize each other as successor and predecessor. 
Complications arise when recognition is not mutual. After losing the 2016 
Gambian presidential election, President Yahya Jammeh refused to recognize the 
result or to give up power to the president-elect, Adama Barrow. It would be odd 
to conclude that Barrow (if he did manage to obtain power) is not Jammeh’s 
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successor, but instead the president of a new state, simply because Jammeh is a 
sore loser. Prospective recognition is strong evidence of succession, but it is not 
strictly necessary for succession.  
Retrospective recognition, on the other hand, is necessary for succession. 
A new government is a successor to the former government only if it explicitly or 
tacitly recognizes the former government as its predecessor. To put it the other 
way around, a new government that refuses to recognize the previous 
government is not its successor. For example, after the breakup of the Soviet 
Union, the governments of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia disavowed the Soviet 
Baltic governments. Instead, the new Baltic governments claimed to be the 
successors to the pre-Soviet Baltic governments, which had been deposed in 
1940. What made this claim credible is that the new Baltic governments 
consistently accepted its consequences: “The Baltic countries refused … to 
participate in the payment and servicing of the Soviet Union's external debts and 
did not claim any of its property or assets in foreign countries" (Müllerson, 1993: 
483). The Baltic governments also upheld treaties that the pre-Soviet 
governments had signed: “the prewar treaties, concluded by the then 
independent Baltic republics, continue to be in force as long as they have not 
expressly been terminated” (Van Elsuwege, 2003: 384).65 If a government 
consistently refuses to recognize the previous government as its predecessor, 
then it has a credible claim of non-succession. 
Although retrospective recognition is necessary for succession, it is not 
sufficient. If it were, then governments would be able to hijack the identities of 
states simply by recognizing former governments as their predecessors. For 
instance, the Soviet-backed government of Poland, which was “a classic example 
of the creation of a puppet entity” (Marek, 1968: 475), ‘impersonated’ Poland by 
claiming to be the successor to the government of the Republic of Poland. The 
fact that the exiled government of the Republic refused to recognize the Soviet-
backed government weakens the latter’s claim to be its successor. But since 
prospective recognition is not necessary for succession, the government of the 
Republic’s non-recognition of the Soviet-backed government is not decisive. 
Succession sometimes cannot be determined by ‘horizontal’ forms of 
                                                        
65 I examine the Soviet, Baltic, and Polish cases in more detail in the next section. 
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recognition—prospective and retrospective recognition between governments—
alone. 
 ‘Vertical’ recognition, or acceptance of the government by its subjects 
(section 3.3), is the crucial factor in cases of contested succession. In the absence 
of prospective recognition, authorization marks the difference between 
legitimate and fraudulent successor governments. The fact that Barrow won the 
2016 Gambian election, and hence had been authorized by the subjects of The 
Gambia, gave him a credible claim to be Jammeh’s successor, despite the fact that 
Jammeh refused to recognize him. Conversely, the Soviet-backed government of 
Poland was not the successor to the government of the Polish Republic because it 
had no credible claim to be authorized by the subjects of Poland. The legitimate 
successor was the exiled government of the Republic. Vertical recognition 
determines succession where mutual recognition between the incoming and 
outgoing governments is absent.  
 Succession is thus determined by a combination of prospective, 
retrospective, and vertical recognition. A new government counts as a successor 
to the previous government if and only if (1) the new government (explicitly or 
tacitly) recognizes the previous government as its predecessor; and either (a) 
the previous government (explicitly or tacitly) recognizes the new government 
as its successor, or (b) the subjects of the state recognize the new government as 
legitimate. In other words, succession requires retrospective recognition plus 
either prospective recognition or vertical recognition. 
     ***  
The Hobbesian account of corporate identity has two parts. The first is an 
account of unity: a multitude is one person, or has one corporate identity, if its 
representatives meet the minimal conditions for authorization and form a 
coherent system of representation. The second part is an account of continuity: a 
corporate entity retains its identity over time as long as it has an unbroken chain 
of succession. Recognition between the representatives of the state at a given 
time gives it unity, while recognition between the representatives of the state 
across time gives it continuity. The next two sections apply the Hobbesian 




4.3 Changes in a Single State 
 The compositions of states are constantly changing. Elections and coups 
replace their governments; births, deaths, immigration, and emigration change 
their populations and demographics; and erosion, tectonic shifts, and boundary 
changes alter their territory. The forms of states also occasionally change as a 
result of institutional reforms, constitutional amendments, and revolutions. The 
Hobbesian account of corporate identity explains how states can persist despite 
all of these changes. Since the identity of the state depends entirely on its system 
of representation, changes in its composition and form do not change its identity. 
Only a break in the chain of succession can extinguish the identity of the state. 
 The case of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation illustrates how a 
state can persist despite changes in both its composition and its form. It also 
illustrates why succession must be determined by what governments do rather 
than what they say. On the face of it, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist 
Republic (along with each of the other republics) appeared to secede from the 
Soviet Union.66 The Russian Federation claimed only part of the population and 
territory of the Soviet Union; it had a new government and constitution; and, at 
first, it explicitly stated that the Soviet Union had been dissolved. In the Minsk 
Declaration of 8 December 1991, the governments of the Russian Federation, 
Belarus, and Ukraine jointly declared that “the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
as a subject of international law and a geopolitical reality no longer exists” (UN, 
1991a: 3). These three governments, along with the governments of eight other 
former Soviet republics, later affirmed that, “[w]ith the establishment of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
ceases to exist” (UN, 1991b: 5). The Russian Federation both appeared and 
claimed to be one new state among many. 
Yet contrary to its initial claim to be the government of a new state, the 
Russian government under Boris Yeltsin tacitly recognized the Soviet 
government as its predecessor. On 24 December, Yeltsin (1991) informed the 
Secretary-General that “the membership of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
                                                        
66 ‘Secession’, or the creation of a new state on part of the territory of an existing 
state, should not be confused with ‘succession’, or the replacement of one 
government with another in the same state. I discuss the consequences of 
secession for state identity in section 4.4. 
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Republics in the United Nations, including the Security Council and all other 
organs and organizations of the United Nations system, is being continued by the 
Russian Federation” (see also Blum, 1992). The Russian government even 
claimed the Soviet Union’s representative in the United Nations: “Yuri M. 
Vorontsov, the former Soviet representative, [was] reaccredited as the 
representative of the Russian Federation” (NYT, 1991). Institutional 
memberships are not transferable, nor can they be ‘succeeded to’ or ‘inherited’ 
by a new state (Bühler, 2001: 31).67 The Yeltsin government’s claim to the Soviet 
Union’s membership in the United Nations therefore presupposed that it was the 
successor to Gorbachev’s Soviet government rather than the government of a 
new state. If the Yeltsin government were not the government of the Soviet 
Union (or the same state with a different name), then it would not have had a 
valid claim to the Soviet Union’s membership (any more than the new 
government of the Kazakh Republic did). The Russian government thus tacitly 
recognized the Soviet government as its predecessor.  
Yeltsin acknowledged as much when he requested that “the name ‘the 
Russian Federation’ should be used in the United Nations in place of the name 
‘the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics’” (Yeltsin, 1991). Consequently, as Yeltsin 
accepted, the “Russian Federation maintains full responsibility for all the rights 
and obligations of the USSR under the Charter of the United Nations, including 
the financial obligations” (Ibid.; see also Ziemele, 2001: 193-202). Despite the 
appearance that the Russian Federation had seceded from the Soviet Union, 
which was made plausible by the simultaneous changes in population, territory, 
and government, it was actually continuous with the Soviet Union. What 
appeared to be the dissolution of one state and the creation of another was, in 
terms of identity, just a name change. 
The principle behind this analysis of the Soviet case is that certain rights-
claims presuppose governmental succession and hence the continuity of the 
                                                        
67 The United Nations (1947: 2) has clearly stated that new states cannot inherit 
membership: “when a new State is created, whatever may be the territory and 
the populations which it comprises and whether or not they formed part of a 
State Member of the United Nations, it cannot under the system of the Charter 
claim the status of a Member of the United Nations unless it has been formally 
admitted as such in conformity with the provisions of the Charter”. 
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state. If a government claims rights that attach to a particular state, then it 
presupposes that it is the government of that state; this, in turn, entails that it is 
the successor to the previous government rather than the government of a new 
state. Claims to institutional memberships, creditors’ rights, and treaty rights 
usually imply succession. For instance, when a new government demands 
repayment of a loan that a previous government has given, the new government 
tacitly recognizes the previous government as its predecessor, since the new 
government would not have a valid claim to repayment if it were not the 
government of the creditor state. To claim the rights of a state is to claim its 
identity. 
However, not all rights-claims imply the continuity of the state. Claims to 
the territory, population, and property of an antecedent state generally do not 
imply claims to its identity. (But these claims sometimes entail inheritance of 
some of the antecedent state’s responsibilities, as I argue in section 4.5). The fact 
that the Russian Federation inherited the bulk of the territory, infrastructure, 
and weaponry of the Soviet Union does not imply that the former and the latter 
are the same state, any more than inheriting a relative’s property implies that 
you and the relative are the same person. Only claims to ‘personal’ or ‘identity-
specific’ rights presuppose continuity.68 A contract that says ‘Jane Smith may use 
Path A’ establishes a personal right; a contract that says ‘the owner of Lot B may 
use Path A’ does not, since the right accrues to anyone who owns Lot B. Jane 
Smith’s heir might inherit the latter right, but—not being Jane Smith—could not 
possibly inherit the former. Likewise, a treaty that says ‘the Soviet Union may 
fish in the Aral Sea’ establishes a personal right; a treaty that says ‘states that 
border the Aral Sea may fish there’ does not. Claims to the former right 
presuppose continuity with the Soviet Union, while claims to the latter right do 
not. One sign of state continuity is thus that the new government claims the 
personal rights of the antecedent state. 
An even clearer sign of state continuity is that the representatives of the 
state remain the same. Like the breakup of the Soviet Union, the breakup of the 
Ottoman Empire appeared to be a case of multiple secession, with the Republic 
                                                        
68 Personal rights are analogous to what I have called ‘personal responsibilities’ 
in the previous chapter (section 3.1). 
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of Turkey being one new state among many. There were changes in population 
and territory; there was a new government and a new constitution; and the new 
government claimed to be the government of a new state. In the Ottoman Debt 
Arbitration (UN, 1925), the new Turkish government argued that it should not be 
solely liable for the debts of the Empire on the grounds that the Republic of 
Turkey was a new state (along with the British and French mandates and the 
new Arab states) rather than the continuing state of the Empire. Yet there was 
clear evidence that the Turkish government was the successor to the Ottoman 
government. Although the Republic had a new constitution, the Ottoman chain of 
succession was clearly intact. 
The [R]epublic inherited not only the central territory of the Empire, but 
also a bureaucratic and military elite who helped to establish a new state. 
… Even the organizational features of the army—ideologically the most 
republican element of the state apparatus—remained the same, such as 
military units’ numbers. (Öktem, 2011: 577-78) 
 
The decisive factor is that it was not just the “organizational features” of the state 
that remained the same, but the representatives themselves: “85 per cent of the 
Ottoman Empire’s civil servants and 93 per cent of its staff officers retained their 
positions in the new republic” (Poulton, 1997: 88). As in the Soviet case, there 
was continuity of representation despite many institutional and territorial 
changes.  
So far, the Hobbesian account of corporate identity is in line with the 
international legal doctrine of state continuity: changes in the populations, 
territories, governments, and even constitutions of states do not affect their 
identities (section 1.2.2). In the Russian/Soviet and Turkish/Ottoman cases, the 
Hobbesian account merely provides an alternative justification for the judgments 
of identity that international lawyers have already made. The legal basis for 
Russian/Soviet and Turkish/Ottoman continuity is that there is continuity of the 
‘nucleus’ of each state’s territory (Crawford, 2007: 676-77; Dumberry, 2012: 
248-50; Öktem, 2011: 575-76). According to the Hobbesian account, the basis for 
continuity in these cases in that there is succession, or continuity of 
representation. Yet the two accounts differ about many other cases. In particular, 
the Hobbesian account of corporate identity provides a better analysis of cases in 
which states undergo complete losses or changes of territory. 
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Annexation is one such kind of case. The three Baltic states were annexed 
by the Soviet Union in 1940 and did not regain their independence until 1991. 
According to the ‘nucleus account’, the Baltic states’ complete losses of their 
territories should have resulted in their extinction. However, international 
lawyers have established a rule that “annexation of the territory of a State as a 
result of the illegal use of force”, provided that it is temporary, “does not bring 
about the extinction of the State” (Crawford, 2007: 690). Present-day Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Estonia are therefore considered to be continuous with the pre-
annexation Baltic states, not with the Baltic Soviet Republics (Van Elsuwege, 
2003). The principle behind this rule is ex iniuria jus non oritur—illegal acts 
cannot make law. However, if the annexation persists, ex iniuria gives way to ex 
factis jus oritur—the principle that the law must recognize the facts (Marek, 
1968: 328-30, 566). For instance, although the American annexation of Hawaii 
was illegal (Craven, 2002), the Kingdom of Hawaii has nevertheless ceased to 
exist, and Hawaii is now part of the United States. But what determines whether 
or not an illegal annexation is a done deal? The rule about illegal annexation is an 
awkward exception to the nucleus account of corporate identity, which is subject 
to a further exception: the state persists as long as it retains the nucleus of its 
territory, except in cases of illegal annexation, except when the illegal annexation 
persists for so long that it appears to be irreversible. 
The Hobbesian account of corporate identity provides a much simpler 
account of illegal annexation: the annexed state persists as long as its chain of 
succession is unbroken. In most cases, the chain of succession is kept alive by a 
government-in-exile, such as the many exiled governments in London during the 
Second World War. These governments maintained the continuity of their states 
despite the fact that their territories had been annexed or occupied. What 
determines whether annexation is a done deal is whether the annexed state 
continues to be represented. The difference between the Baltic states and the 
Kingdom of Hawaii is that the former continued to be represented despite the 
annexation. 
A government-in-exile is not the only possible vehicle for keeping the 
chain of succession alive. Of the three Baltic states, only Estonia had a 
government-in-exile, and the authority of that government was questionable. 
145 
 
Estonia at one point “had two governments in exile at one time”, and, even when 
it had only one, “its reputation and authority among Estonian refugees was not 
very high” (Mälksoo, 2000: 298-99). Lithuania and Latvia failed to establish 
governments-in-exile, in large part because most members of their governments 
had been killed or deported to the Soviet Union. The task of representing the 
Baltic states fell to their diplomatic and consular missions, which were financed 
by gold deposits in Western banks (Misiunas, 1991: 141; Marek, 1968: 399-410). 
In addition to their normal functions, the Baltic legations “functioned de facto as 
quasi-governments”:  
The Estonian general consulate in New York, led by Johannes Kaiv and 
 later by Ernst Jaakson, continued its uninterrupted functioning 
 throughout the entire period of Soviet rule in Estonia. It continued to 
 issue new passports to the citizens of the Republic of Estonia (so-called 
 Jaakson passports), and symbolized the continued de iure existence of its 
 state. (Mälksoo, 2000: 312)   
 
Similarly, “the Latvian Minister in London had been granted, by the [pre-
annexation] Latvian Government, emergency powers”, which “conferred on him 
a status similar to that of an actual Foreign Minister” (Marek, 1968: 410). The 
post-Soviet Baltic states were continuous with the pre-Soviet Baltic states 
because the Baltic legations had maintained their chains of succession during the 
occupation. The important factor is not that the Soviet annexations were illegal; 
it is that, despite the annexations, the Baltic states still had representatives who 
kept their chains of succession alive. 
 A conspicuous feature of the Baltic case is that many other states 
continued to recognize the Baltic states throughout the Soviet period. The Baltic 
legations probably would not have been able to exist without external, and 
particularly American, recognition. One might therefore think that the continuity 
of external recognition, not the continuity of representation, is what sustains the 
identity of the state. Yet other cases suggest that state continuity is possible in 
the absence of external recognition. The Polish government-in-exile during the 
Second World War “represented the immediate continuation of the Government 
which had functioned in Poland itself prior to, and during, the invasion” (Marek, 
1968: 439, note 3). But in 1945, most states—including its host state, the United 
Kingdom—withdrew recognition from the government-in-exile. However, “the 
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Polish Government did not go into liquidation and has, on the contrary, remained 
in existence in London, although such existence is of necessity precarious” (Ibid. 
535). The exiled Polish government continued to exist until the Polish Republic 
was restored, and, crucially, the new government of the Republic recognized the 
exiled government as its predecessor. 
[O]n 22 December 1990, in Warsaw’s Royal Castle, as the last President of 
the government-in-exile, [Kaczorowski] handed over to President Lech 
Wałęsa the presidential insignia: the flag of the Republic, presidential 
seals (one each for ink, wax and dry embossing) and the original of the 
Constitution of April 1935. (Rojek, 2004: 45) 
 
The mutual recognition between the new Polish government and the 
government-in-exile implies the continuity of the Polish Republic, despite the 
fact that most states had withdrawn recognition from the Republic several 
decades before. What matters for the continuity of the state is not whether other 
governments recognize the government-in-exile, but whether, at the end of the 
occupation, the restored government recognizes the government-in-exile as its 
predecessor. 
 The case of Italy’s annexation of Ethiopia in 1936 even more clearly 
illustrates the irrelevance of external recognition to the continuity of the state. 
By 1938, almost all states had recognized the annexation, and there were few 
vestiges of the Ethiopian state left: “There remained not even a government in 
exile, or recognized legations which could have been instrumental in carrying on 
Ethiopia’s continuity through the critical period” (Marek, 1968: 278). Yet the 
identity of Ethiopia was sustained by “the Emperor [Haile Selassie], as the exiled 
claimant to his throne and country” (Ibid. 278). Other states assumed as much 
when they “reestablished” diplomatic relations with Ethiopia after the end of the 
Italian occupation (Ibid. 275). But this fickle re-recognition of independent 
Ethiopia counts for just as little as the fickle withdrawal of recognition in the first 
place. External recognition carries no independent weight. If it is not based on 
actual evidence of state continuity—a continuous chain of succession, or at least 
continuity of some other feature—then it is simply arbitrary.69  
                                                        
69 The Hobbesian account of corporate identity thus supports the declaratory 
theory of recognition, which holds that “recognition of new States is a political 
act which is in principle independent of the existence of the new State” 
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 The Ethiopian case marks the outer limit of state continuity. There was 
hardly a system of representation left; the identity of the state was sustained 
entirely by its exiled emperor. Although Ethiopia’s chain of succession was 
precarious, it was nevertheless unbroken. Ethiopia, the Baltic states, and Poland 
stand in clear contrast to the Kingdom of Hawaii, Czechoslovakia, and the many 
other states that have ceased to be represented at all. Annexed states survive as 
long as they have representatives who carry on their chains of succession, but no 
state can survive a total loss of representation. The present-day Baltic states are 
continuous with the Baltic states of 1940, despite five decades of Soviet 
occupation, because they are linked by a chain of succession. Present-day Israel, 
on the other hand, is not continuous with any of the ancient Kingdoms of Israel. 
Whether extant states and antecedent states have “substantially the same 
constituent features” (Crawford, 2007: 671)—the same territorial nuclei—is 
irrelevant.  
 Cases of relocation illustrate the irrelevance of territory. Some island 
states, such as the Maldives and Kiribati, could lose all of their territory to sea-
level rises by the end of the next century. The former president of the Maldives 
proposed “a plan that would use tourism revenues from the present to establish 
a sovereign wealth fund with which he could buy a new country—or at least part 
of one—in the future” (Schmidle, 2009). The territorial nucleus account has the 
implausible implication that relocation of the Maldives would literally make it “a 
new country”, free of all of its current debts and obligations. Relocation is, 
strictly speaking, impossible. If the territorial nucleus of a state is essential to its 
identity, then a loss of this territorial nucleus necessarily implies the extinction 
of the state. The Hobbesian account, on the other hand, implies that relocation of 
the Maldives would leave its identity intact. The post-relocation state would be 
continuous with the pre-relocation state provided that the post-relocation 
government were the successor to the pre-relocation government.  
 The Hobbesian account of corporate identity thus explains how states can 
persist despite changes in their populations, territories, governments, 
                                                                                                                                                              
(Crawford, 1977: 93). See Marek (1968: 130-39) on the conceptual problems 
with the constitutive theory of recognition, or the view that the identity of the 
state depends on external recognition. 
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constitutions, and names. Even revolutions, annexations, and relocations do not 
affect the identity of the state, provided that its chain of succession remains 
unbroken. Apparent discontinuity is common, as in the Russian/Soviet and 
Turkish/Ottoman cases, but actual discontinuity is rare. New governments 
almost always tacitly recognize previous governments as their predecessors. I 
discuss cases of discontinuity, such as dissolutions and absorptions, in the next 
section. 
 
4.4 Relational Changes 
 The previous section applied the Hobbesian account of corporate identity 
to cases of change in individual states. This section addresses ‘relational’ 
changes, or those that involve multiple states. There are five logically distinct 
kinds of cases: (1) cession, in which one state transfers territory to another; (2) 
secession, in which part of a state separates to form a new state; (3) absorption, 
in which one state becomes part of another; (4) unification, in which two or more 
states merge to form a new state; and (5) dissolution, in which a state ceases to 
exist.70 Some of the specific cases are the same as those in the last section, since 
changes in the form or composition of one state are often accompanied by 
relational changes. For instance, the breakup of the Soviet Union was 
simultaneously a case of continuity (of the Soviet Union/the Russian Federation) 
and of secession (of the other Republics). Yet the individual and relational 
aspects of these cases must be separated because they involve different 
conceptual issues. The individual aspects involve a single chain of succession; the 
question is simply whether or not the chain remains unbroken. The relational 
aspects involve the merging and branching of chains of succession; the question 
is not just which chains of succession remain unbroken, but also how many 
chains there are. 
 The simplest kind of case is cession of territory from one state to another, 
such as the Russian Empire’s sale of Alaska to the United States. Cession has no 
                                                        
70 These five types overlap with the six types in international law: “Unification of 
states, dissolution of states, incorporation [or absorption] of states, secession, 
‘newly independent states’ and cession/transfer of territory” (Dumberry, 2012: 
240, note 13). I treat decolonization, or the emergence of ‘newly independent 
states’, as a type of secession.  
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consequences for the identity of the ceding state or the receiving state. This 
follows clearly from what has been said before. Since the identity of a state 
depends on its system of representation, not on its territory, a gain or loss of 
territory does not affect its identity. 
 Secession is more complicated. It is clear that secession does not affect the 
identity of the original state, because a loss of territory or population does not 
affect the identity of the state in general. The question is what happens to the 
seceding part. In some cases, such as the secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan, 
secession involves the creation of a new chain of succession and hence a new 
corporate entity. Bangladesh was created ‘from scratch’ during the War of 
Independence—the Provisional Government of the People's Republic of 
Bangladesh was the first link in its new chain of succession. In other cases, such 
as the secession from the Soviet Union of its constituent Republics, secession 
involves a change in the status of an existing corporate entity. Each of the 
Republics had its own chain of succession and its own corporate identity within 
the Soviet Union. So when Kazakhstan seceded from the Soviet Union, it became 
a new state, but it was nevertheless continuous with the Kazakh Soviet Socialist 
Republic. There was succession despite secession: the Chairman of the Supreme 
Soviet of Kazakhstan became the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan. It 
follows that any obligations of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic became 
obligations of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Secession can entail either the 
creation of a new corporate entity or a change in the status of an existing 
corporate entity. 
 Absorption of one state by another is the obverse of secession. In some 
cases, absorption involves the dissolution of the absorbed corporate entity. 
There is no continuity between the Kingdom of Hawaii and the American State 
(or Territory) of Hawaii, since the Kingdom’s chain of succession was broken 
when the monarchy was overthrown. The State of Hawaii is therefore a new 
corporate entity. In other cases, absorption involves a loss of statehood but 
continuity of the absorbed corporate entity. When Newfoundland joined the 
Canadian federation in 1949, it did not cease to exist; it simply went from being a 
state to being a province. Absorption can entail either the dissolution of the 
absorbed entity or a change in its status. 
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Unification occurs when two or more states combine to form a new state. 
It is logically distinct from absorption because it involves the creation of a new 
chain of succession. But as with absorption, unification can involve either the 
continuity or the dissolution of the uniting entities. When four of the colonies of 
British North America united in 1867, they created a new, federal chain of 
succession and a new corporate entity called Canada. The colonies retained their 
own chains of succession and therefore did not cease to exist; they simply 
became provinces. But when North Yemen and South Yemen united in 1990, they 
simultaneously created a new chain of succession and broke their previous 
chains of succession. The Agreement on the Establishment of the Republic of 
Yemen (1991: Art. 1) established a “full and complete union” between the two 
states, “in which the international personality of each of them shall be integrated 
in a single international person called ‘the Republic of Yemen’”, with “one 
legislative, executive and judicial power” (see also Crawford, 2013a: 448). 
Unification entails the creation of a new corporate entity and either the 
dissolution of the uniting entities or a change in their status. 
Dissolution occurs when a state ceases to exist, typically as a result of 
absorption or multiple secessions. The breakup of Czechoslovakia, unlike the 
breakup of the Soviet Union, was a true case of dissolution because neither the 
Czech Republic nor the Slovak Republic claimed the identity of Czechoslovakia.  
In view of the fact that the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic [CSFR] 
ceased to exist as of December 31, 1992, and there was no continuing 
international person which could claim the original UN seat of the former 
CSFR, both the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic … had to apply 
anew for UN membership and were, subsequently, on January 19, 1993, 
admitted to the United Nations. (Bühler, 2001: 275; see also Crawford, 
2007: 402) 
 
The dissolution of Czechoslovakia was essentially ‘secession without remainder’: 
the two parts of the state seceded to form two new states. However, it is possible 
for a state to be dissolved without being absorbed or replaced. Unless the 
Maldives and Kiribati either find new territory or fortify their existing territory, 
they might be ‘dissolved’ by the ocean. This implies that dissolution is not 
necessarily relational, though it almost always is. 
 There is often uncertainty about whether a particular case is a case of 
unification or absorption, secession or dissolution. Although our intuitive 
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understandings of these distinctions suffice in obvious cases, they tend to fail us 
in more difficult cases. The Russian/Soviet and Turkish/Ottoman cases were not, 
as they appeared to be, cases of dissolution. They were actually cases of 
continuity (of the Soviet Union/Russia and the Ottoman Empire/Turkey) 
combined with multiple secessions (of the other Soviet Republics and the Arab 
territories). The Hobbesian account of corporate identity helps us to analyze 
complicated cases by defining the types of relational cases more precisely, 
according to what happens to the relevant chains of succession.  
One potentially deceptive case is that of the ‘unification’ of the Federal 
Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1990. 
The Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany (1991) seems to 
suggest that the FRG and the GDR merged to form a new state, “the united 
Germany”. For instance, in Article 3, “[t]he Governments of the Federal Republic 
of Germany and the German Democratic Republic reaffirm their renunciation of 
the manufacture and possession of and control over nuclear, biological and 
chemical weapons”. In addition, “[t]hey declare that the united Germany, too, will 
abide by these commitments”, including “the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons”. If the united Germany were continuous with either the FRG 
or the GDR, then the latter declaration would have been redundant. The united 
Germany would automatically be bound by all agreements of a state with which 
it is continuous. The declaration would be necessary only if the united Germany 
were, as ‘unification’ suggests, a new state. 
The Treaty on the Establishment of German Unity (1991), on the other 
hand, suggests that the ‘unification’ was really a case of absorption.  
Upon the accession of the German Democratic Republic to the Federal 
 Republic of Germany in accordance with Article 23 of the Basic Law 
 taking effect on 3 October 1990 the Länder of Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-
 Western Pomerania, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia shall become 
 Länder of the Federal Republic of Germany. (Art. 1(1)) 
 
The FRG’s chain of succession continued, while the GDR’s came to an end. This is 
confirmed by Article 42, which says that the GDR’s Volkskammer shall “elect 144 
Members of Parliament to be delegated to the [FRG’s] 11th Bundestag” before 
the Volkskammer is abolished. Another sign that the FRG absorbed the GDR is 
that “the FRG's membership in the United Nations now covered former GDR 
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territory as well, substituting for the latter's membership as of October 3, 1990” 
(von der Dunk and Kooijmans, 1991: 552). If the united Germany were a new 
state, then it would have had to apply for a new membership.71 
A more complicated and contested case is that of the ‘two Chinas’. At the 
end of the Chinese Civil War (1946-1950), two governments claimed to 
represent the whole of China: the government of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) in Beijing and the government of the Republic of China (ROC) in Taipei. 
The Beijing government had gained control of almost all of the territory of pre-
war China, and the Taipei government—which had been the government of pre-
war China—had fled to Taiwan from the mainland. According to the Beijing 
government, the result of the war was “a successor government situation” in 
which “the ROC government was ‘replaced’ as the government of all of China” (Li, 
1979: 136; see also Bush, 2011). This implies that the PRC was continuous with 
pre-war China. There was a new government, not a new state. According to the 
Taipei government, there was no succession, nor any such state as the PRC. The 
pre-war government had been exiled, but it remained the only legitimate 
government of China. In the beginning, the Taipei government won the day: “For 
nearly twenty-two years, the [Taipei government’s] delegation to the United 
Nations represented China in both the United Nations General Assembly and the 
Security Council” (Chen, 1998: 234). But in 1971, the Beijing government took 
over China’s seat at the United Nations, and the Taipei government eventually 
gave up its claim to be the government of the whole of China. The Beijing 
government’s claim that the PRC is continuous with pre-war China is now 
generally accepted by international lawyers (Vidmar, 2013: 158-59).  
However, the Beijing government’s claim that it simply replaced the pre-
war government is implausible. The result of the Civil War could not have been 
just a change in government, since there was only one state before the war but 
two in its immediate aftermath. Although the PRC and the ROC claimed the same 
territory, they in fact had distinct territories, populations, and, most importantly, 
                                                        
71 Another important question is whether the FRG was, as it claimed to be, 
continuous with the German Reich. This issue is too complicated to adequately 
address here. See Hailbronner (1991: 27-34), von der Dunk and Kooijmans 




chains of succession. The question, then, is which state (if either) was continuous 
with pre-war China. (Whether the ROC or Taiwan is still a state is a separate 
question; see Crawford, 2007: 206-21.) The case of the ‘two Chinas’ must be a 
case of either secession or dissolution. There are three possibilities: the ROC 
seceded from pre-war China; the PRC seceded from pre-war China; or pre-war 
China was dissolved and two new states were created.  
According to the nucleus account of corporate identity, the PRC is 
continuous with pre-war China because the PRC has the same territorial nucleus. 
This implies that Taiwan seceded from the PRC. But if we apply the nucleus 
account in this case, then we should also apply it in other cases in which 
governments relocate (section 4.3). If we accept that Taiwan must have seceded 
from the PRC because it lacks the territorial nucleus of pre-war China, then we 
should also say that the Maldives and Kiribati would be dissolved if they 
relocated to escape the rising sea. A consistent application of the nucleus account 
is difficult to justify. 
According to the Hobbesian account of corporate identity, the PRC 
seceded from pre-war China, and Taiwan is continuous with the ROC. Although 
the Beijing government controls almost all of the territory of pre-war China, the 
Taipei government has a much stronger claim to be the successor to the pre-war 
government. In fact, the first Taipei government was more than the successor; it 
was the pre-war government. Taiwan clearly inherited pre-war China’s system of 
representation: “the KMT [Chinese Nationalist Party] imposed its governmental 
structure (imported from China) to replace the Japanese law … the bureaucrats 
from China, who were forced into exile in Taiwan by Mao's troops, were able to 
retain power” (Chen, 1998: 232). In terms of identity, what happened in 1949 
was not a change in the government of China; it was the secession of the PRC 
from pre-war China. Taiwan, not the PRC, therefore ought to be held responsible 
for any residual debts, treaty obligations, and reparative obligations of pre-war 
China. 
 One might doubt that Taiwan is continuous with the ROC on the grounds 
that Taiwan is no longer a state, if it ever was. But as I have previously argued, a 
state can be continuous with a non-state corporate entity. The Republic of 
Kazakhstan is continuous with the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic; the 
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Canadian province of Newfoundland is continuous with the Dominion of 
Newfoundland; and the State of Virginia is continuous with the Virginia Colony, 
and even with the Virginia Company. A corporate entity persists despite changes 
in its status, provided that its chain of succession remains unbroken. It is obvious 
that, whatever Taiwan is, its government is the extension of pre-war China’s 
chain of succession. 
In sum, the Hobbesian account of corporate identity categorizes relational 
cases of change in states according to what happens to the relevant chains of 
succession. (1) Cession is a transfer of territory without any change in the chain 
of succession of either the ceding state or the receiving state (as in the sale of 
Alaska). (2) Secession is a split in a state’s chain of succession in which the 
original chain of succession remains intact; the seceding state’s chain of 
succession is either the continuation of a provincial chain of succession (as in the 
Republic of Kazakhstan) or is altogether new (as in Bangladesh). (3) Absorption 
is a merger of two or more states’ chains of succession in which one of the 
original chains remains intact; the absorbed state’s chain of succession either 
becomes a provincial chain of succession (as in Newfoundland) or is broken (as 
in the Kingdom of Hawaii). (4) Unification is a merger of two or more states’ 
chains of succession in which a new chain of succession is created; the unifying 
states’ chains of succession either become provincial chains of succession (as in 
the Canadian provinces) or are broken (as in North and South Yemen). (5) 
Dissolution is a break in a state’s chain of succession, either with continuity of its 
provincial chains of succession (as in Czechoslovakia) or without any continuity 
(as in the hypothetical submersion of the Maldives).  
 
4.5 Non-Identity  
 Continuity of the state implies continuity of its responsibilities.72 But does 
discontinuity of the state imply the negation of its responsibilities? For instance, 
does the dissolution of Czechoslovakia extinguish its debts, or should they be 
divided among the Czech Republic and Slovakia? This section examines what 
                                                        
72 There are some limited exceptions to this principle, such as when a 
responsibility is odious or unfulfillable. I discuss these exceptions in Chapter 5. 
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ought to happen to states’ responsibilities in cases of secession, absorption, 
unification, and dissolution. 
 International lawyers have attempted to develop rules for dividing 
responsibility in cases of discontinuity. Two Vienna Conventions propose rules 
for dividing debts and treaty obligations (UN, 1978, 1983), and the International 
Law Commission is currently developing rules for dividing responsibility for 
wrongdoing (Šturma, 2017). The general principle is that a new state ought to 
assume “an equitable proportion” of its antecedent state’s responsibilities, 
except if the new state is a postcolonial state. “Newly independent states” do not 
accede to the responsibilities of their former colonizers. One problem with the 
Vienna Conventions is that they do not specify what counts as an equitable 
proportion (Blum, 1997: 272). Another is that they have had limited uptake: 
“The 1983 Convention lacks the requisite number of state parties and never 
entered into force … The 1978 Convention did enter into force, but to date it has 
only twenty-two parties” (Cheng, 2011: 11-12). The legal rules regarding state 
responsibility in cases of discontinuity are contested and uncertain, in large part 
because cases of discontinuity are so varied that “it is difficult to reach any 
conclusions of general application” (Crawford, 2013a: 455). 
 Although it is not possible to develop universal rules for cases of 
discontinuity, it is possible to sketch some general principles. There is a 
presumption against accession to responsibility in cases of discontinuity: a state 
does not automatically accede to the responsibilities of an antecedent state with 
which it shares population or territory. By virtue of being a new corporate entity, 
a new state is presumably free of responsibilities. It is not bound by treaties that 
it did not sign, does not owe money that it did not borrow, and has no reparative 
obligations for wrongs that it did not commit. However, there are at least two 
circumstances in which the ‘clean slate presumption’ should be overturned: (1) 
when a state agrees to assume the responsibilities of an antecedent state and (2) 
when a state adopts or perpetuates the actions of an antecedent state. 
 ‘Accession by agreement’ occurs when a state agrees to assume the 
responsibilities of an antecedent state. In most cases of discontinuity, the 
division of responsibility is settled by agreement. The Czech Republic and 
Slovakia agreed to divide Czechoslovakia’s debt on a per capita basis (Blum, 
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1997: 293), and the Federal Republic of Germany agreed to assume all of the 
German Democratic Republic’s debt (Treaty, 1991: Art. 23). The Republic of 
Turkey and the former Ottoman territories agreed to divide the Ottoman debt 
according to their respective annual revenues: “the Treaty of Lausanne ... 
enunciated the principle that the share in the Turkish [i.e., Ottoman] Debt 
apportioned to each state should bear the same proportion to the total amount 
as the average total revenue of the territory attributed to each state bore, in 
typical financial years, to the average total revenue of the Ottoman Empire” 
(Brown, 1926: 137). The only condition for accession by agreement is that the 
agreement must be made by an authorized government. The agreement to divide 
Czechoslovakia’s debt was valid because the governments of the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia were authorized. But Turkmenistan could not have made a valid 
agreement to assume a share of the Soviet Union’s debt because the government 
of Turkmenistan failed (and still fails) to meet the conditions for authorization. A 
government cannot agree to assume responsibilities in the name of the state 
unless it has a credible claim to be an authorized representative of the state. 
 ‘Accession by implication’ occurs when a state adopts or perpetuates the 
actions of an antecedent state, and hence assumes the responsibilities that follow 
from these actions. Suppose (contrary to what has been established in section 
4.3) that the Republic of Turkey was, as it claimed to be, discontinuous with the 
Ottoman Empire. This would entail a presumption that the Republic is not 
responsible for the Ottoman Empire’s genocide against its Armenian population. 
But this presumption would be overturned by the fact that the Turkish National 
Movement—the first link in the ‘new’ Republic’s embryonic chain of 
succession—continued the Empire’s genocide during the Turkish-Armenian War 
(Akçam, 2006: Ch. 8).73 The Republic thus retained the “criminal essence” of the 
Empire (Diamantis, 2017). Even if the Republic is not continuous with the 
Empire, and even though the Republic has refused to take responsibility for the 
genocide, it has acceded to this responsibility by implication. The Republic 
incurred responsibility for the Empire’s genocide by perpetuating it.  
                                                        




 Accession by agreement and by implication decisively overturn the clean 
slate presumption. If a state agrees to assume an antecedent state’s 
responsibilities, or it adopts or perpetuates the actions from which these 
responsibilities follow, then it accedes to the antecedent state’s responsibilities. 
There is also a third but less decisive way in which the clean slate presumption 
could be overturned. ‘Accession by inheritance’ occurs when a state claims the 
assets of an antecedent state. Just as the heir to an estate inherits some of the 
liabilities of the deceased person along with her property, a new state inherits 
some of the liabilities of an antecedent state along with its property (Pasternak, 
forthcoming). The inheritance analogy is, like other state/human analogies, 
imprecise and potentially misleading, so it is doubtful that any firm conclusions 
can be drawn from it (Crawford, 2013a: 440; Öktem, 2011: 563-64). 
Interpersonal inheritance is triggered only when a person dies, but interstate 
inheritance can be triggered without the ‘death’ of a state, as in cases of 
secession. With this caveat in mind, there are two questions that must be 
answered in order for the inheritance analogy to be applied: (1) What is included 
in the state’s ‘estate’?; (2) Which responsibilities does a state’s ‘heir’ accede to?  
 The state’s estate comprises its property, or the things that it owns. It 
includes military equipment, embassies and consulates, state-owned companies, 
sovereign wealth funds, and public infrastructure. It does not include the state’s 
personal rights, such as institutional memberships (section 4.3). For one thing, 
institutional memberships are non-transferable, so they cannot be inherited. For 
another, states do not ‘own’ memberships. Nor does the state’s estate include its 
population or territory. The state has a population and a territory, but it does not 
own them, any more than a human being owns her appendages. In other words, 
population and territory are not parts of the state’s estate; they are simply parts 
of the state. The fact that a state claims part of the territory or population of an 
antecedent state therefore does not imply inheritance the antecedent state’s 
responsibilities. For instance, the fact that Ukraine claimed part of the territory 
of the Soviet Union did not, by itself, make Ukraine liable for a share of the Soviet 
debt. Nor would the Maldives accede to a share of another state’s debt simply by 
acquiring part of that state’s territory. The state’s estate includes only the things 
that it can be said to own.  
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 The next question is what kinds of responsibilities states can inherit. 
Debts and other financial obligations are generally inheritable. As in most legal 
systems, the heir to an estate has to pay off the debts of the deceased as a 
condition of inheriting her property. If you inherit a house, then you also inherit 
the mortgage. Similarly, if a state inherits infrastructure or military equipment, 
then it inherits a share of the antecedent state’s debt. Since Ukraine inherited 
about 18 percent of the Soviet Union’s Black Sea Fleet, it should have inherited a 
proportionate share of the Soviet debt. Ukraine’s fair share of the Soviet debt is 
equal to the total share of Soviet assets that it inherited. Reparative obligations 
are also inheritable. Although torts were once considered to be personal, 
meaning that the liability died with the tortfeasor, “both civil and common law 
jurisdictions now generally provide for the survivability of actions against 
deceased tortfeasors” (Crawford, 2013a: 441). Like other financial obligations, 
torts must be paid out of the deceased person’s estate. States can inherit 
reparative obligations just as they inherit debts. However, many treaty 
obligations are non-transferable, just as many contracts are non-transferable. 
Treaties and contracts are often personal, like institutional memberships. For 
instance, an independent Quebec would not automatically accede to the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, for the same reason that it would not 
automatically accede to membership in the United Nations. In general, only 
financial obligations are inheritable. 
 The inheritance analogy suggests the following rule: when a state inherits 
the property of an antecedent state, it accedes to a proportionate share of that 
state’s financial obligations. However, the analogy also suggests that there is a 
limit to the amount of debt that the heir state can accede to. In most modern legal 
systems, an heir assumes liabilities only up to the value of the estate: “successors 
are not liable to contribute resources that they own independently of the 
inheritance” (Miller, 2007: 150).74 If a son inherits a $500,000 house from his 
mother, then he has to assume the $480,000 mortgage and possibly her $20,000 
credit card debt. But if the mother’s debts exceed the value of her estate, then her 
                                                        
74 See Miller’s (2007: 147-151) discussion of the ethics and the law of 
inheritance. He notes that, in Roman law, inheritance of liability was not limited 
by the value of the estate, but the heir-apparent could choose whether to assume 
the role of heir.  
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son has no obligation to pay the excess. Her estate would then be insolvent, so 
the creditors would have to absorb the loss. Similarly, if a state inherits $500 
million worth of infrastructure, then it should assume a proportionate share of 
the antecedent state’s financial obligations, but only up to $500 million. The heir 
state is not obligated to assume debt in excess of the value of the property that it 
claims. This limit marks the crucial difference between inherited and non-
inherited financial obligations. While a state’s inherited obligations are limited 
by the value of the property that it inherits, its non-inherited obligations persist 
in full as long as the state does. 
     *** 
 The identity of the state is, as Carr (1946: 146) described it, “a necessary 
fiction”. What sustains this fiction is the practice of representing the state. The 
state has a corporate identity only because it has representatives who speak and 
act in its name, and this identity persists only as long as the state has a 
continuous chain of succession. Without representation, the state is “but a word, 
without substance, and cannot stand” (Hobbes, 2012: XXXI. 554). Yet the fiction 
of corporate identity is as indispensable as it is ephemeral. The very idea that 
states can have responsibilities depends on it, as does the continuity of these 
responsibilities over time and through generations. As Maitland (2003: 69) said 
about the personality of the state, “a fiction that we needs must feign is somehow 
or another very like the simple truth”. 
 Although corporate identity is fictional, it is not infinitely malleable. 
Political fictions, unlike mere nonsense, are bound by the constraints of logical 
consistency. Corporate identity is not closely analogous to personal identity or 
physical identity, but it is nevertheless subject to the logical constraints of 
identity in general. The Hobbesian account of corporate identity begins with the 
principle that claims about state identity are credible only insofar as they are 
consistent.  
 The Hobbesian account is, broadly speaking, ‘constructivist’: the identity 
of the state depends on the political processes of authorization and 
representation rather than on material factors such as territory and population. 
But it is not constructivist in the sense that IR scholars commonly use the term. 
The corporate identity of the state is not externally constituted by the 
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recognition of other states; it is internally constituted by the state’s 
representatives and by the subjects who authorize them. The identity of the state 
depends on what its authorized representatives do, not on what they (or the 
representatives of other states) say. Assertions of identity are cheap, and 
external recognition is often fickle and arbitrary. However, the actions of 
governments entail presuppositions of state identity, and these provide the most 
reliable basis for judgments of state identity. 
 While the Hobbesian account of attribution explains how responsibilities 
can be attributed to states, the Hobbesian account of corporate identity explains 
how these responsibilities can persist over time. But the responsibilities of states 
must be distributed to their subjects in order to be fulfilled. The costs of debts, 
reparations, sanctions, and treaty obligations inevitably fall on individuals. The 
























DISTRIBUTION: THE QUESTION OF FULFILLMENT 
 
 
“And because the Multitude naturally is not One, but Many; they cannot be 
understood for one; but many Authors, of every thing their Representative saith, 
or doth in their name” (Hobbes, 2012: XVI. 250). 
 
Under what conditions should the costs and burdens of the state’s 
responsibilities be distributed to its subjects? There are two common answers to 
this question (section 1.1.3). According to the authorization account of 
distribution, subjects should bear the costs if they have authorized the 
government of the state. According to the participation account, subjects should 
bear the costs if they have participated in the state, such as by voting and using 
public services. The problem with both of these accounts is that they cannot 
justify distribution of liability across generations. Even if the state’s identity 
persists for centuries, its subjects do not. Since subjects cannot possibly have 
authorized a government or participated in a state before they were born, 
neither authorization nor participation can explain why they should bear the 
costs of intergenerational debts, treaty obligations, or reparative obligations.  
This chapter develops a Hobbesian account of distribution that explains 
why subjects who are neither authors nor participants should nevertheless be 
liable for acts of state. The central idea is ‘authorization by fiction’, which is 
based on Hobbes’ idea of ‘representation by fiction’ (section 2.3). Much as 
guardians authorize representatives for wards, subjects authorize 
representatives for the people among them and after them—children and future 
subjects—who are incapable of authorizing representatives on their own. 
Authorization by fiction creates a presumption that it is legitimate for the state to 
distribute the costs of its responsibilities to its subjects, both within and between 
generations.  
 The chapter has four sections. The first section examines the problem of 
distributing liability to subjects and the previous attempts to address it. I identify 
two normatively relevant aspects of distribution—whether the costs that 
subjects bear are diffuse or burdensome, and whether the costs are distributed 
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within a generation or between generations—and I show that neither the 
authorization account nor the participation account can provide a justification 
for intergenerational distribution. The second section develops a Hobbesian 
account of distribution. I argue that there is a ‘presumption of legitimate 
distribution’ as long as the government of the state is authorized, but that the 
strength of this presumption depends on how intergenerational and how 
burdensome the distribution is. The third section examines how, when the 
distribution is legitimate, liability ought to be divided up among subjects. I use 
Collins’ (2016) idea of ‘source-tracking’ to develop an ideal division rule and then 
apply it to non-ideal conditions. The fourth section examines how the 
presumption of legitimate distribution can be overturned, and when a state can 
legitimately suspend or repudiate its responsibilities.  
 
5.1 The Problem of Distribution 
States are incapable of acting on their own, so their responsibilities must 
be distributed to individuals in order to be fulfilled (section 1.1.3). The core of an 
answer to the Question of Fulfillment must therefore be an account of 
distribution. There are two classes of people to whom the state’s responsibilities 
can be distributed: its representatives and its subjects. Distribution to 
representatives is relatively unproblematic. The representatives of a state are 
obligated to uphold its agreements, honour its debts, and apologize for its 
wrongs simply because that is what their jobs require. Like corporate executives 
and employees, political representatives and state officials typically assume their 
roles voluntarily, and these roles require that they do their parts to ensure that 
the state fulfills its responsibilities.  
Distributing the state’s responsibilities to its subjects is more difficult to 
justify. The role of subject, unlike the role of representative, is typically 
involuntary (section I.1). When a state pays reparations or repays a loan, the 
costs inevitably fall on its subjects, usually in the form of taxation, inflation, or a 
reduction in public services. When sanctions are imposed on a state, its subjects 
suffer from the interruption of economic activity. An adequate account of 
distribution has to explain why subjects ought to bear these costs, despite the 
fact that most subjects of most states have not chosen to be subjects and cannot 
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easily leave. It is not necessary to show that subjects are culpable for what their 
state does—that they are guilty or blameworthy. Liability and culpability can and 
do come apart (section 3.4). However, it is necessary to show that subjects are 
implicated in acts of state somehow.  
Cases of distribution vary in two normatively relevant ways. One 
important factor is the size of the burden that subjects bear. In some cases, the 
distribution of liability is diffuse, which means that the cost to any individual 
subject is materially insignificant. The cost of repaying a single $1 million 
Treasury bill is so small compared to the budget of the United States that the cost 
to any particular American is negligible. In other cases, the distribution is 
burdensome, which means that individual subjects bear significant costs. Iraqis 
suffered greatly from the sanctions and reparations against Iraq after the 1990 
invasion of Kuwait, and Greeks suffered greatly as a result of the Greek Debt 
Crisis that began in 2009. Whereas diffuse distributions show up in the state’s 
budget and in economic data, burdensome distributions are apparent to an 
observer on the ground. 
The other normatively relevant factor is how much time has elapsed 
between attribution and distribution of the responsibility. If most of the state’s 
subjects at the time of distribution were subjects at the time of attribution, then 
the distribution is intragenerational. For instance, most of the subjects who bear 
the cost of repaying a one-year Treasury bill were subjects of the United States 
when the Treasury bill was issued. Births, deaths, immigration, and emigration 
result in only a modest change in the composition of the population over the 
course of a year. But if most of the subjects at the time of distribution were not 
subjects at the time of attribution, then the distribution is intergenerational. In 
2014, the United Kingdom repaid a series of ‘consolidated annuities’, or 
perpetual bonds, that were issued between 1752 and 1927 (Kollewe and Farrell, 
2014). The distribution was intergenerational because most of the repayment 
costs, as well as many of the interest costs, were distributed to subjects who 
were born after the money was borrowed.  
 The distinctions between diffuse/burdensome and 
intra/intergenerational distribution are graded rather than binary. Although 
some distributions are purely of one type—for instance, reparations for ‘historic 
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wrongs’, such as slavery, are purely intergenerational—most distributions fall 
somewhere in between. In addition, some distributions become more 
intergenerational and more or less burdensome over time. Germany’s 
reparations for the Holocaust became less burdensome as the compensation was 
paid but more intergenerational as the Germans of the Second World War died 
out. Combining the two distinctions gives us four broad types of distribution.  
 
Figure 3. Types of Distribution 
 
 
I return to the types of distribution in the next section. I turn now to the difficulty 
that intergenerational distribution poses for existing accounts of distribution. 
 There are two common accounts of distribution. According to the 
authorization account, subjects tacitly authorize the state’s actions, and therefore 
ought to share in the resulting liability, if the state credibly protects their rights 
(Parrish, 2009; Stilz, 2011). According to the participation account, subjects 
ought to share liability for acts of state if they have “intentionally participated” in 
the collective project of the state, such as by paying taxes, voting, claiming 
benefits, or taking pride in their citizenship (Jubb, 2014; Pasternak, 2013; 
Vernon, 2011). Whereas the authorization account focuses on the structure of 
the state, the participation account focuses on subjects’ attitudes and actions 
toward the state. I leave aside the fine details and the relative merits of the two 
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accounts here. The important point is that neither can justify intergenerational 
distribution. 
 The problem with the authorization account is that subjects who do not 
yet exist cannot grant authority. Although you might be an author of a debt that 
your state incurs today, you cannot possibly be an author of a debt that your 
state incurred before you were born. It is difficult to see how authorization can 
be retroactive. The fact that the current subjects of the United Kingdom are 
authors of the bonds that the state issues today does not imply that they are 
authors of the bonds that the state issued a century or more ago. When subjects 
authorize a government, they become liable for what that government does in 
the near future, but not for what the government (or its predecessors) did in the 
past.  
 The participation account suffers from the same kind of problem. While 
participating in the state might make you liable for what the state does, it is 
difficult to see how it could make you liable for what the state did before you 
were born. Thompson (2006: 160) makes this point in a discussion of historic 
injustice.  
Accounts of shared or collective responsibility that make it depend on 
individuals contributing to the achievement of a common objective or 
participating together in a joint action ... do not encompass cases where 
individuals cannot have contributed or participated. Not being born when 
an injustice took place seems a very good reason for denying any 
responsibility. 
 
Most Americans in 1850 might have been complicit in slavery, either directly by 
owning slaves or indirectly by participating in the state that made the institution 
of slavery possible. But present-day Americans could not possibly have 
participated in slavery, either directly or indirectly, because they did not exist 
during the time of slavery. Thompson’s point is not that there is no justification 
for distributing the costs of reparations across generations, but that the 
participation account cannot provide one.  
 The authorization and participation accounts thus suffer from the same 
problem. Neither can justify intergenerational distribution, for the simple reason 
that it is not possible to authorize or participate (or perform any other action) 
before you were born. Any other account that attempts to justify distribution 
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according to the wills or actions of subjects is bound to fail for the same reason. 
An adequate account of distribution has to face the fact that intergenerational 
debts, treaty obligations, and reparations impose costs on subjects that they 
could not possibly have brought on themselves. The justification for 
intergenerational distribution has to be sought elsewhere. 
 There are two other arguments that are sometimes invoked to justify 
intergenerational distribution. One is that subjects are liable for acts of state 
insofar as they benefit from them (Butt, 2007). For example, subjects of the 
former colonial powers should bear the costs of reparations to former colonies 
because colonialism has unjustly enriched them (e.g., Beckles, 2013). But as 
Thompson (2006: 158) points out, this argument has a crucial limitation: “If an 
injustice produces no benefits for existing people, then on this account they have 
no responsibility”. Moreover, the ‘benefiting from injustice’ argument is not 
really an account of distribution at all. It implies that people who benefit from a 
wrongful act should bear the costs of compensating the victims, regardless of 
whether they are subjects of the state that committed the wrongful act. If 
Switzerland’s subjects were enriched by the Holocaust but (counterfactually) 
Germany’s subjects were not, then the Swiss, not the Germans, should bear the 
costs of reparations. Whatever its merits, the benefiting from injustice argument 
does not explain specifically why subjects ought to bear the costs of fulfilling 
their state’s responsibilities. 
 The idea of ‘national responsibility’ is also invoked to justify 
intergenerational distribution of liability (Abdel-Nour, 2003; Miller, 2007). One 
could argue that present-day Germans ought to bear the costs of reparations for 
the Holocaust because they are members of the German nation, which, via the 
German state, carried out the Holocaust. The limitation of this argument is that 
the set of subjects is not coextensive with the set of nationals. As Miller (2007: 
111-12) argues, national responsibility is distinct from—and, in his view, “more 
basic than”—state responsibility: “national responsibility and state 
responsibility may coincide, [but] in other cases this may not happen”. Not all 
subjects of Germany are members of the German nation, and not all members of 
the German nation are subjects of Germany. So if the costs of Germany’s 
reparations for the Holocaust were distributed to Germans, then some subjects 
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of Germany would escape liability, and some non-subjects would be liable. The 
problem is that, like the benefiting from injustice argument, the national 
responsibility argument is not really an account of distribution. National 
responsibility is an account of why people should share liability for what their 
co-nationals do, not an account of why subjects should share liability for what 
their states do. The next section develops a Hobbesian account of distribution, 
which explains why subjects in particular ought to bear the costs of their state’s 
responsibilities, even if the state incurred those responsibilities before they were 
born. 
 
5.2 The Conditions for Distribution 
 The starting point for the Hobbesian account of distribution is the 
Hobbesian account of authorization. Recall from Chapter 3 that two conditions 
must be met in order for a government to count as an authorized representative 
of the state: (1) the government must satisfy the background conditions for valid 
authorization (i.e., it must not systematically indoctrinate or coerce its subjects); 
and (2) a substantial number of subjects must accept that the government is 
legitimate (as demonstrated by elections or by some other means). The 
argument of this section is that if the government of a state is authorized at the 
time of attribution, then there is a presumption that it is legitimate to distribute 
the costs of fulfilling the state’s responsibilities to its subjects. 
 
5.2.1 Intragenerational Distribution 
 The ideal distribution of liability is one that is both diffuse and 
intragenerational. The archetype is the repayment of a small short-term bond, 
such as a one-year United States Treasury bill (issued in denominations of 
$1,000 to $5 million). Most subjects of the United States can legitimately be made 
to bear the costs of repayment because they are authors of the debt, both at the 
time of attribution and at the time of distribution. They have authorized both the 
government that issued the bond and the government that will repay the money 
when the bond matures.  
 Even in the ideal case, there are some subjects who cannot be counted as 
authors of the state’s responsibilities (section 3.3.2). Pasternak (2013: 371) 
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argues that these non-authorizing subjects include those “who genuinely reject 
their citizenship status—who would like to give it up had they the real 
opportunity to do so”. Subjects who credibly, consistently, and publicly disavow 
the state, such as radical separatists and pacifists, cannot plausibly be counted as 
authors of its responsibilities. In addition, there are some subjects who cannot 
possibly be authors of the state’s responsibilities. As Hobbes (2012: XXVI. 422) 
says, 
naturall fooles, children, or mad-men ... had never power to make any 
covenant, or to understand the consequences thereof; and consequently 
never took upon them to authorise the actions of any Soveraign, as they 
must do that make to themselves a Common-wealth.  
 
Incapable subjects cannot authorize a government any more than “brute beasts” 
can (Ibid.). Nor can prisoners authorize a government, regardless of whether the 
laws of the state disenfranchise them. Even by Hobbes’ meagre standards for 
authorization, people who are “kept in prison, or bonds” are rendered incapable 
of voluntary action and hence of granting valid authority (Ibid. XX. 312; section 
3.3.1). There are always some subjects who cannot be counted as authors of the 
state’s responsibilities, either because they refuse to authorize the government 
or because they are incapable of doing so. 
Distributing liability to non-authorizing and incapable subjects is 
relatively unproblematic when the distribution is diffuse. The fact that most 
subjects have authorized the government is sufficient to justify distributing the 
costs of the state’s responsibilities to all subjects, since the costs that the non-
authors bear is negligible. The state’s imperatives to compensate victims of its 
wrongs, repay its creditors, and uphold its agreements far outweigh any claims 
that non-authorizing and incapable subjects might have to be exempt from costs 
that are materially insignificant. If the government is authorized and the 
distribution is diffuse, then there is a strong presumption that it is legitimate to 
distribute liability to all subjects.  
Difficulties arise when the distribution is burdensome. The costs of 
repaying a single bond or compensating one injured person are negligible, but 
the costs of repaying thousands of bonds or compensating millions of people can 
be enormous. Many diffuse distributions can add up to a burdensome 
distribution. The archetype of a burdensome distribution is the combination of 
169 
 
sanctions and reparations against Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The 
United Nations Security Council imposed an almost-total embargo against Iraq. 
The state was permitted to sell a limited amount of oil in order to buy food and 
medicine, but the United Nations withheld 30 percent of the revenue (later 
reduced to 25 percent) to compensate the victims of the invasion and 
occupation. The United Nations Compensation Commission (2018) ultimately 
awarded $52.4 billion in compensation, 78 percent of which was awarded to 
Kuwait and its citizens (see also Van Houtte, Das, and Delmartino, 2006). A 
report commissioned by the Security Council (1999: 35-38) describes the toll 
that the sanctions and reparations took on Iraqis. 
[P]er capita income fell from 3,416 US dollars in 1985 to 1,500 in 1991 
and has deceased to less than 1,036 in 1998. Other sources estimate a 
decrease in per capita GDP to as low as 450 US dollars in 1995. ... The 
dietary energy supply had fallen from 3,120 to 1,093 kilo calories per 
capita/per day by 1994-95. The prevalence of malnutrition in Iraqi 
children under five almost doubled from 1991 to 1996 (from 12% to 
23%). 
 
The report concludes that “[t]he gravity of the humanitarian situation of the Iraqi 
people is indisputable and cannot be overstated” (Ibid. 46).75 The question is 
when, if ever, it is legitimate to distribute costs and burdens of this magnitude to 
the subjects of a state. 
The fact that the distribution is burdensome poses no particular problem 
when the subjects who bear the burdens are authors of the state’s 
responsibilities. Subjects, like private individuals, sometimes have to bear large 
costs as a result of actions done under their authority. If an employee injures 
someone in the course of his duties, then his employer is partly liable for 
compensating the victim, even if the compensation payments cause her financial 
hardship. The employer ought to bear the costs because, having hired the 
employee, she is the author of the harm that he has caused. Similarly, if an 
authorized government wages an aggressive war, then the state owes 
reparations to the victims, even if the reparations payments are burdensome to 
                                                        
75 A recent study suggests that the Iraqi government manipulated child mortality 
statistics to exaggerate the severity of the humanitarian situation (Dyson and 
Cetorelli, 2017; cf. Alnasrawi, 2001: 214). Yet there was little need to exaggerate, 
as there is plenty of other evidence that the subjects of Iraq, and children in 
particular, did suffer greatly as a result of the sanctions and reparations. 
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its subjects. The subjects are liable because, having authorized the government, 
they are the authors of the war. The government of Iraq probably did not meet 
the conditions for authorization at the time of the invasion of Kuwait. But if the 
government were authorized, then distributing liability to the subjects who 
authorized it would have been presumptively legitimate, even though the 
distribution was very burdensome. 
The difficulty lies with subjects who do not or cannot authorize the 
government. A minority of non-authorizing and incapable subjects can more or 
less be ignored when the distribution is diffuse, but not when the distribution is 
burdensome. The costs that these subjects bear become morally significant as 
soon as they become materially significant. 
Incapable subjects tend to suffer greatly from burdensome distributions, 
such as large debts and reparations. Children and the severely disabled bear 
little of the tax burden but often suffer the most from reductions in public 
services. Although incapable subjects cannot truly be authors, they can be 
authors ‘by fiction’. When subjects authorize political representatives, they grant 
authority not only for themselves, but also for the people among them who 
cannot grant authority on their own. So if most subjects are authors of the state’s 
responsibilities, then the incapable subjects among them can be understood as 
‘fictive authors’ of the state’s responsibilities. 
The idea of authorization by fiction follows from Hobbes’ idea of 
‘representation by fiction’ (section 2.3). Just as “Children, Fooles, and Mad-men 
that have no use of Reason, may be Personated by Guardians” (Hobbes, 2012: 
XVI. 248), those guardians may grant authority on behalf of the wards whom 
they personate. For instance, the guardians of children can authorize lawyers to 
represent them. If guardians can act in the names of wards, and authorization is 
simply a type of action, then guardians can authorize in the names of wards. 
True authorization must be voluntary, which means that it must proceed 
from the author’s will (section 3.3.1). But fictive authorization is not voluntary in 
relation to the fictive author, since it proceeds from the will of a third party. The 
authority of a child’s lawyer is derived from the will of her guardian rather than 
the will of the child herself. What gives the child a ‘presence’ in the actions of her 
lawyer is that there is a third party—her guardian, or in some cases a judge—
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who is capable of representing the interests of the child and of objecting to what 
the lawyer does if he fails to act in her interests. As Runciman (2007: 99) argues, 
“[i]ncapable persons and things can have a presence in the actions of their 
representatives, so long as that presence is capable of being asserted by 
someone. It does not have to be asserted by the person being represented 
themselves”. Incapable persons can thus be represented “so long as a mechanism 
exists for objecting to what is being done in their name” (Ibid. 98). Whereas true 
authority derives from the author’s will, fictive authority derives from a third 
party’s representation of the fictive author’s interests. 
There are three kinds of objection mechanisms that make fictive 
authorization possible. Internal mechanisms operate within the representative 
relationship, such as when the guardian who has authorized a child’s lawyer 
objects to what the lawyer does in the child’s name. External mechanisms 
register objections from outside the representative relationship, such as when a 
judge objects to what the child’s guardian or lawyer does in her name. 
Retrospective mechanisms register objections after the representative 
relationship has ended, such as when a child grows up and objects to what her 
guardian or lawyer has done in her name. Retrospective mechanisms are not 
strictly necessary for fictive authorization, and in some cases are not possible. 
For instance, a person in a coma cannot object to what his lawyer did if he never 
wakes up, but his guardian-appointed lawyer nevertheless has a legitimate claim 
to represent him. Internal and external objection mechanisms are necessary. The 
guardian who authorizes the ward’s lawyer must be able to withdraw this 
authority, at least periodically, and there must be someone, such as a judge, who 
can ‘guard the guardian’. The internal and external objection mechanisms 
together ensure that the incapable person has a genuine presence in the actions 
of her representative. 
In order for subjects to authorize a government on behalf of the incapable 
subjects among them, there must be mechanisms for objecting to the 
government on behalf of those incapable subjects. The internal objection 
mechanism is the normal authorization procedure. Subjects can withdraw 
authority from a government that fails to serve the interests of incapable 
subjects (for instance, by voting it out of office), just as a guardian can withdraw 
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authority from a lawyer who fails to serve the interests of a ward. The external 
objection mechanism operates through civil society. A children’s advocate or an 
interest group can object to a government that fails to serve the interests of 
children, much as a social worker can object to a guardian who fails to serve the 
interests of a particular child. The retrospective objection mechanism becomes 
possible when incapable subjects come of age or regain their faculties. Subjects 
can retrospectively object to a past government that failed to protect them when 
they were children (for instance, by electing a government that condemns the 
actions of the past government), much as an adult can object to what a guardian 
did in her name when she was a child.76 The internal, external, and retrospective 
objection mechanisms together ensure that incapable subjects have a presence 
in the state’s actions.  
Fictive authorization creates a presumption of legitimate distribution for 
incapable subjects. Although the government’s actions do not derive from the 
wills of incapable subjects, these actions may nevertheless derive from a credible 
representation of their interests. This is sufficient to justify distributing the costs 
of the state’s responsibilities to them, even when the distribution is burdensome. 
The fact that a state’s debt imposes significant costs on children does not, by 
itself, make that debt odious. The debt might have served their interests, even 
though they could not have truly authorized the government that incurred it. 
Children can have a genuine presence in the actions of the government, provided 
that the necessary objection mechanisms are in place. However, the presumption 
of legitimate distribution is weaker for fictive authors than it is for true authors. 
For this reason, as I argue in section 5.3, it is desirable to divide liability among 
subjects in a way that minimizes the burdens that incapable subjects bear. 
Non-authorizing subjects, or subjects who refuse to authorize the 
government, also bear the costs of its responsibilities. For example, pacifists bear 
the costs of war debts and reparations through the tax system, and these costs 
may well be burdensome. But authorization by fiction, like representation by 
                                                        
76 Like all state/human analogies, these three analogies should be used with 
caution. The objection mechanisms do not work exactly the same way in the 
individual and political cases. In particular, while the objection of a single 
guardian, judge, or grown-up ward can be decisive, the objection of a single 
subject is never decisive. 
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fiction, is possible only for people who are incapable of speaking and acting on 
their own. A parent can authorize a representative for a young child, but not for a 
competent adult child, and certainly not against that adult child’s will. Similarly, 
while subjects can authorize political representatives on behalf of the incapable 
subjects among them, they cannot authorize representatives on behalf of the 
subjects among them who simply refuse to authorize. One might argue, as Stilz 
(2011) does, that all subjects ought to share liability for the state’s 
responsibilities because they all require the state to protect their rights. But this 
argument has no force against the most radical pacifists and separatists, who 
would, if they had the option, take their chances without a state rather than 
accept the protection of the one that they have. An account of distribution has to 
contend with the fact that some subjects cannot plausibly be counted as authors 
of the state’s responsibilities. 
The burdens that non-authorizing subjects bear are best thought of as a 
kind of collateral damage. State responsibility would not be possible if the costs 
of fulfilling the state’s responsibilities could not be distributed to its subjects. 
Debts and reparations could not be paid, treaties could not be upheld, and 
sanctions could not be imposed. Yet it is often difficult to confine the costs to the 
subjects who are authors or fictive authors. So if most subjects have a presence 
in the state’s responsibilities, then some ‘overspill’ of liability to the non-
authorizing subjects among them is permissible. As with other kinds of collateral 
damage, the distribution of liability to non-authorizing subjects ought to be 
mitigated, and it requires proportionality. The more non-authorizing subjects 
there are, and the less important the responsibility is, the more difficult it is to 
justify distributing the costs to non-authorizing subjects.  
In sum, it is presumptively legitimate to distribute liability to subjects 
intragenerationally provided that the government of the state meets the 
conditions for authorization. Most subjects can legitimately be made to bear the 
costs because they are authors of the state’s responsibilities. When the 
distribution is diffuse, the costs to non-authorizing and incapable subjects are 
negligible and can therefore be ignored. But when the distribution is 
burdensome, the presumption of legitimate distribution becomes weaker. 
Distributing liability to incapable subjects is justified insofar as there are 
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mechanisms by which others can represent their interests and object to the 
government on their behalf, and distributing liability to non-authorizing subjects 
is sometimes permissible as a kind of collateral damage. 
 
5.2.2 Intergenerational Distribution 
Liberal political philosophers have long worried that there is something 
unjust about distributing liability across generations. Jefferson (1958) argued 
that “no generation can contract debts greater than may be paid during the 
course of it’s own existence”. Since “one generation is to another as one 
independant nation to another” (Ibid.), intergenerational distribution of debt is 
morally equivalent to distributing the debts of an empire to a colony. Mill (1870) 
argued, on similar grounds, that states “should conclude their treaties, as 
commercial treaties are usually concluded, only for terms of years”, and that 
sanctions and reparations against states “ought not ... to exceed the length of a 
generation; or, more properly, the period at the end of which a majority of the 
adult population will have grown up from childhood subsequently to the 
offence”. More recently, Waldron (2006) and Dworkin (2013) have questioned 
whether treaties can be binding in perpetuity: “It seems unfair that people 
should suffer serious disadvantage only because politicians chosen by entirely 
different people under entirely different constitutions signed a document many 
generations ago” (Dworkin, 2013: 8).  
The problem with intergenerational distributions of liability is, in 
Hobbesian terms, that authority dies with the authors. If the justification for 
distributing liability to subjects is that they are authors of the state’s 
responsibilities, then intergenerational distribution seems unjustifiable, since 
most of the subjects who bear the costs of intergenerational responsibilities 
could not possibly be authors of them. Consider the United Kingdom’s perpetual 
bonds from 1853. The justification for distributing the repayment costs to the 
subjects of the United Kingdom in 2014 cannot possibly be that they are authors 
of the debt, since none of the subjects of the United Kingdom in 2014 were alive 
when the bonds were issued. In this case, the repayment costs are so diffuse that 
they might be morally insignificant. But a justification for more burdensome 
intergenerational distributions has to answer ‘Jefferson’s challenge’: why should 
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one generation be liable for the actions of a government that was authorized by 
another generation? 
Thompson (2009: 62) suggests that intergenerational distribution can be 
justified on grounds of intergenerational equity. 
We ought to do for our predecessors what we think we are entitled to 
claim from our survivors. If I think that my survivors ought to fulfil 
certain demands (were I to make them), then I have to accept a duty to 
fulfil relevantly similar demands that were made, or could be made, by 
those whom I survive.  
 
If the current generation expects future generations to bear the costs of debts 
that it incurs, then the current generation must bear the costs of debts that past 
generations have incurred. A generation cannot make commitments that bind 
future generations unless it is willing to honour the commitments that past 
generations have made.  
 There are two problems with this line of argument. First, as Miller (2007: 
144) points out, it provides only a conditional justification for intergenerational 
distribution. If the current generation did not incur any intergenerational 
responsibilities, then it could, without any inconsistency, repudiate the 
intergenerational responsibilities of past generations. Yet this objection is of no 
real consequence, since every generation actually does make intergenerational 
commitments. The second, more fundamental problem with Thompson’s 
argument is that it establishes a necessary condition for intergenerational 
distribution but not a sufficient condition. What the argument shows is that the 
current generation cannot legitimately expect future generations to bear the 
costs of its debts if it does not honour the debts of previous generations. This 
follows from the principle of intergenerational equity. But it does not follow that 
the current generation can legitimately expect future generations to bear the 
costs of its debts as long as it honours the debts of previous generations. 
Consider another example with the same form. The current generation cannot 
legitimately expect future generations to bear the costs of its pollution if it does 
not accept that it was legitimate for previous generations to pollute. But it does 
not follow that the current generation can legitimately pollute as long as it 
accepts that it was legitimate for previous generations to do so. Honouring the 
debts of the previous generation does not give the current generation the right to 
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incur debts that the next generation will have to pay, any more than accepting 
the costs of the previous generation’s pollution gives the current generation the 
right to pollute.  
 What needs to be explained is why it was legitimate for some generation 
to initiate the practice of making intergenerational commitments in the first 
place. A retrospective justification will not work: the fact that the current 
generation honours the commitments of past generations does not, by itself, give 
it the right to make commitments that bind future generations. An adequate 
justification has to be prospective: it has to explain why a generation that did not 
inherit any intergenerational commitments—such as the first generation of 
subjects in a new state—would have the right to make commitments that bind 
subsequent generations. A prospective justification for intergenerational 
distribution of liability has to refer to future subjects. And since future subjects 
do not yet exist, the justification has to refer to their interests rather than their 
wills. The question, then, is how the interests of future generations can have a 
genuine presence in the current generation’s decisions, despite the fact that 
future generations cannot (yet) speak for themselves. 
  The idea of authorization by fiction explains how we can give future 
subjects a presence in acts of state, just as we give a presence to incapable 
subjects. If children, inanimate objects, and even imaginary entities can be 
represented, then so can the subjects of the future (Brito Vieira and Runciman, 
2008: 182-92). And if it is possible to represent future subjects, then it is possible 
to grant fictive authority on their behalf. All that is required is a set of internal 
and external mechanisms by which third parties can object to the government if 
it fails to act according to the interests of future subjects. First, through the 
normal authorization procedure, subjects can periodically withdraw authority 
from the government if it fails to serve the interests of future subjects. Second, 
through protests and petitions, interest groups and advocates can object on 
behalf of future subjects to what the government does. In addition, when future 
subjects become current subjects, they can retrospectively object to what past 
governments have done. Future subjects count as fictive authors of the state’s 
responsibilities, and intergenerational distribution is therefore presumptively 
legitimate, provided that the state had internal and external objection 
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mechanisms at the time of attribution. For the same reason that subjects ought to 
bear the costs of debts that their state incurred when they were children, they 
ought to bear the costs of debts that their state incurred before they were born.  
The obvious problem with fictive authorization in the case of future 
subjects is that people tend to discount the future—especially the future in 
which they no longer expect to be alive. Limited time-horizons also pose a 
problem for fictive authorization in the case of children, but the problem is much 
more severe in the case of future subjects. As Brito Vieira and Runciman (2008: 
187) point out, the interests of children are effectively given a presence by “all 
those representatives, and all those voters, who have children and take 
children’s interests into account when they decide how to act”. But subjects and 
representatives give much less weight to the interests of their more distant 
descendants. Many authorized governments have run up large debts that future 
subjects will have to pay and made environmental messes that future subjects 
will have to clean up. There were internal and external objection mechanisms, 
and many subjects and interest groups did object to policies that were 
detrimental to the interests of future subjects, but the interests of the present 
won the day. Future subjects often have some presence in the actions of 
governments, but they rarely have a sufficient presence. The longer the 
timespan, the more the future tends to be discounted, and the less effective the 
internal and external objection mechanisms become. So although it is 
presumptively legitimate to distribute the costs of the state’s responsibilities to 
its future subjects, this presumption is far weaker than it is for incapable 
subjects. 
Since the internal and external objection mechanisms are less effective in 
the case of future subjects, the retrospective objection mechanism is accordingly 
more important. Subjects and governments often fail to give enough weight to 
the interests of future subjects, so the retrospective objections of those future 
subjects must be given more weight. I explore in section 5.4 when these 
retrospective objections are sufficient to overturn the presumption of legitimate 
distribution. 
There is one final kind of distribution that remains to be justified. The 
argument so far is that it is presumptively legitimate for the state to distribute 
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liability to its subjects as long as the government meets the conditions for 
authorization. But what if the government was authorized at the time of 
attribution but not at the time of distribution? Suppose that an authorized 
government incurred debt but was later deposed in a coup and replaced by an 
unauthorized government. Although it is clear that debts incurred by the 
unauthorized government cannot legitimately be distributed to subjects, since 
those debts are not attributable to the state in the first place, the debts of the 
authorized government can legitimately be distributed. The fact that the 
authorized government has been deposed does not change the fact that the 
subjects of the state are authors (or fictive authors) of the debt that this 
government incurred. What matters is whether the government at the time of 
attribution was authorized, not whether the government at the time of 
distribution is authorized. However, as I argue in the next section, divisions of 
liability that are determined by unauthorized governments have to be held to a 
higher standard.  
    *** 
The strength of the presumption of legitimate distribution depends on 
two factors: whether the distribution is diffuse or burdensome, and whether it is 
intragenerational or intergenerational. The presumption is strongest in diffuse-
intragenerational cases, such as when the state incurs a small short-term debt. 
Most subjects ought to bear the costs because they are authors of the debt, and 
the costs to the non-authors are morally insignificant because they are negligible. 
The presumption is somewhat weaker in burdensome-intragenerational cases, 
such as when the state incurs a large short-term debt. Again, most subjects ought 
to bear the costs because they are authors of the debt. The costs to incapable 
subjects are justifiable provided that there are mechanisms for representing 
their interests, and the costs to non-authorizing subjects are justifiable as a kind 
of collateral damage. The presumption is weaker still in diffuse-intergenerational 
cases, such as when the state incurs a small long-term debt. Future subjects 
ought to bear the costs provided that, at the time of attribution, the state had 
internal and external objection mechanisms that gave their interests a genuine 
presence in acts of state. Yet because subjects and governments tend to discount 
the interests of future subjects, the presumption of legitimate distribution is 
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weaker for them than it is for incapable subjects. The presumption is even 
weaker in burdensome-intergenerational cases, such as when a state incurs a 
large long-term debt, because the tension between the interests of current and 
future subjects is even more acute. In short, the more intergenerational and the 
more burdensome the distribution is, the weaker the presumption of legitimate 
distribution becomes. 
 
5.3 The Division of Liability 
 The previous two sections addressed the question of when it is legitimate 
to distribute the costs of the state’s responsibilities to its subjects. But when it 
has been established that distributing liability to subjects is legitimate, there is a 
further question of how the costs ought to be divided up among them. This 
section draws on Collins’ (2016) idea of ‘source-tracking’ to determine what an 
ideally just division of liability would look like. I argue that, in practice, 
authorized governments should have a more or less free hand to divide liability, 
but that divisions of liability by unauthorized governments and third parties 
should be held to a standard that is closer to the ideal.  
 Pasternak (2011: 220-28) identifies three ideal-typical rules for dividing 
liability among subjects. Although her focus is on the costs of sanctions, her three 
rules apply to any kind of liability. The first rule is equal division, which 
apportions an equal share of liability to each subject. Equal division can be 
construed in absolute terms, meaning that each subject bears the same cost, or in 
relative terms, meaning that each subject bears the same burden. An absolutely 
equal division of debt would mean that each subject pays the same amount; a 
relatively equal division would mean that each subject pays the same proportion 
of his or her income. The justification for an equal division rule follows from the 
idea that “citizenship is a common destiny” (Walzer, 1977: 297). Since subjects 
are moral equals, they “should see themselves as having equal shares in their 
joint political activities and as equal bearers of responsibility for them” 
(Pasternak, 2011: 226). 
 The second division rule is proportional, which means that the costs of 
fulfilling a responsibility are apportioned to subjects according to their personal 
connections to it. For example, a proportional division of reparations would 
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assign liability to subjects in proportion to their contributions to the wrong to be 
repaired. Subjects who helped to perpetrate the wrong would bear the greatest 
share of the costs; those who tried to prevent the wrong would bear the least (if 
any); and passive subjects would fall somewhere in between. The justification for 
a proportional division rule appeals to the idea of fairness (Ibid. 224). It seems 
unfair that subjects who protested against an aggressive war should bear the 
same share of the reparations burden as subjects who participated in or 
supported the war. If certain subjects have a stronger or weaker connection to 
the actions that generated a responsibility, then considerations of fairness 
suggest that they should bear more of less of the cost of fulfilling it. 
The third possible division rule is random, which means that liability is 
apportioned according to “luck or chance, rather than by a systematic principle” 
(Ibid. 222). Economic sanctions often produce divisions of liability that are 
random in this sense. Subjects do not bear the costs equally or in proportion to 
their connections to the actions that brought about the sanctions. The subjects 
who bear the costs of an embargo are usually just unlucky that they work in an 
export-driven industry. A random division might be justified on utilitarian 
grounds: “if there are good reasons to think that sanctioning the group would 
stop it from perpetrating greater wrongs, then the fact that this measure would 
have an impact on group members on a random basis should perhaps be 
ignored” (Ibid. 224). 
Of the three rules, proportional division has the strongest justification. 
Random division is, as Pasternak (2011: 224) argues, justifiable merely as “a 
moral compromise, permissible not because it is supported by some underlying 
normative principle but by virtue of the fact that it produces an overall desired 
outcome”. An embargo that imposes costs on subjects randomly is normatively 
suboptimal, even if it achieves a desirable objective. Equal division is also 
suboptimal. Even if we think citizenship is a common destiny, considerations of 
fairness provide a compelling reason to take the connections between individual 
subjects and acts of state into account. The moral equality of subjects does not 
justify an equal division of liability any more than it justifies a flat tax. If the 
ideally just tax system is one that divides the tax burden among subjects 
proportionally (according to wealth, need, or other criteria), then the ideally just 
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liability-division system is also one that divides costs proportionally. This 
parallel is not coincidental, since the major part of the liability-division system is 
the tax system. The ideal division rule is proportional—the question is, in 
proportion to what? 
Collins’ (2016) idea of ‘source-tracking’ provides a precise account of 
proportional division. She proposes a two-step process. 
First, the costs [of fulfilling the state’s responsibility] are divided among 
 duty sources, in accordance with those sources’ strength. Second, the 
 costs earmarked to each source are divided amongst members in 
 proportion to members’ individual instantiations of that source (Ibid. 
 350-51). 
 
Consider Canada’s duty to reduce carbon emissions. Suppose that the sources of 
this duty are in equal parts causally contributing to climate change (as an oil-
producing state) and having the capacity to help mitigate it (as a wealthy state). 
According to source-tracking, the costs of reducing Canada’s carbon emissions 
should be divided equally between subjects who instantiate causation (those 
who profit from carbon-emitting industries) and subjects who instantiate 
capacity (those who are wealthy enough to bear the costs of mitigating climate 
change). The ideal division mechanism would therefore be a combination of 
carbon taxation and progressive taxation. The core idea of source-tracking is that 
the division of liability should track subjects’ connections to the responsibility in 
question. 
One problem with source-tracking, as Collins (2016: 335) recognizes, is 
that some sources of states’ responsibilities are not instantiated by any of their 
subjects. 
Suppose the state … incurs a wrongdoing-based duty to compensate these 
present-day people, although no present-day individuals contributed to 
the wrong. The source-tracking model is silent on how the state should 
pass the cost of its duty onto its members. It seems the state bears a duty, 
but no individual should bear costs through its fulfilment. The duty is thus 
‘shortfallen’.  
 
Collins argues that the costs of shortfallen responsibilities should not be 
distributed unless there is some secondary source that is instantiated by the 
subjects of the state. If the state’s wrongdoing is not instantiated by any of its 
members, then its reparative obligation might still be distributed, but only if 
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there is some other source—such as “association, benefit, capacity, or some 
combination of these”—that is instantiated (Ibid. 357). However, relying on 
secondary sources will not always work. In particular, it is difficult to see why 
the costs of debts and treaty obligations should be distributed at all. The source 
of a debt or a treaty obligation is an agreement. The state owes money because it 
agreed to borrow the money, and it is bound by a treaty because it agreed to sign 
the treaty. Yet it is not even clear what it would mean for an agreement to be 
instantiated by individuals. If it means that those individuals have agreed, then 
debts and treaty obligations will only ever be instantiated by a few 
representatives of the state. Source-tracking provides a plausible account of how 
the costs of reparative obligations should be divided among subjects, but it 
struggles to explain why treaty obligations or debts should be distributed in the 
first place. 
 The problem with Collins’ source-tracking proposal is that it elides an 
important difference between small, participatory groups and large, non-
participatory groups. She first develops the idea of source-tracking “with regard 
to small-scale groups”, such as “a team of mountaineers” and “five teenage 
friends who earn pocket money on weekends” (Ibid. 345-47). She then “applies 
the source-tracking proposal to states” (Ibid.), with the assumption that dividing 
liability in states differs only in scale. As I have previously argued (section 1.1.1), 
it is often a mistake to make inferences about states and corporations from 
examples of small groups. There are conceptual differences as well as differences 
in scale. The members of a team of mountaineers participate directly in its 
collective actions. For the team to do wrong (e.g., to loot a cabin) is for the 
individual mountaineers to act in ways that bring about the wrong (such as by 
picking the lock or acting as a lookout). Source-tracking the team’s wrong is 
straightforward because its members instantiate the wrong by directly 
participating in it. But in a state or a corporation, the relation between the 
corporate entity’s actions and its members is mediated by authorization. For the 
state to do wrong (e.g., to violate another state’s sovereignty) is for the 
authorized representatives of the state to act in ways that bring about the wrong 
(such as by planning and executing an invasion). Source-tracking does not work 
the same way because most subjects do not participate in the state’s wrongdoing 
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and therefore do not directly instantiate it. Subjects are one step removed: they 
authorize representatives, and these representatives instantiate the state’s 
wrongdoing. Liability-division in the state must therefore take the relations of 
authority between its subjects and its representatives into account. 
Authorization is the ultimate source of many of the state’s 
responsibilities. Although the ‘proximate’ source of a treaty obligation is an 
agreement, its ‘ultimate’ source, which makes the agreement valid, is 
authorization. Similarly, although the proximate source of a reparative obligation 
is wrongdoing, its ultimate source, which makes the wrongdoing attributable to 
the state, is authorization. The division of liability for treaty obligations, 
reparative obligations, and debts should track authorization rather than direct 
instantiation of responsibility-sources. Subjects are liable for the costs of 
upholding a treaty not because they instantiate the agreement, whatever that 
might mean, but because they are authors (or fictive authors) of it. Likewise, 
subjects are liable for the costs of the state’s reparative obligations not because 
they are among the wrongdoers, nor because they are beneficiaries of the 
wrongdoing—they need not be either—but simply because they are authors of 
the wrongdoing. Much as authorization makes an employer liable for the actions 
of her employee, authorization makes subjects liable for the actions of their state. 
Obviously, the individual wrongdoers ought to be held personally liable (and 
culpable), but their liability is concurrent with, not derived from, the state’s 
reparative obligations. Authorization, not instantiation, should thus be the 
primary basis for dividing liability among subjects.  
An ideal system of liability-division would use both source-tracking and 
‘author-tracking’. There is a natural division of labour between the two. For 
‘personal responsibilities’, which follow from the actions of the state’s authorized 
representatives (section 3.1), the division of liability should track authorization. 
Since authorization is the ultimate source of debts, reparative obligations, and 
treaty obligations, liability should be divided among the authors. I say more 
below about precisely what this division should look like. But for ‘general 
responsibilities’, which follow from the state’s characteristics or capacities, the 
division of liability should be source-tracked. It does not make sense to author-
track purely capacity-based duties, such as duties to provide humanitarian aid. 
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Subjects can be authors of a debt, but it is not clear how they could be authors of 
a humanitarian duty. General responsibilities have to be source-tracked because 
direct source-instantiation is the only possible connection that subjects have to 
them. The costs of fulfilling a capacity-based humanitarian duty therefore ought 
to be divided among subjects according to capacity, such as through progressive 
taxation. The ideal liability-division system would source-track the state’s 
general responsibilities and author-track its personal responsibilities. 
If the state’s personal responsibilities are to be divided among their 
authors, then there is a further question about what this division should look 
like. The baseline ought to be an equal division of costs to each author. Since 
authorization is binary in relation to each subject—each subject either is or is 
not an author—there is no reason to assign more liability to some authors than 
to others. Of course, subjects who participate in acts of state or protest against 
them should bear more or less individual responsibility for them, but their shares 
of liability for the state’s responsibility should nevertheless be equal. An author-
tracked division of liability thus seems to look a lot like Pasternak’s equal 
division. 
However, as I have argued in the previous section, not all subjects are 
authors of the state’s responsibilities. Incapable subjects and future subjects can, 
at most, be considered fictive authors, and subjects who credibly and 
consistently disavow the state cannot be considered authors at all. Even though 
it is justifiable to distribute liability to all subjects provided that the government 
meets the conditions for authorization, liability should be divided in a way that 
mitigates the burdens that these fictive authors and non-authors bear. The ideal 
rule is a ‘trickle-down’ division. First, the full amount of liability should be 
divided among the authorizing subjects such that each bears an equal burden. 
Then, if there is any liability left over—for instance, if the authors are no longer 
alive or are unable to bear the costs in full—the remaining liability should be 
divided among incapable subjects, then future subjects, and finally non-
authorizing subjects in that order of priority.  
To use a stylized example, suppose that State A owes $100 million in 
reparations to State B for an aggressive war. State A has a million subjects: 
900,000 authorizing subjects, 50,000 children, 30,000 subjects who were not yet 
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born when the war was waged, and 20,000 radical pacifists who disavow the 
state and minimize their contact with it. In the first instance, the full $100 million 
ought to be divided among the authorizing subjects such that each bears a 
relatively equal share of the cost. If a subject who has an annual income of 
$100,000 pays $1,000, then a subject who has an annual income of $200,000 
should pay $2,000. The distribution is complete if the full $100 million can be 
recovered from the authorizing subjects. But if there is a shortfall—say, of $10 
million—then the remaining costs ought to be divided equally among the 
incapable subjects. State A might have to cut funding for healthcare and 
education to make up the shortfall. Since fictive authorization creates a weaker 
presumption of legitimate distribution than does true authorization, incapable 
subjects ought to be included in the division of liability only if the full amount 
cannot be divided among the authorizing subjects. 
Suppose that 50 years have passed, and most of the subjects from the 
time of the war have since died. The full amount of the remaining liability—say, 
$5 million—ought to be paid by the authors of the war who are still alive. Only 
when there is a shortfall should liability be divided among the incapable subjects, 
and only when there is still a shortfall should liability be divided among the 
subjects who were not yet born when the state waged the war. Fictive 
authorization is weaker for future subjects than it is for incapable subjects, since 
the tendency to discount the future means that future subjects tend to have less 
of a presence in acts of state. The division of liability therefore ought to cross 
generational boundaries only if liability cannot be confined to the generations 
that include the authors. 
Non-authorizing subjects, such as radical pacifists, ought to be included in 
the division of liability only as a last resort. The presumption of legitimate 
distribution is even weaker for them than it is for subjects who were not yet born 
at the time of the war. Whereas the unborn might have had some presence in the 
decision to wage the war—the government at the time might have waged it with 
their interests in mind—a radical pacifist who consistently and credibly 
disavows the state demonstrates that she is ‘absent’ from the state’s actions. The 
division of liability should not include non-authorizing subjects unless it is 
impossible to exclude them.  
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The trickle-down model gives us an ideal standard by which to judge 
actual divisions of liability. But in practice, the division rarely tracks 
responsibility-sources or authorization; it is determined primarily by the 
preexisting laws and institutions of the state, especially the tax system. The costs 
of debts and reparations are typically paid out of general revenue. Even when 
they are not, as in the case of Iraq’s reparations for the invasion of Kuwait, the 
division of liability tends to be based on practical rather than normative 
considerations. The reason for garnishing Iraq’s oil revenue to pay for the 
reparations was not that Iraqis in the oil industry instantiated the source of the 
reparative obligation, nor that they were the authors of the war. This was simply 
the easiest way to extract reparations payments from Iraq. The question, then, is 
how large the gap between the ideal division and the actual division can get 
before the distribution of liability is rendered illegitimate. 
One important consideration is whether the division is determined 
‘internally’ by the government of the state or ‘externally’ by a third party. 
Internal divisions of liability are presumptively legitimate as long as they are 
determined by an authorized government. The division of liability has to be 
determined by someone, and an authorized government has the strongest moral 
claim to be able to determine it, since most subjects have a genuine presence in 
its decisions. This presumption is overturned only when the division of liability 
is severely unjust or exploitative. Consider a state, such as the pre-Civil War 
United States, that has an elected government but also permits slavery. Although 
the state is unjust, its government nevertheless meets the minimal conditions for 
authorization, because a substantial proportion of the subjects actually accept 
the government as legitimate (section 3.3.2). The actions the government are 
therefore attributable to the state. But suppose that the state uses the proceeds 
of slavery or human trafficking to pay its debts. The fact that the government is 
authorized implies that it is legitimate for the state to distribute liability to its 
subjects. Yet the division of liability is illegitimate, since it is grossly exploitative. 
Internal divisions of liability that deviate from the ideal ought to be tolerated in 
all but the most extreme cases. 
External divisions of liability, or divisions that are imposed by other 
states or by international organizations, ought to be held to a higher standard. 
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Third parties sometimes have moral claims to determine the division of liability, 
but these claims are much weaker than those of authorized governments. 
External divisions must therefore be reasonably just in order to be legitimate. 
The third party must ensure not only that the division of liability is not 
exploitative, but also that the burdens that non-authorizing and incapable 
subjects bear are mitigated as much as possible. Consider the division of liability 
for Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. The Security Council largely dictated the division: it 
decided how much oil Iraq would be allowed to export, what the revenue could 
be used for, and how much revenue would be withheld for reparations 
payments. Since the subjects of Iraq did not authorize the Security Council, the 
division of liability has to be held to a high standard. The fact that the sanctions 
and reparations imposed costs on the population ‘randomly’ (in Pasternak’s 
sense) calls the legitimacy of the division into question. The Security Council did 
not do enough to mitigate the burdens on children, the disabled, and political 
dissidents, as is clear from the Security Council’s (1999: 36-37) report: “The 
most vulnerable groups have been the hardest hit, especially children under five 
years of age … hospitals and health centers have remained without repair and 
maintenance … School enrollment for all ages (6-23) has declined to 53%”. An 
external division of liability is legitimate only if the third party takes pains to 
mitigate the burdens that non-authorizing and incapable subjects bear. 
The case is similar for divisions that are determined by unauthorized 
governments. As I have previously argued (section 5.2), although an 
unauthorized government cannot legitimately distribute the costs of 
responsibilities that it incurred, it might nevertheless be legitimate for the 
unauthorized government to distribute the costs of responsibilities that a 
previous, authorized government incurred. Even if the authorized government 
has been deposed, subjects are still authors of its debts and reparative 
obligations. But if the current government is unauthorized, then it has hardly any 
moral claim to determine the division. The Iraqi government had an even less 
credible claim to determine the division of liability for the reparations than did 
the Security Council. An unauthorized division has to approximate the ideal 
division in order to be legitimate.  
    *** 
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In sum, the ideal rule for dividing liability depends on whether the 
responsibility in question is general or personal. While general responsibilities 
(such as humanitarian duties) ought to be source-tracked, personal 
responsibilities (such as debts and reparations) ought to be author-tracked. In 
practice, the standard for legitimate distribution depends on who determines the 
division. Internal divisions are legitimate as long as they are not severely unjust 
or exploitative. Authorized governments should have a more or less free hand to 
divide liability, since most subjects have a genuine presence in their actions. 
External divisions are legitimate only if the third party that determines the 
division takes steps to mitigate the burdens that non-authorizing and incapable 
subjects bear. Although third parties, and especially international organizations, 
might have some moral claims to determine the division of liability, they have 
much less standing than authorized governments, and their divisions must 
therefore be held to a higher standard. Unauthorized divisions should be held to 
the highest standard. Since unauthorized governments have hardly any moral 
claim to determine the division, their divisions of liability are legitimate only if 
they approximate the ideal division. 
 
5.4 Suspension and Repudiation 
What has been established so far is that the distribution (and division) of 
liability is presumptively legitimate provided that the government of the state 
meets the conditions for authorization. Yet there are some circumstances in 
which the presumption of legitimate distribution can be overturned, and it 
becomes legitimate for the state to suspend or repudiate its responsibilities. To 
suspend a responsibility is to defer fulfillment of it, and to repudiate a 
responsibility is to refuse to fulfill it, in whole or in part. For instance, a state 
might suspend a debt payment until a later date, or it might repudiate some or all 
of the debt. This section develops an account of ‘non-fulfillment’, which 
determines when suspension and repudiation are justified. 
Two fundamental principles come into conflict in cases of suspension and 
repudiation. On one side is the principle of sovereignty. If we take seriously the 
idea that parliament (or some other person or assembly) is the supreme 
authority, which can amend or abrogate any law, then it seems that parliament 
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can also suspend or repudiate any obligation that is created by law. It is difficult 
to see how a sovereign could bind itself with a treaty if it cannot bind itself with 
legislation. On the other side is the principle of rational consistency. Persons—
individual and corporate—have to stand by their words and actions in order to 
avoid self-contradiction. As Hobbes (1994: XVI.2) says,  
[T]here is in every breach of covenant a contradiction properly so called; 
for he that covenanteth, willeth to do, or omit, in the time to come; and he 
that doth any action, willeth it in that present, which is part of the future 
time, contained in the covenant: and therefore he that violateth a 
covenant, willeth the doing and the not doing of the same thing, at the 
same time; which is a plain contradiction.  
 
A state that signs a treaty and then repudiates it contradicts itself, and, in so 
doing, fails to perform as a competent person (Pettit, 2012: 133). The principle of 
pacta sunt servanda thus follows from the more basic principle of rational 
consistency. Whereas sovereignty implies the right to suspend or repudiate 
responsibilities, the requirement of consistency over time precludes suspension 
and repudiation. 
 Both principles have intolerable implications if they are taken to be 
absolute. If we take sovereignty to be absolute, as Hobbes does, then ‘state 
responsibility’ is an empty phrase (section 2.5). States can never truly be bound 
by their words or actions, since they can release themselves from their 
obligations whenever it is expedient. But if we take rational consistency to be 
absolute, then state responsibility becomes ‘the tyranny of past governments’. An 
absolutist interpretation of pacta sunt servanda would allow governments 
(which inevitably have limited time-horizons) to bind future governments 
indefinitely, and contrary to the interests of future subjects. Intuitively, there is 
something unjust about an agreement (such as a perpetual lease or bond) that 
confers benefits on the subjects of the present at the expense of subjects far into 
the future. This is the concern that animated Jefferson’s and Mill’s objections to 
intergenerational debts and treaties. An account of non-fulfillment has to try to 
reconcile the tension between sovereignty and rational consistency.  
 Runciman (2007) argues that we ought to give priority to sovereignty. 
Although “no national government can repudiate all the commitments of its 
predecessors and expect to be taken seriously … it is the objections or otherwise 
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of the active public, and not the expectation of consistency over time on the part 
of an inactive ‘people’, that is the final arbiter of political representation” (Ibid. 
106). The active public is the body of subjects qua authors of the government, 
while the inactive ‘people’ is the state, as it is for Hobbes (section 3.2). Runciman 
argues that the responsibilities of the state cannot stand in the face of 
overwhelming objections from subjects.  
Public opinion may turn decisively against a government seeking to 
uphold earlier commitments undertaken in the name of the people—for 
example, many democratic governments have been forced to repudiate 
their public debts because of the objections of large sections of their 
populations to the privations honouring those debts would entail. In these 
circumstances, the non-objection criterion trumps the claims of rational 
consistency. (Ibid.) 
 
However, only certain kinds of objections on the part of subjects count. 
Objections that individual subjects make in their own names—‘I disavow this 
debt’—have no force. Only objections made in the name of the state—‘we declare 
that Greece disavows this debt’—can have any force. When a substantial number 
of subjects do object in the name of the state, rational consistency must give way 
to sovereignty, and the obligation to pay the debt must give way to the will to 
repudiate it. 
 Runciman’s example suggests that repudiation must take the form of an 
internal objection: the subjects must authorize a new government with a 
mandate to repudiate the debt. But repudiation could also take the form of an 
external or retrospective objection. A third party, such as an international 
organization, could object to the debt. External objections carry less weight than 
internal objections, since third parties do not normally have the authority to 
represent the state, but these objections become important when subjects do not 
have the opportunity to object. An objection from the United Nations might even 
be decisive if the legitimacy of the government that incurred the debt is doubtful. 
Alternatively, if the debt is intergenerational, the objection could be 
retrospective. The current subjects of the state could authorize a government 
with a mandate to repudiate debts that its predecessors incurred. In any case, as 
Runciman argues, a credible objection must be made in the name of the state 
rather than in the names of individual subjects. 
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Runciman’s account of repudiation makes sense from the perspective of 
the Hobbesian theory of state responsibility, in large part because his 
understanding of the state is fundamentally Hobbesian. He sees the state as a 
fictional person that acts only through its authorized representatives (Runciman, 
2003a, 2003b). If the state were an agent, then it would be subject to the same 
constraints of rational consistency as a human agent (List and Pettit, 2011). 
Pacta sunt servanda would be more or less absolute. But since the state is not an 
agent, the constraints of rational consistency are not as strict. The validity of an 
act of state is ultimately determined by whether it is performed with authority, 
not by whether it is consistent with previous acts of state. The authorized 
representatives of the state inevitably represent it in inconsistent ways over 
time, such as when they sign a treaty that comes into conflict with an earlier 
treaty, and one of the tasks of politics is to resolve these inconsistencies. This 
might be done by giving precedence to the earlier treaty, as pacta sunt servanda 
implies, but it might also be done by repudiating the earlier treaty in favour of 
the later one. Runciman’s point is that the ‘right answer’ has to be determined by 
representative politics, not predetermined by the principle of rational 
consistency.  
The question that Runciman leaves unanswered is what constitutes a 
legitimate reason to repudiate responsibilities. His account of repudiation is 
purely formal. It tells us what form repudiation must take—namely, a competing 
representation of the state—but it says nothing about what the content of a 
legitimate claim must be. Consistency must sometimes bend to sovereignty, but 
this does not mean that it is legitimate for the state to repudiate responsibilities 
arbitrarily, or whenever it is expedient. Repudiation requires reasons, albeit 
reasons that correspond to the structure of representative politics. I argue that 
there are four legitimate reasons for a state not to fulfill a responsibility: 
impossibility, misattribution, non-identity, and misdistribution. While the first is 
a factual reason, the other three are normative reasons that correspond to the 
three Fundamental Questions. 
The first legitimate reason for non-fulfillment is that the responsibility is 
impossible to fulfill. A responsibility that is unfulfillable must be suspended as 
long as there is a possibility that a change in circumstances will make it possible 
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for the state to fulfill it in the future. Repudiation is legitimate only if it is clear 
that fulfilling the responsibility will never be possible. Article 61(1) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (UN, 1969) is based on this idea. 
A party may invoke the impossibility of performing a treaty as a ground 
for terminating or withdrawing from it if the impossibility results from 
the permanent disappearance or destruction of an object indispensable 
for the execution of the treaty. 
If the impossibility is temporary, it may be invoked only as a ground for 
suspending the operation of the treaty.  
 
If a state (say, Ethiopia) signed a treaty that obligates it to patrol its coastline for 
pirates, but it no longer has a coastline, then the state can suspend the treaty on 
the grounds of impossibility. Whether the state can justifiably repudiate the 
treaty will depend on whether there is a possibility that it will get its coastline 
back. There is no real conflict between sovereignty and rational consistency in 
cases of impossibility. Pacta sunt servanda assumes the possibility of fulfillment; 
agreements must be kept only if they can be kept. 
 The second legitimate reason for non-fulfillment is that the responsibility 
is misattributed—that the actions that generated the responsibility were not 
valid acts of state (section 3.5). Either the actions were misrepresentations of the 
state (as in corruption), or the agents who performed the actions were not 
authorized representatives of the state (such as rogue officials or members of an 
unauthorized government). For instance, Mobutu’s debts might be misattributed 
to Zaire either because he used the money for personal enrichment or because 
he was not an authorized representative of Zaire. Repudiation is the only 
justifiable form of non-fulfillment in cases of misattribution. If a responsibility is 
not attributable to the state in the first place, then there is no justification for 
suspending it until a later date so that some subsequent government will have to 
deal with it. The conflict between sovereignty and rational consistency is only 
apparent in cases of misattribution. States do not contradict themselves when 
they refuse to stand by words or actions that were not theirs to begin with. 
 The third legitimate reason for non-fulfillment is non-identity—that the 
allegedly responsible state is not the same state as the one to which the 
responsibility was attributed. Non-identity does not justify non-fulfillment unless 
it is accompanied by non-accession. It has to be shown both that the state in 
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question is not identical to the responsible state and that the state in question 
did not accede to the other state’s responsibilities by agreement, implication, or 
inheritance (section 4.5). For example, if the Russian Federation were 
(counterfactually) discontinuous with the Soviet Union, this would not 
necessarily mean that the Russian Federation can justifiably repudiate all of the 
Soviet Union’s debt. Total repudiation would be justified only if the Russian 
Federation did not explicitly or tacitly agree to assume the Soviet Union’s debts 
and did not claim any of its property. But if non-fulfillment were justified at all, it 
would have to take the form of repudiation rather than suspension. A state 
cannot justifiably defer fulfillment of a responsibility that does not belong to it in 
the first place. In cases of non-identity, as in cases of misattribution, the conflict 
between sovereignty and rational consistency is only apparent. Pacta sunt 
servanda presupposes identity; a state need not keep an agreement that some 
other state made. 
 The fourth legitimate reason for non-fulfillment is misdistribution—that 
it is unjustifiable to distribute the costs of fulfilling the responsibility to the 
state’s subjects. This is the kind of reason that Runciman’s (2007: 106) example 
suggests: the debt is attributable to the state, and the state in question is the 
same state as the one that borrowed the money, but the subjects of the state 
overwhelmingly object to the debt. It is in cases such as this that sovereignty and 
rational consistency truly collide. Either the objections prevail over the debt, or 
the debt prevails over the objections.  
 The objections ought to prevail only if two conditions are met. First, the 
distribution must be burdensome. Objections to fulfilling an otherwise valid 
responsibility are normatively significant only if the costs to subjects of fulfilling 
that responsibility are materially significant. The state’s imperative to fulfill its 
responsibilities outweighs subjects’ objections when the costs to those subjects 
are negligible. A burdensome debt might be misdistributed, but a diffuse debt 
cannot be. Second, subjects must lack a genuine presence in the actions that 
generated the responsibility. The claim of ‘absence’ is easiest to make for 
intergenerational responsibilities. If the state incurred a debt 100 years ago, then 
the current subjects might claim that the government that borrowed the money 
discounted their interests in favour of the interests of the subjects of the time. 
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The plausibility of this claim will depend on what the money was used for and 
whether the state had effective internal and external objection mechanisms at 
the time of attribution. But the retrospective objection mechanism is ultimately 
the decisive one; it is up to current subjects to judge whether past governments 
have adequately represented their interests. The claim of absence is more 
difficult to make when the responsibility in question is intragenerational. 
Although there is a strong presumption that most subjects have a presence in the 
actions of an authorized government, claims of absence are still possible. 
Subjects might object to the debt on the grounds that it served the government’s 
interests rather than theirs. In any case, in order for non-fulfillment to be 
justified on grounds of misdistribution, the responsibility in question must be 
burdensome, and subjects must lack a genuine presence in the actions that 
generated it. And if nonfulfillment is justified on grounds of misdistribution, then 
it has to take the form of repudiation rather than suspension. If the current 
subjects do not have a genuine presence in the state’s debt, much less will future 
subjects. 
 There is one final reason for non-fulfillment: forgiveness. A creditor or an 
injured party can release a state from its debts or reparative obligations, even if 
the responsible state does not have a legitimate reason to suspend or repudiate 
them. This might be done in order to bring about peace, reconciliation, or 
economic development. Forgiveness is unlike the previous four reasons in that it 
is a matter of charity rather than a matter of right. States have a right to suspend 
or repudiate responsibilities in cases of impossibility, misattribution, non-
identity, and misdistribution, but forgiveness depends entirely on the good will 
of the party to which the responsibility is owed. 
     *** 
 Distribution is essentially the flipside of attribution. Just as authorization 
determines whose actions are attributable to the state, it determines to whom 
the costs of fulfilling the consequent responsibilities ought to be distributed. The 
Hobbesian account of distribution thus uses the same vocabulary as the 
authorization account of distribution. The crucial difference is that it takes 
seriously the fact that there are many subjects who cannot plausibly, or even 
possibly, count as authors of the state’s responsibilities. The idea of 
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authorization by fiction fills the gap. Although incapable subjects and future 
subjects cannot truly be authors of the state’s responsibilities, they can be fictive 
authors, provided that there are mechanisms that give them a presence in the 
state’s actions.  
 This chapter has focused squarely on distributing liability from the state 
to its subjects. It is worth mentioning that there are other ways of apportioning 
the costs of reparations and debts. May (2012: 194) proposes “a worldwide no-
fault insurance scheme” in which “every State of the world would have to pay 
into a fund that would be used to pay all restitution and reparations at the end of 
war or mass atrocity” (emphasis in original). There is already something like a 
global insurance scheme for sovereign debt, though it leaves a lot to be desired. 
Creditors can buy insurance to protect themselves against the risk of default, and 
the International Monetary Fund serves as a ‘lender of last resort’. As it stands, 
there is no global insurance scheme for reparations, and the creation of one 
seems a long way off. State responsibility will remain the primary mechanism for 
allocating the costs of large-scale international obligations for the foreseeable 




















THE FUTURE OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 
 
 
 What makes the Hobbesian theory of state responsibility a ‘political’ 
theory is that it is built from the basic concepts of representative politics. Unlike 
the agential theory, which requires the metaphysics of corporate agency, the 
Hobbesian theory requires only the concepts of authority and representation. 
There are no corporate wills or intentions; there are only authors, 
representatives, and the fiction of state personality. But unlike the functional 
theory, which elides issues of legitimacy, the Hobbesian theory puts them at the 
forefront. To act in the name of the state is not just to perform a governmental 
function; it is to provide a plausible representation of the state, and to do so with 
authority. The central claim of the Hobbesian theory is that states are 
responsible for the actions of their authorized representatives. The best 
vocabulary with which to talk about state responsibility is that of authorization 
and representation, not that of agency and intentionality, nor that of organs and 
functions. This Conclusion summarizes the payoffs of the Hobbesian theory and 
then looks to the future of state responsibility. 
 One advantage of the Hobbesian theory is that it accords well with the 
ways that we commonly think about state responsibility. When there is a dispute 
about whether a state owes money, we do not ask, ‘did the person who borrowed 
the money act according to the state’s will?’ Although we might ask, ‘did the 
person who borrowed the money perform a governmental function?’, only a 
lawyer would stop there. We would also ask whether the person was authorized, 
whether he acted within his authority, and whether borrowing the money was a 
plausible representation of the state. The idea of odious debt has such broad 
resonance outside the legal world precisely because we tend think in these 
terms. The Mobutu government’s debt is intuitively different from the American 
government’s debt because Mobutu’s claims of authorization and representation 
were far less credible. 
 The more fundamental advantage of the Hobbesian theory is that it 
corresponds better to the conceptual structure that is implicit in the practice of 
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state responsibility. The agential and functional theories rely on analogies that 
fail to adequately capture this structure. The analogy between states and human 
beings, which underpins the agential theory, is sometimes a helpful heuristic. 
Thinking of treaties as interpersonal contracts and of reparations as torts might 
well be useful. Yet the analogy becomes misleading if we put too much stock in it. 
Unlike individuals, states act only vicariously; they merge and divide; and the 
process of distributing the state’s responsibilities to its subjects has no 
individual-level analogue. The analogy of a principal-agent relation, which 
underpins the functional theory, is to some extent a helpful corrective, but it 
comes with blind spots of its own. Unlike principals, states cannot authorize their 
own representatives. Their representatives are authorized by their subjects, who 
are ultimately liable for what those representatives do. The principal-agent 
analogy illuminates the relation between the state and its representatives but 
obscures the equally important relation between its representatives and its 
subjects. State responsibility has a conceptual structure that neither analogy fully 
captures: subjects authorize representatives; those representatives act in the 
name of the state; responsibility for their actions attaches to the state; the state 
persists over time as long as it continues to be represented; and the costs of 
fulfilling the state’s responsibilities are distributed to its subjects. 
 One important implication of the Hobbesian theory is that state 
responsibility should be reparative rather than retributive. Since states do not 
have wills or intentions, they cannot truly be culpable or guilty (section 3.4). 
‘Blaming’ a state is metaphorical if it is meaningful at all. The purpose of holding 
states responsible for wrongdoing is to repair harms and to prevent future 
wrongdoing. We should think of reparations as compensation, not as punitive 
damages. We should think of sanctions as means to change behaviour, not to 
punish ‘criminal’ states. The appropriate outlet for retribution is international 
criminal law, not state responsibility. 
 The functional theory also implies that we should abandon retributive 
understandings of state responsibility, and for precisely the same reason. But 
whereas the functional theory provides only an instrumental justification for 
holding states responsible, the Hobbesian theory provides a genuinely normative 
justification. Proponents of the functional theory typically see state 
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responsibility as a crude, albeit useful, mechanism for allocating costs. As 
Cassese (2005: 241) argues, “the international community is so primitive that 
the archaic concept of collective responsibility still prevails”. The implication is 
that, in a more developed international community, state responsibility should 
be replaced with “a feasible alternative to the current system … that does more 
good, overall” (Murphy, 2010: 311), such as a global insurance scheme. As I have 
suggested, there are good reasons to develop alternative mechanisms for 
allocating the costs of reparations and sovereign defaults, since there are some 
cases in which the costs cannot or should not be allocated to the subjects of the 
wrongdoer or debtor state. But even if we had alternative cost-allocation 
mechanisms, we would still have compelling normative reasons to hold states 
responsible. The authors of a wrong or a debt ought to bear the costs in the first 
instance, even if the costs could be pooled or shifted. The Hobbesian theory thus 
provides a non-retributive conception of state responsibility that is still 
genuinely normative. 
I conclude with some speculative remarks about three ongoing 
developments that might alter the practice of state responsibility as we know it: 
the development of international criminal law; the proliferation of treaties and 
international arbitration; and the development of new technologies, such as 
autonomous vehicles and weapons.  
 
C.1 International Criminal Law 
 Since the end of the Second World War, there has been a trend toward 
holding individuals responsible for acts of state. The Nuremberg and Tokyo 
Trials are often credited with establishing international criminal law, although 
the idea has much earlier origins (Crootof, 2016: 1358-60; Van Schaack and Slye, 
2007). The International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the Former 
Yugoslavia reinforced the norm that state officials are individually responsible 
for their actions, and this norm has become firmly entrenched with the creation 
of the International Criminal Court. Although there has been some notable 
opposition to the Court itself, especially from the United States and the African 
Union (BBC, 2017a; Ralph, 2007), the idea of international criminal 
responsibility is still widely accepted. One might have expected the rise of 
199 
 
international criminal law to bring about the demise, or at least the partial 
decline, of state responsibility, since holding individuals responsible for acts of 
state seems to render state responsibility redundant. Yet state responsibility 
remains central to international law and international relations. 
 There are two reasons why international criminal law has not displaced 
state responsibility. The first is that the two forms of responsibility are 
complementary, not competitive. International law relies on the principle of 
“dual” or “non-exclusive” responsibility: the responsibility of an individual 
neither entails or precludes the responsibility of her state (Bonafè, 2009: 5; 
Nollkaemper, 2003). State responsibility and individual responsibility can even 
coincide. For instance, a state and its officials can be held concurrently 
responsible for the very same act of genocide. There is a ‘division of labour’ 
between the two forms of responsibility: “the principal distinction between 
individual and state responsibility … is the difference between criminal liability 
and ‘civil’ liability” (Reid, 2005: 798). Whereas state responsibility is concerned 
with repairing harm and preventing future wrongdoing, international criminal 
law is concerned with punishing wrongdoers. The two forms of responsibility 
can coexist because they have fundamentally different purposes. 
 The deeper reason that the rise of individual responsibility has not led to 
the decline of state responsibility is that neither form of responsibility is capable 
of serving the purpose of the other. There is no other rational way to draw up the 
division of labour. On one hand, as I have argued, it is a mistake to try to 
criminalize state responsibility. Since states cannot be culpable, the outlet for 
retribution has to be found in international criminal law. On the other hand, 
trying to extract compensation from individuals would often be futile. State 
officials rarely have enough resources to pay reparations for large-scale wrongs, 
so restitution has to be sought from the states that they represent. Further, even 
if individual responsibility could replace state responsibility for wrongdoing, it 
could not replace state responsibility in general. States would continue to be the 
primary bearers of debts and treaty obligations even if they no longer bore 
reparative obligations. There is thus no reason to expect the development of 
international criminal law to spell the decline of state responsibility, or even a 
reduction in its domain. 
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C.2 The Proliferation of Treaties 
Another important development since the end of the Second World War is 
the enormous expansion in both the number and the scope of international 
treaties. There are currently over 560 multilateral treaties registered with the 
United Nations, which cover everything from navigation to trade to drug control 
(UNTC, 2018). In addition, there are thousands of bilateral treaties. The 
proliferation of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) is especially striking. From 
1989 to 2017, the number of BITs in force has ballooned from 385 to nearly 
3,000 (UNCTAD, 2000: 1; UNCTAD, 2017: 111). These treaties are designed to 
protect the interests of foreign investors, typically by preventing expropriation 
of their assets and allowing them to use international arbitration instead of the 
host state’s courts to resolve disputes. As treaties proliferate, the domain of state 
responsibility becomes increasingly broad. 
 The proliferation of treaties increases the tension between sovereignty 
and rational consistency, as domestic policy goals frequently come into conflict 
with treaty obligations. A sovereigntist backlash has already begun, especially 
among developing states: “Between 1 January 2016 and 1 April 2017, 
terminations became effective for at least 19 IIAs [international investment 
agreements], with more scheduled to take effect later the year … 16 were 
unilaterally denounced” (UNCTAD, 2017: 112). South Africa has replaced most of 
its BITs with investor protection legislation (Schlemmer, 2016), and Ecuador has 
terminated all of its BITs (Olivet, 2017). Some developed states are also taking 
the sovereigntist path, though for different reasons. The United States has 
recently ordered “performance reviews of, inter alia, all bilateral, plurilateral and 
multilateral investment agreements to which the United States is a party” 
(UNCTAD, 2017: 112). Investment treaties often have renegotiation and 
withdrawal provisions (Gordon and Pohl, 2015), which tends to mitigate the 
tension between sovereignty and rational consistency, but many treaties do not. 
It remains to be seen whether the post-war project of a treaty-bound world will 
be able to withstand the sovereigntist backlash. 
 The recent flurry of treaty terminations underscores the importance of an 
account of legitimate repudiation. The risk of allowing repudiation at all is that it 
would undermine the binding force of treaties. Yet a stubborn insistence that 
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agreements must always be kept would also undermine the project of a treaty-
bound world. There is an important difference between repudiating a treaty 
because it is expedient to do so and repudiating it on grounds of impossibility, 
misattribution, non-identity, or misdistribution (section 5.4). If we refuse to 
make a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate repudiation, then every 
repudiation becomes a direct affront to the principle that agreements must be 
kept. But if we do make this distinction, and we carefully specify the conditions 
under which agreements must be kept, then we have some hope of mitigating the 
damage that the sovereigntist backlash causes. The best way to preserve pacta 
sunt servanda is to admit that there are some limited exceptions to it. 
 
C.3 Cyborg States 
 I have so far assumed that the subjects and representatives of states are 
all either human beings or corporate entities (the members of which are 
ultimately human beings). As Hobbes (2012: Intro. 18) says, the “matter” and the 
“artificer” of the artificial man are both man: the state is both composed of and 
created by human beings. New technologies will force us to revise this 
assumption. The next challenge for state responsibility will come from the 
“internal mechanization” of the state.77 As states rely more and more on 
algorithms to make decisions and on machines to implement them, our 
understanding of state responsibility will have to adapt.  
 Current theories of responsibility, including state responsibility, implicitly 
rely on the ‘tool model’ of technology, which treats technological artefacts as 
extensions of human agency. Hammers, rifles, vehicles, and drones merely 
augment the capacities of the human agents who use them. The European 
Parliament (2017) has recently suggested that the tool model will no longer 
suffice in a world of algorithms, self-driving vehicles, and autonomous weapons: 
“the more autonomous robots are, the less they can be considered to be simple 
tools in the hands of other actors (such as the manufacturer, the operator, the 
owner, the user, etc.)” (Ibid. 6-7). As the learning and decision-making capacities 
of robots become increasingly sophisticated, they become “more and more 
                                                        
77 I take this phrase from Matwyshyn (2010), who analyzes the implications of 
the internal mechanization of corporations. 
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similar to agents that interact with their environment” (Ibid. 6). At a certain 
point, it might no longer be the case that the behaviour of the robot “can be 
traced back to a specific human agent” (Ibid. 7).  
 The problem with autonomous robots is that they can create 
“responsibility gaps” (Matthias, 2004). As the European Parliament (2017: 7) 
argues, “the traditional rules [of civil liability] will not suffice to give rise to legal 
liability for damage caused by a robot, since they would not make it possible to 
identify the party responsible for providing compensation”. Under the traditional 
rules, liability requires recklessness or negligence; people are held liable only for 
harms that they foresaw or should have foreseen. But harms caused by 
autonomous robots might not be foreseeable from the perspective of any 
individual. Suppose that a soldier deploys an autonomous vehicle to deliver a 
load of supplies. All he does is set the destination; the vehicle then uses a 
combination of data and sensors to navigate its way there. Who should be held 
responsible if the vehicle swerves onto the sidewalk and runs over a pedestrian? 
The soldier has a good excuse, since all he did was program the destination. He 
could not have foreseen the accident, let alone prevented it. It is tempting to say 
that the manufacturer of the vehicle is responsible. But unless the manufacturer 
was negligent, or there was a defect in the vehicle, the manufacturer also has a 
good excuse. Autonomous vehicles learn from data that they (or a larger network 
of vehicles) collect along the way, so the accident might have been an 
unfortunate consequence of some combination of data and code that the 
manufacturer could never have foreseen. This is just a simple illustration of a 
responsibility gap that autonomous robots create. Autonomous weapons pose 
more complicated problems (Beard, 2014; Crootof, 2016), as do cases in which 
autonomous robots operate in networks instead of in isolation. 
 Autonomous robots pose a particular problem for the rules of attribution. 
As it stands, an act of state requires an act of an individual; the state cannot act 
unless the actions of one or more individuals are attributed to it. So if the actions 
of autonomous robots cannot be traced back to specific individuals, then they 
cannot be attributed to the state either. One possible solution to this problem is 
to treat autonomous robots like agents instead of like tools. If we accept that an 
autonomous vehicle is an agent, then it becomes possible to think of it as a 
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representative. The actions of the vehicle then need not be attributed to the state 
indirectly through some human ‘user’; they could be attributed directly to the 
state. The question would be whether the vehicle was authorized to act in the 
name of the state. 
 If we can attribute the actions of autonomous robots directly to the state, 
then state responsibility itself becomes a way to fill the responsibility gaps that 
autonomous robots create. We could hold the state responsible for harms caused 
by its autonomous robots when the people who manufactured and deployed 
those robots have good excuses, or when it is simply too difficult to trace the 
actions of the robots back to particular individuals. As Crootof (2016: 1390) 
argues, state responsibility provides the most practical way to fill the 
responsibility gaps that autonomous weapons create: “not only is the state in the 
best position to ensure that autonomous weapon systems are designed and 
employed in compliance with international humanitarian law, states will also 
have pockets deep enough to adequately compensate victims of their actions”. 
The development of autonomous robots will likely lead to an expansion in the 
domain of state responsibility, since many existing mechanisms for allocating 
liability will become impossible or impractical. 
     *** 
 The greatest virtue of the Hobbesian theory of state responsibility is that 
it is flexible, like the theory of the state that underpins it. The concepts of 
authorization and representation apply to monarchies as well as democracies, 
corporations as well as states, and robots as well as human beings. We have used 
the same core vocabulary of political representation for centuries, and it has so 
far been able to adapt to great technological and societal changes. This is not to 
say that the Hobbesian theory is timeless. Representative politics will eventually 
become obsolete, just as feudal politics became obsolete. Thinking about state 
responsibility in Hobbesian terms will make sense as long as we continue to rely 
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